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Notice/disclaim: it is necessary to highlight that the content of this study and the 
concepts expressed within, does not reflect in any way the official opinions nor of 
the Italian Government/Italian Armed Forces neither of NATO, or those of any 
other government, organization or individual. No military classified materials have 
been used. All the published sources, pictures, screenshots, reference books etc. are 
available to the public, with the exception of parts of the Exploratory Team 43 study 
material and SIMJOCH related products, which intellectual property belongs to 
their owners. On that regard, the author wants to thank Professor Agostino 
Bruzzone, Head of the SIMCJOH Consortium, the pro tempore Chairman of 
Exploratory Team 43, Professor Erdal Cayirci, and Dr. Armando Geller in his 
capacity of member of the working group, for granting the possibility to access and 
use disclosed items made available for the purpose of the current research.        
Last, but not least, a special thanks goes to Captain (ITA Navy) Vincenzo Milano, 
former Director of the NATO MS COE, who encouraged my PhD endeavour.  
The study itself, made in fulfilment of a PhD in Mathematical Engineering and 
Simulation, it is scientific with regard to the followed methodology, with no 
intentions or purposes other than provide a rigorous inquiry into the subject of 
Hybrid Warfare and Human Behaviour Modelling, not contaminated with value 






MODELLING & SIMULATION HYBRID WARFARE 





The present work has been inspired by the candidate’s membership and active 
commitment inside the NATO Modelling & Simulation Centre of Excellence (from 
2011 to 2018), thus participating at different national and international working 
groups, workshops, conferences and courses, until current days.  
In particular, the candidate acted inside: 
 
1. MSG 139 “NATO M&S User’s Risk Methodology “Task Group:                
the probability that inappropriate application of M&S results for the specific 
intended use will produce unacceptable consequences to the decision maker, had 
driven NATO to create a Modelling & Simulation Task Group, in order to 
optimize the use of V&V resources and minimize risks associated with the 
application of M&S during the development of systems. The Final Report has 
been submitted to NATO in March 2018;  
 
2. SIMCJOH Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving 
Human Modelling project: participation, as Subject Matter Expert, at the 
development of the conceptual model and VV&A process for SIMCJOH 
simulator. SIMCJOH (Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations Involving 
Human Modelling) is a MS2G (Modelling & Interoperable Simulation and 
Serious Game) project for Strategic Decision Making, designed as a HLA 
interoperable immersive framework for the Commander and his staff within 
time-critical decision making over Joint and Multi Coalitions scenarios, 
considering a strong impact of human factors. SIMCJOH was extensively tested, 
verified and validated and finally employed by the author at NATO Modelling 
and Simulation Centre of Excellence during the M&S Basic Course, as 






3. NATO Exploratory Team n.43 on Hybrid Warfare (NATO ET 43):              
a working group on Hybrid Warfare Modelling and Simulation, tasked in early 
2016 to investigate the dynamics of hybrid warfare environments, analyse the 
requirements, survey the existing capabilities, develop a conceptual model and 
finally recommend a follow on in order to properly address the shortfalls 
identified. 
 
In particular, the subject of the “Hybrid Warfare” sparkled the current research.     
As such, all the previous activities were put into a logic order by their contribution 
to the framework of the Hybrid Warfare Modelling and Simulation.  
The Hybrid Warfare phenomena has been framed by the work of Professor 
Agostino Bruzzone (University of Genoa) and Professor Erdal Cayirci (University 
of Stavanger), and thanks to their efforts in June 2016 the NATO Exploratory Team 
n.43 was approved by NATO Modelling & Simulation Group (a panel of the NATO 
Science & Technology Organization) and established with the participation as well 
of Doctor Armando Geller and Lieutenant Colonel Paolo Di Bella. The author 
brought his personal contribution within the ET43 by introducing insights coming 
from the lecture of “Fight by the minutes: Time and the Art of War (1994)”, written 
by Lieutenant Colonel US Army (Rtd.) Robert Leonhard. In such work, Leonhard 
extensively developed the concept that “Time”, rather than geometry of the 
battlefield and/or firepower, is the critical factor to tackle in military operations and 
by extension in the Hybrid Warfare domain. The critical reflection about the time - 
both in its quantitative and qualitative dimension - in a hybrid confrontation it is 
addressed and studied inside SIMCJOH, a software built around challenges that 
imposes literally to “Fight by the minutes”, echoing the concept expressed in the 
eponymous work.  
Furthermore, the author, capitalizing on his personal experience as Officer deployed 
in several missions abroad in Iraq and Afghanistan, integrated this analysis with 
time management in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Train Advice Assist (TAA) and 
Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. In this contest, the mass of the military 
apparatus appears to asymptotically decelerate into an endless commitment. 
Moreover, Hybrid Warfare – which, we will see, by definition and purpose aims to 
keep the military commitment of both aggressor and defender at the lowest level- 






them into a weapon, as in the case of mass migrations, as it is examined in the “Dies 
Irae” simulation architecture. Currently, since migration is a very sensitive and 
controversial issue among the public opinions of many European countries, 
cynically leveraging on a humanitarian emergency caused by an exogenous, 
inducted migration, could result in a high level of political and social 
destabilization, which indeed favours the concurrent actions carried on by other 
hybrid tools. Other kind of disruption however, are already available in the arsenal 
of Hybrid Warfare, such cyber threats, information campaigns lead by troll factories 
for the diffusion of fake/altered news, etc. From this perspective the author 
examines how the TREX (Threat network simulation for REactive eXperience) 
simulator is able to offer insights about a hybrid scenario characterized by an 
intense level of social disruption, brought by cyber-attacks and systemic faking of 
news. Furthermore, the rising discipline of “Strategic Engineering”, as envisaged by 
Professor Agostino Bruzzone, when matched with the operational requirements to 
fulfil in order to counter Hybrid Threats, it brings another innovative, as much as 
powerful tool, into the professional luggage of the military and the civilian 
employed in Defence and Homeland security sectors.  
This thesis is then structured as follows: chapter 1 describes the theoretical 
framework developed in order to understand and properly address the concerns 
posed by Hybrid Threats, in accordance with the Modelling and Simulation (M&S) 
established foundations and the work of ET 43; chapter 2, with the use of M&S 
tools and techniques, concrete hybrid scenarios are explored in the contest of a 
Hybrid Conflict/Military Operation Other Than War (CAPRICORN simulator), 
with the challenges posed by an exogenous, massive phenomena of mass migration 
pressing the gates of Europe (examined though the lens of a proposed simulation 
architecture named “Dies Irae”), and by terrorist attacks coupled with a campaign of 
truth defacing (T-REX simulator). Then in chapter 3, with the support of M2SG 
technology and in particular the SIMCJOH simulator, the time concern will be 
addressed within the frame of a tactical situation, however capable to escalate into a 
serious strategic blunder because of mismanagement of time and human factors. 
The results from the reiteration of SIMCJOH scenarios will be displayed with 
insights.  
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GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS 
 
ACLED: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project  
AFOSR: Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
ABMS: Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation  
ABSS: Agent-Based Social Simulation 
ACT: Allied Command Transformation (NATO) 
AJP: Allied Joint Publication (NATO) 
AMSP (NATO): Allied Modelling & Simulation Publication  
ANA: Afghan National Army 
ANOVA: Analysis of Variance 
ANP: Afghan National Police  
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C2: Command and Control 
C2IS: Command and Control Information 
C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Intelligence 
CAPRICORN: CIMIC And Planning Research In Complex Operational Realistic 
Network 
CAVE: Cave Automatic Virtual Environment 
CAX: Computer Assisted eXercise 






CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological e Nuclear  
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency  
CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation (NATO) 
CMA: Civil Military Affairs (US Army) 
CLARION: Combined Land Air Representation of Integrated Operations 
CLD: Causal Loop Diagram 
CoA: Course of Action 
CoE: Centre of Excellence 
COIN: Counter Insurgency  
CONOPS: Concept of Operations 
COP: Common Operating Picture 
DARPA: Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DBN: Dynamic Bayesian Network  
DBNL: Distributed Networked Battle Labs  
DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations) 
DHSS: Defence and Homeland Security Simulation 
DIS: Distributed Interactive Simulation 
DIES IRAE: Disasters, Incidents and Emergencies Simulation Interoperable Relief 
Advanced Evaluator  
DIMEFIL: Diplomatic/Political, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, 
Intelligence, Legal  






DON: Distributed Observer Network  
DOE: Design of Experiment 
DoD: Department of Defence (USA) 
DVx2: Distributed Virtual eXperience and eXercise 
ELINT: Electronic signals Intelligence  
ET: Exploratory Team 
EU: European Union 
EW: Electronic Warfare  
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization  
FOM: Federation Object Model  
GESI: GEfechts-SImulation System 
GIROA: Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
GM V&V: Generic Methodology for Verification and Validation 
GO: Governmental Organization 
GOTS: Government Off-The-Shelf 
GUI: Graphic User Interface  
HABITAT: Harbour Traffic Optimization System  
HADR: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations 
HBM: Human Behaviour Modelling  
HSCBM: Human Social Culture Behaviour Modelling. 






HLA: High Level Architecture  
HT: Hybrid Threat 
HTL: Human in The Loop 
HTN: Hierarchical Task Network 
HUMINT: Human Intelligence 
HW: Hybrid Warfare 
IA: Intelligent Agent  
IA&O: Influence Activities and Outreach  
IA-CGF: Intelligent Agent - Computer Generated Forces  
IA-CGF NFC: Intelligent Agent Computer Generated Forces Non-Conventional 
Framework 
IAW: In Accordance With 
IC: International Community 
ICT: Information and Communications Technology  
IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons  
IED: Improvised Explosive Device  
IOM: International Organization for Migration 
IoT: Internet of Thinghs 
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force 
ISTAR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance  
ISIL/ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant 






IT²EC: International Training Technology Exhibition & Conference  
I/ITSEC: Inter-service/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference 
IW: Irregular Warfare 
JESSI: Joint Environment for Serious Games, Simulation and Interoperability 
JISR: Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
LIC: Low Intensity Conflicts 
LVC: Live Virtual Constructive 
MEL/MIL: Main Events List/Main Incidents List   
M & S: Modelling & Simulation  
MSC-LES: Modelling & Simulation Centre -  Laboratory of Enterprise Solutions  
MSCO: (US) Modelling and Simulation Coordination Office 
MoM: Measures of Merits  
MOOTW: Military Operations Other Than War 
M&S COE: NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence 
MS2G: Modelling, interoperable Simulation and Serious Game  
MSG: (NATO) Modelling and Simulation Group 
MSHE: Modelling and Simulation of the Hybrid Environments 
MURM: Modelling & simulation User Risk Methodology 
NAC: North Atlantic Council 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration  






NCF: Non Conventional Framework 
NDPP: NATO Defence Planning Process 
NEC: Network Enabled Capabilities 
NETN FOM: NATO Education and Training Network FOM 
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NLC: Non-Lethal Capabilities 
N2M2C2: NATO Net-enabled Capability (NEC) Command and Control (C2)       
Maturity Model 
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OMT: Object Model Template 
ONR: Office of Naval Research 
OOP: Object Oriented Programming 
OPNET: Optimum Network Simulator  
OSINT: Open Source Intelligence 
PKO: Peace Keeping Operation 
PLA: People’s Liberation Army (China) 
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PMSEII-PT:  Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information –  
Physical Environment & Time 
PSYOPS: Psychological Operations  
R&D: Research and Development 
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SASO: Stability and Support Operations 
SOFA: Status Of Force Arrangements 
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SFA: Security Force Assistance 
SIMCJOH: Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving Human 
modelling  
SIMCJOH VIC: Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving Human 
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SIMCJOH VIS: Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving Human 
modelling Virtual Interoperable Simulator  
SISO: Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization  
SISO RPR FOM: SISO Real-time Platform Reference Federation Object Model 
SME: Subject Matter Experts  






SPIDER: Simulation Practical Immersive Dynamic Environment for Reengineering  
STO (NATO): Science and Technology Organization 
STRATCOM: Strategic Communication 
TAA: Train, Advice, Assist 
T-REX: Threat network simulation for REactive eXperience  
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UGV: Unmanned Ground Vehicles 
UN: United Nations 
UNTSO: Unites Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
UNIFIL: United Nation Interim Force In Lebanon (UN) 
UNFLIE: United Nation Force for Large Improvement of Eblanon (fictional) 
UNICAL: University of Calabria 
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1. Introduction: Modelling and Simulation for Hybrid 
       Environment (MSHE) 
 
The objective of the present introduction is to understand the description of hybrid 
environments, to identify the M&S requirements with regard to hybrid threats, and 
finally point out M&S shortfalls and ways for addressing/mitigate them.            
What follows is an extract of the work carried out by the NATO Exploratory Team 
43 between 2016 and 2017, and scientific papers co-presented by the Author at 
2018 WAMS workshop, framed within the applicable and relevant M&S 
foundations. In particular, it is introduced an overview of Agent Based Modelling 
(ABM) in the DIMEFIL/PMESII domains, with a survey of the current M&S tools 
available. Finally, we will present two other perspectives which address the issue of 
Hybrid threats, and in conclusion, we will compare those with the findings of 
NATO ET 43. 
 
1.1 Hybrid Warfare: Seed and Evolution        
 
Hybrid derives from Latin hibrida, meaning the offspring of two creatures, which is 
indeed an appropriate term to describe such phenomena. One of the first researcher   
who introduced the concept of Hybrid Warfare was Lieutenant Colonel US Army 
(Rtd) Frank G. Hoffman, who described it as the “convergence of the physical and 
the psychological, the kinetic and non-kinetic, and combatants and non-combatants, 
of states and non-states actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with”. 
Hybridity, more broadly, means complexity and multi-dimensionality (Hoffman, 
2009).  
Adopting this perspective, it is possible to track back the genesis of the Hybrid 
Warfare to the work of two PLA Chinese Colonels (Liang, Q. & Xiangsui, W.), 
which in 1999 wrote a book called “Unrestricted Warfare”. They argued that 
Warfare in the modern world will no longer be defined just by military means — or 
even involve the military at all (sic!); instead, society is the battlefield, and so wars 
would inevitably encompass attacks on all elements of society without limits. 
Indeed, their thesis was quite revolutionary for the ‘90s, characterized by the post-
Cold War posture and the highly (successfully) kinetic military operations named 






years, that they have been the Precursors/Prophets of Hybrid Conflict; this because 
indeed nowadays war “is using all means, including armed force or non-armed 
force, military and non-military, and lethal and nonlethal means to compel the 
enemy to accept one’s interests” (Liang & Xiangsui,1999). Additionally, there isn’t 
a clear distinction between soldiers and civilians, since the fight is taking place 
virtually everywhere; the new battlefields could include environmental warfare, 
financial warfare, trade warfare, cultural warfare, and legal warfare, to name just a 
few (Barno & Bensahel, 2016).  
The opera of Liang & Xiangsui foreshadowed the evolution of geopolitics in the 
21st century, that has revealed the extent to which conflicts have been influenced by 
non-linear actions across what has become known as the Diplomatic/Political, 




Fig. 1 – Sinergy of kinetic, non-kinetic and DIMEFIL (Hoffman, 2009)  
 
A number of state and non-state actors, even individuals (Wittes & Blum, 2015), 
have sought to undertake activities coordinated across the DIMEFIL spectrum that 
challenge the rules of the international order, in order to achieve their political 
goals.  
 
This is what has become known as Hybrid Warfare (Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. 2016). 
Hybrid Warfare is underpinned by comprehensive strategies based on a broad 






unconventional means, overt and covert activities, by military, paramilitary, 
irregular and civilian actors, which are targeted to achieve (geo)political and 













    
 
 
They are directed at an adversary’s vulnerabilities, focused on complicating 
decision making and conducted across the full DIMEFIL spectrum in order to create 
ambiguity and denial. The objective of the owner of the Hybrid Strategy is to 
impose, over the targeted state, the acceptance of a resulting political situation. 
Hybrid Strategies can be applied by both state and non-state actors, through 
different models of engagement, which may vary significantly in sophistication and 
complexity, with the possibility of maintaining economic and diplomatic relations. 
For such reason Adversaries employing hybrid strategies will seek to remain 
ambiguous, either by claiming pursuit of legitimate goals or by keeping their 
activities below a “threshold” and so avoiding a coordinated response from the 
International Community (UN Chart, NATO Article 5). 
FACT BOX 1, HYBRID WARFARE IS:  
 
 HIGHLY INTEGRATED (SYNCHRONIZED)  
 A COMBINATION OF CONVENTIONAL AND 
UNCONVENTIONAL MEANS 
 OVERT AND COVERT ACTIVITIES  
 MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, IRREGULAR AND CIVILIAN 
ACTORS  
 DIRECTED AT AN ADVERSARY’S VULNERABILITIES  
 COMPLICATING DECISION MAKING  
 ACROSS THE FULL DIMEFIL SPECTRUM  
 CREATING AMBIGUITY AND DENIAL  








Fig.2 - Graphic of crisis escalation over time 
 
In order to avoid the response of the International Community, it is of capital 
importance to avoid direct military confrontation if not necessary, even though the 
use of limited (in size of force over time) overt military actions as part of a hybrid 


















FACT BOX 2: HYBRID WARFARE IS: 
 
 COMBINED, POLITICAL, CIVIL AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS. 
 POLITICAL AIMS ACHIEVED THROUGH CONVENTIONAL/REGULAR, 
SUBVERSIVE/IRREGULAR, CRIMINAL/CORRUPT ACTIONS. 
 INCREASED VULNERABILITIES THROUGH GLOBALIZATION 
EMPHASIZED BY TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES. 
 FALL SHORT OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT. 
 COMPLEX PROPAGANDA AND MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS. 
 TARGETED AND COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRESSURE. 
 COMPLICATING, DELAYING AND IMPEDING TIMELY DECISION 
MAKING. 
 BOTH STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR 
 INTRODUCED AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL 






The use of hybrid strategies in conflict are not new, but what is new for NATO is 
the way a wide range of political, civil and military instruments are combined and 
coherently applied, aiming at particular vulnerabilities of targeted nations and 
international organizations in order to achieve strategic objectives.  
From this perspective, Hybrid Warfare could be seen as the “black” counterpart of 
NATO Comprehensive Approach (Cayirci, Bruzzone et all, 2016); in facts “lessons 
learned from NATO operations show that addressing crisis situations calls for a 
comprehensive approach combining political, civilian and military instruments. 
Building on its unique capabilities and operational experience, including expertise 
in civilian-military interaction, NATO can contribute to the efforts of the 
international community for maintaining peace, security and stability, in full 
coordination with other actors. Military means, although essential, are not enough 
on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. The effective 
implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations requires nations, 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations to contribute in a 
concerted effort” ( https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm ). 
However, common to the state and non-state actors is the simultaneous, 
opportunistic, synergistic and sophisticated combination of conventional/regular, 
subversive/irregular and criminal/corrupt actions in designated geographic areas to 
achieve political aims. Globalization, underpinned by technological advances, 
particularly in the field of communications, including those in cyber space, has led 
to increased vulnerabilities in nations and international organizations that can be 
exploited in a variety of scenarios that fall short of direct military conflict. 
Increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks, far reaching complex propaganda and 
disinformation campaigns, as well as targeted and coordinated political and 
economic pressure are indicative of modern hybrid warfare scenarios, which 
represents a challenge to the defence of Allies’ populations and territory, that is 
broader and subtle than just a conventional military threat. Furthermore, hybrid 
strategies aim at complicating, delaying and impeding timely decision making and 
undermining the ability of a country or an Alliance as a whole to respond to such a 
threat swiftly, firmly and effectively. In particular, when modelling the defender in 
a Hybrid contest, it necessary to remind what is the role in NATO attributed to the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC); standing at the very core of the functionality of the 






instance within NATO, overseeing the political and military process relating to 
security issues affecting the whole Alliance. As such, its decision must be taken 
unanimously among members on all issues affecting their peace and security; this 
can and will be exploited as a vulnerability, especially when the owner of the 
Hybrid Strategy appear to be a monocratic apparatus.  
 
 
Fig 3 - Features of typical pluralistic political body vs a typical authoritarian one 
  
Different elements of hybrid strategies will be combined in different ways, resulting 
in the fact that no two Hybrid Strategies will be the same (Caircyi, Bruzzone et al. 
2016). Each individual element of the Hybrid Threat will not necessarily be illegal 
or pose a threat in their own right, but their combination could threaten individual 
Allies or the Alliance. The primary response to hybrid threats or attacks rests 
foremost with the targeted nation, but the wider international community must also 
be prepared to play an important role. No single nation, supranational entity or 
international organization has all the levers needed for a coherent counter to hybrid 
warfare. Modern technology enables even individuals to wield the destructive 






Western Democracies laws and political organization for security have evolved. 
National borders, jurisdictional boundaries, citizenship, and the distinctions 
between national and international, between act of war and crime, and between state 
and private action all offer divides less sharp than they used to. Any nation can face 
attack through channels controlled and operated not only by governments but by 
private “enterprises” as well, and by means against which governments lack the 
ability to defend. Strung together, these issues describe the security future with 
which citizens and governments must now struggle with (Wittes & Blum, 2015). 
For all the above mentioned reasons, any ambition to model hybrid warfare have to 
take in account the extreme volatility of the aggressive means brought into action. 
Having introduced the concept of Hybrid Warfare, in the next paragraphs we will 
examine the findings of the Modelling and Simulation of Hybrid Environments 
(MSHE) task group, with a focus on the human and social behaviour modelling, 
because most of the related work that can be useful in MSHE is from that field.      
A survey of the current available modelling & simulation tools will be presented. 
However, in order to do that, it necessary to introduce the foundations of such M&S 
tools, in terms of employing Social Behaviour Models and Agent Based Simulation 
and their implementation into DIMEFIL modelling process, which is the 
cornerstone of Hybrid Warfare modelling. 
  
1.2 Rationale to employ Models in Hybrid Warfare 
 
A model is a simplified representation - small scale, less detailed, less complex - of 
an empirical target, as for example a social structure, system or phenomenon 
(Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). Rather than studying the empirical target directly, 
because it is impossible or difficult, a model is built that can scale down the target, 
simplify it to make it more tractable or substitute it with analogical examples (e.g., 
the hydraulic model of an economic system or the computer model of the mind). 
Models can perform two fundamentally different representational functions. On the 
one hand, a model can be a representation of a selected part of the world (the ‘target 
system’). Depending on the nature of the target, such models are either models of 
phenomena or models of data. On the other hand, a model can represent a theory in 
the sense that it interprets the laws and axioms of that theory.  






I) Abstraction, which is the degree to which (a model) is simplified to its base 
      form, concept or idea, so that only the important characteristics (based on 
      purpose of model), attributes or behaviors are apparent; 
II) Fidelity, which is the degree to which the representation within a model or 
      simulation is similar to a real-world object, feature, or condition in  
      a measurable or perceived manner; 
III) Resolution: The degree of detail used to represent aspects of the real world 
      or a specified standard or referent by a model or simulation. 
In general, more Abstraction leads to less Fidelity, while Resolution and fidelity are 
mutually exclusive, so you can have a greater degree of one and not the other; this 
depends on what you are trying to accomplish.  The picture below shows, within the 











The model can have a theoretical purpose, for example, understanding macro 
implications of theoretical assumptions about micro processes, or a more empirical 
one, for example, drawing intuitions from existing raw data (Hartmann and Frigg 
2006). Epstein (2008) reported a detailed list of reasons to build models in social 
sciences. They are (not in order of importance): [predict], explain, guide data 
collection, illuminate core dynamics, suggest dynamical analogies, discover new 
questions, promote a scientific habit of mind, bound (bracket) outcomes to plausible 
ranges, illuminate core uncertainties, offer crisis options in near-real time, 
demonstrate trade-offs/suggest efficiencies, challenge the robustness of prevailing 
theory through perturbations, expose prevailing wisdom as incompatible with 
available data, train practitioners, discipline the policy dialogues, educate the 
general public, reveal the apparently simple (complex) to be complex (simple).  
For whatever reason, generally, models make reality more understandable in 
scientific terms, and a significant proportion of research is carried out on them 
rather than on reality itself (Hartmann and Frigg 2006). They have a learning 
function, as scientists can learn about the target exactly because they discover 
features and ascertain facts by manipulating the model. In this case, the model itself 
becomes the “real” object of research as it and only it can be subjected to peer 
scrutiny, extension, testing, and comparison. In many respects, such a categorization 
orients itself along the lines of a scale that has been developed by Axtell and 
Epstein (1994), in which any model can be placed on levels 0 to 3, depending on 
performance and analysis: 
 
a) 0 level model is a “caricature”; 
b) a level 1 model which “is in qualitative agreement with empirical macro-
structures”; 
c) a level 2 model which “produces quantitative agreement with empirical 
macro-structures”; 









Figure 5 - Axtell & Epstein scale of Model (1994), revisited (Di Bella, 2019). 
 
Models that are devised to support real word decision making or training will have 
to be located on levels 2 and 3; in other words, models and simulations that are built 
for the purpose of representing human and social dynamics have to be necessarily 
located on level 2 or higher; therefore, they need to be empirically driven and based, 
and validated across multiple scales (Axell & Epstein, 1994).  
However, between the “entertainment” and “model for social dynamic”, according 
to the author, there could be a sort of buffer zone, where the so called “Serious 
Game” are placed. They merge the ludic characteristic with some degrees of 
“reality”, being able to reproduce inside the game mechanics the behaviour of real 
phenomena; particularly in the case of war-game with historical (the real military 
units that took part in the engagement), geographical (the battleground reproduced 
with its features) and mathematical (attrition and loss) accuracy. Their goals are to 






Among those purposely born for entertainment, worth to mention are rare cases of 
games which turn into a serious game and more, as the fortunate series of paper 
game and PC game named “Harpoon”. Born in the 80’ and computer coded in the 
90’s, over thirty-plus years witnessed how military professionals used the 
commercial product in their official jobs: for education and for training, when they 
used the product to do desktop analysis before engaging in various war games on 
mainframes (e.g., at the US Naval War College) or with actual forces in the field 
conducting live simulations (Gilman & Bond 2016). The RAND Corporation used 
the system to evaluate a Taiwan vs. China engagement (Shlapak, et al. 2000).      
The bitter irony was the inability of the military establishment to adopt a $50 
“game” (Harpoon), even though their multimillion dollar systems only 
accomplished a fraction of the same functionality (Gilman & Bond, 2016). 
 
 
Fig.6 - Harpoon 3 Basic Display (Gilman, 2016) 
 
A recently issued game born with the explicit task of “Entertain & Educate” is 
Command Modern Air Naval Operations (CMANO), declared as the global 
(gaming) simulation of modern warfare at sea, in the air, in space and over land, 
which comes accompanied by a 323 page’s rule book (Matrix Games, 2019). 
 
 






1.3 Multi-Agent and Agent based Simulations 
 
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are a means of understanding the mechanisms which 
are responsible for the macro patterns under scrutiny. The idea is that the macro 
behaviour of social systems can be better understood bottom-up, rather than 
beginning with a set of variables and their predefined relations. Here lies the real 
uniqueness of the ABM approach, compared with other approaches that investigate 
social patterns through the computer (Castellani & Hafferty, 2009). 
ABMs are stochastic simulations that are built around dynamically interacting 
objects called agents, which usually are all of comparable size and scope (Hartley, 
2015). On this regard, human and social dynamics modelling can be only performed 
by means of employing multi-agent simulation technique (Squazzoni, 2012).         
In some ABMs the agents are all identical copies of the same object, while in others 
there are two or more types of agents. The agents have pre-set attributes and 
behaviours; however, the choice of data inputs can dramatically change the model’s 
purported real-world ideal. For example, the same agents in an ABM can represent 
soldiers with a mission in one model and a set of mines in the ocean in another 
model. Generally, ABMs contain some spatial representation, (x, y) or (x, y, z) 
coordinates, that can be used to model real-world distances. Only multi-agent 
simulations concomitantly allow for realistically taking into consideration human 
cognition and behaviour in a social context (Geller, 2016). Many types of agent-
based models exist, and differences can be found in empirical foundations, degree 
and range of validity, and the purpose of agent-based models.  
 
 






Agent based modelling focuses on the individual active components of a system. 
This is in contrast to both the more abstract system dynamics approach, and the 
process-focused discrete event method. With agent based modelling, active entities, 
known as agents, must be identified and their behaviour defined; they may be 
people, vehicles, equipment, or whatever is relevant to the system. When 
connections among them are established and environmental variables set, the 
simulations run and so the global dynamics of the system emerge from the 
interactions of the many individual behaviours (Castellani & Hafferty, 2009). 
The simulations that are most commonly referred to as ABMs have simple sets of 
rules; however, the simulations are dynamic. The rules mesh together during the 
simulation run and produce often surprising, emergent behaviours. The stochastic 
nature of the models and the sensitivity to small changes means that thousands to 
millions of runs are required to understand the range of behaviours, their 
frequencies, and associations with input data. The outcomes are non-linear, that is, 
not predictable beyond small time increments. Further, the results from N iterations 
will likely differ from the results of N + M iterations. The emergence of complex 
behaviours from simple sets of rules is the principal reason for using ABMs; the 
best way to understand the complexity of human interactions is to investigate the 
emergence of complex interactions from simple simulation rules in an ABM 
(Geller, 2016). 
The more complex ABMs incorporate variable behaviours. These ABMs support 
connected sequences of runs in which the results of previous runs are used to 
modify the behaviours in subsequent runs. These ABMs are adaptive and can 
generate the coevolution of the behaviours of one or more groups of agents (sides). 
The ABMs of interest here are the models that include attributes such as emotions, 
opinions, and social grouping valences (Hartley, 2015). These attributes present 
problems because our understanding of the true relationships among such variables 
is poor, and so validating the code is difficult. Further, some ABM proponents 
claim that the primitives that make up the relationships are what should be 
modelled, and that by observing the emergent behaviour users can make 
correlations between these and real-world behaviour. 
The ideal ABM would be a completely protean, content free model in which any 
situation in any portion of reality could be modelled simply by changing the data 






(Hartley, 2015). Thus the dots on the computer screen that the model uses to portray 
the agents can be thought of as individual soldiers or as floating mines. The rules 
governing movement toward or away from other agents can be thought of as social 
rules of liking or disliking or as representing the physical constraints of chains and 
wave action. On that regard, Multi-agent simulations create simplified versions of 
social actors, groups or organizations, along with their behaviours and the 
environments they inhabit; these social actors are called agents, which are 
autonomous and interact with one another to achieve goals (Bonabeau, 2002).  
 
 
Fig. 9 - Agent characteristics 
 
For instance, in a multi-agent model of a football game, the agents are the players, 
coaching and support staffs, referees and spectators. Their environment is composed 
of the stadium and weather. The players have positions, skills, health and physical 
conditions; the coaches, game’s strategies; the referees the same characteristics as 
the players (plus a hidden amount of bias in assigning penalties). Forward, 
midfielder and defence players have common and specialized behaviours. The 
outcomes of these agents’ behaviours depend on the initial conditions of the game 






vision, game reading ability, legs strength and accuracy, along with the weather and 
wind shear. The relationships among these factors are represented as algorithms in 
the simulation, which represent knowledge gained by observation, field surveys, 
and statistical data into computer procedures that describe agent behaviour. 
Algorithms can be more than if-then rules based on empirical data, because agents 
can have memory and learn. For example, the midfielder can remember how many 
times he has passed the ball to the forward and seeing how many have been gone 
through. Since it is difficult to compute outcomes of agents’ interaction 
mathematically, multi-agent models should be simulated by a computer 
(Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). That is why multi-agent models are often rendered 
as simulations.  
Specific studies have been focused on using multi-level agents in complex system 
modelling to derive macro-level group agent behaviours from micro-level agents; 
moreover, different types of agents have been investigated to reproduce proper 
human external behaviour as well as human thinking (Takadama et al. 2007; 2008). 
Indeed, the modelling based on Multi Agents is capable of capturing collective 
effect in simulations resulting from their interactions (Macal et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, human behaviour models have been widely used to investigate 
reaction of populations during emergency situations; multi-agent simulations enjoy 
richness of narrative and rigor of mathematics, because they use data on actors’ 
perceptions, intentions, actions, and reasoning to inform behaviours. They also 
account for the physical space and networks of links among social actors (Axtell 
2000). Multi-agent simulations serve as virtual labs in which a system can be 
recreated as a counterfactual to the world where policies, plans, programs and 
projects are implemented. This property of multi-agent simulations impact 
assessment and program evaluation because it makes attribution of effects to 
specific interventions possible. That is why multi-agent simulations are popular 
tools in designing, analysing and evaluating complex socio natural systems such as 
combat (Ilachinski 2004), civil wars (Epstein 2002; Latek et al. 2013), 
environmental management (Matthews et al. 2007), urban planning (Batty 2007), 
economic development (Geller et al. 2012) and finance (Samanidou et al. 2007; 
Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006) to name a few.  
The simulation of Hybrid Warfare is a very challenging framework as well as the 






implementation (Alam & Geller 2012). Agent Based Modelling and Simulation, as 
already outlined, is the most powerful modelling approach and enables many 
possibilities. Indeed, the use of Object Oriented Programming (OOP), for instance 
using Java, C++ or C#, is a very powerful approach to develop agent driven 
simulations of people and population (Signorile, 2004). In facts from this point of 
view, there are many M&S tools and approach exist that could be used to model and 
simulate population (Zhang 2016). Among them: Repast (Tatara et al. 2006) which 
encapsulates both JAVA/C++, ReLogo that adopt AOP (Ozik et al.2013), 
CORMAS – Common Pool Resource and Multi Agent Systems (Le Page et al. 
2000), Ascape (Parker 2001), MASON (Luke et al. 2005), NetLogo Toolkit 
(Wilensky 1999), Swarm (Minar et al., 1996; Lingnau & Drobnik 1999) and 
AnyLogic (Borshchev et al. 2002). Therefore, most of them are generalist toolkit 
and languages that could be used to build up models and requires obviously the 
severe effort of the model expert to define, implement, characterize and tailor the 
Hybrid Warfare context, based on skills and expertise as always happen in M&S 
(McLeod 1982). However, some of the above mentioned simulations have been 
described (para 1.5) because of their relevance versus MSHE.  
 
1.4. Modelling DIME/PMESII domains for Hybrid Warfare 
 
The exploration of the existing models and simulations relevant to Hybrid Warfare 
must be pre-empted by an explanation of the conceptual framework where the 
hybrid interactions take place, which consist in the DIMEFIL power and the related 
PMESII status (Hillson, 2009; Hartley, 2015; Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. 2016; 
Balaban & Mielniczek, 2018; Bekkers et al. 2019). The acronym DIMEFIL refers to 
Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement level of power of a nation, while PMESII refers to the Political, 
Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure variables that describe 
the status of a situation (state vector). 
Throughout history, governments, groups, organizations (and individuals 
sometimes) have sought to exert influence over others via a range of policies and 
actions, in order to achieve a range of objectives. In the current discourse, the 
components associated with power and influence projection are abstracted into 






Enforcement (DIMEFIL) actions, while the resultant impacts are typically 
characterized as Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, and 
Infrastructural (PMESII) effects. Much more recently, efforts based on social, 
political, and economic theories have attempted to represent, at least in part, limited 
DIMEFIL/PMESII scenarios in a systematic manner suitable for automated 
computer simulation (Hillson, 2009). 
Adopting this perspective, it is evident that modern (and past as well) military 
operations and conflicts cannot be described in purely kinetic effect terms, such as 
damage and kills (Hartley, 2015). Even more than in the past, current military 
operations need the capability to understand the human terrain and the various 
dimension of human behaviour within it (Levis & Elder, 2016). Leonhard (1994) 
regroup military operations as: Peace (Support) Operations (PO/PSO), 
Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster Relief (DR) together HADR, Counter 
Insurgency (COIN), Counter Terrorism (CT), and (Military) Operations Other Than 
War (MOOTW); later operations have been called Stability and Support Operations 
(SASO), and Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction operations (SSTR 
or SSTRO). In this framework, quantitative measure of the popular perception of 
security, the level of support for the indigenous government, the economic stability 
of the country, and other non-strictly and non-military variables are important 
indicators of success. Some tangible non-kinetic effect variables, such as the state of 
infrastructure reconstruction, free elections, are important. The technical approaches 
that have been used to model these operations have generated DIMEFIL, which 
refers to the levers of power that a nation has to influence the PMESII state. 
Examples of individual PMESII states include (US Office Secretary of Defence, 
2009):  
 Political: structure, process, policy, laws, diplomatic standings, plans, etc.  
 Military: status, ROEs, objectives, physical security status, capability, 
morale, etc.  
 Economic: policy, production, norms, behaviours, confidence, etc.  
 Social: perception, opinions, attitudes, norms, networks, demographics, etc. 
 Information: sources, content, coverage, quality, availability, etc.  
 Infrastructure: condition, networks, capability, demand, loads, etc.  
 
Each individual state consists of its current value and associated temporal trend 






categorically across the groups of actors, the socio-behavioural contexts, interaction 
protocols, and the physical environment. 
 
 
Fig.10 - PMESII_PT state vectors vs DIMEFIL levels of power 
 
The performance of operations that required more than kinetic effects (a polite term 
for destructive effects through physical means) drove the development of 
DIMEFIL/PMESII models. Similarly, the development of DIMEFIL/PMESII 
models is driving a need to understand and apply social science theories. Therefore, 
we have a new acronym and term, HSCB Modelling, which stands for Human 
Social Culture Behaviour Modelling. When using the acronym, HSCB, the focus is 
on the theoretical basis of a model whereas, DIMEFIL/PMESII focuses on the 
technical details needed to implement a model. When the focus is on the operations 
being modelled, models may be cited as OOTW, SASO, etc., models; however, it 
has become clear that most of the operations listed above will require 







Fig.11 - Categorization of Military Operations (Hartley, 2015) 
 
 
PMESII models are like other models; they have inputs, logic, and outputs, all 
mediated by variables; however, there was an historical reluctance of military 
modellers to use “soft factors” in their simulations, especially in the Military 
computer combat models of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
Consider figure below in which the PMESII categories have been subdivided. The 
entire complement of those early military models would be contained just in the 








Fig. 12 -PMESII categories (Hartley, 2015) 
 
One can understand that there is an (implicit) assumption when looking at the 
categories of fig. 12: that each of these 27 subcategories is independent of all the 
others. This is obviously not the case, because some of these subcategories are 
probably correlated; for example, good health care might not be found where 
education levels are too low. Thus, there might actually be fewer than 27 
independent dimensions. On the other hand, some of the subcategories are probably 
composites, increasing the actual number of dimensions; on this perspective, the 
true dimensionality can only be approximated. The dimensionality issue causes 
problems with understanding the outputs of a PMESII model, even assuming that it 
is a perfect model. Figure 13 displays an example of a 27-dimensional PMESII 
snapshot of the state of some geopolitical area. A simulation model would generate 








Fig. 13 - PMESII Dimensional radar diagram 
 
A second difference between kinetic models and PMESII models lies in the nature 
of our understanding of their underlying realities. Kinetic models rely on physics, 
which at the gross level is well-understood. The non-kinetic parts of PMESII 
models rely on economics, sociology, psychology, and other very poorly 
understood sciences. Thus not only should the size of the implicit error intervals for 
each variable be increased, but also some of the assumed interaction relationships 
are probably wrong, meaning that is hazardous to compel correlation in a cause-
effect scheme with linear dependencies among them (Hartley, 2015). 
In particular, PMESII system models are (Allen, 2006):  
a) non-linear: the response to multiple inputs it is not the same as the composite 
of the responses of individual input; 
b) non-reversible: don’t always return to the origin, or not along the same path, 
as in a hysteresis cycle; 
c) non-deterministic: future states are uncertain, and the process is stochastic; 
d) non-stationary: statistical properties vary with time; 
e) non ergodic: an unexpected behaviour can rise because the statistical 
description of individuals over time are not the same as the statistical 
description of the whole group at a given time or the whole group over time; 
f) non-invertible: initial conditions of the system cannot be inferred from 
knowledge of the output. 
According to Allen (2006), the PMESII modelling should consist of: 
I) creation of behaviour paradigms from psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
     political science, military, economics, and modelling them using algorithms 






II) creation of databases, model parameters, and initial conditions for any 
      scenario; 
III) actions and effects of real-world users must be translated into definitions 
      that correspond to the model. Finally, the actions can be input as 
      independent variables, the model can be run and the dependent 
      variables/outputs can be observed as effects.  
 
A third important factor is actually common to both types of models, although only 
recently recognized. During the early times of military computer modelling, all 
relationships were assumed to be essentially deterministic, although some required 
stochastic modelling due to inherent measurement errors. Overall, there is every 
reason to believe that PMESII models and the reality they model are also subject to 
these complexity and chaos problems (Hartley, 2015). 
In modelling PMESII, the below approaches have been identified (Hartley, 2015):  
 Segmentation by Agent/Object: the concept is that a few significant persons 
and groups operate as independent actors, with geographically distributed 
demographic categories of people operating as opinion repositories. Events 
(E 1, E 2, …) impact each of the actors/objects (in appropriate ways), with 
impacts propagating to external countries, including active interveners, and 
active NGOs. The active interveners and the NGOs post events to the event 










 Segmentation by PMESII Category:  it describes the PMESII system in terms 
of links and nodes within and among the six PMESII categories, as shown in 
Fig. 16 below. Each category is considered to be a system and must be 
analysed as such. Further, these systems interact with each other, The nodes 
in the HQ DA picture are specific physical, functional, or behavioural 
entities within each system. The nodes can be facilities, forces, people, 
information, or other types of system components. The links are the 
connections between the nodes, which can be physical, functional, or 
behavioural in nature. In addition, the links have a strength-of-connection 
attribute. Node and link analyses will determine potential “decisive points,” 
which help in identifying the centres of gravity. 
 
 
Fig. 15 -View of PMESII System (Hartley, 2015) 
 
 Influence and Causal Networks: The Analysts’ Guide for the Interim Semi-
Static Stability Model (ISSM) - a model that supports understanding the 
evolution of a situation (Hartley, 2006) -  describes a node and link system 
that is divided into sectors with connections among the nodes in each sector 







Fig. 16 - Influence and causal networks (Hartley, 2015) 
 
 
There is visual similarity to the Segmentation concept; however, the nodes 
and links have different meanings. In the ISSM, the nodes are DIME and 
PMESII variables and the links are inferential links, some timeless and 
sometime delayed. There are several levels of variables. While this is a 
relatively simple model, it still has a large number of variables and requires 
some decomposition to support human understanding. The input and 
intermediate variables are divided into six sectors: conflict, economy, 
government, miscellaneous, movement, and needs. These variables feed into 
the variables of the final output, which is divided into the core sector and 
output variable. The relationships among these PMESII variables are shown 
in the upper two-thirds of the inference-diagram in Figure 17; the lower third 
of figure consists of the DIME variables, that is, the variables that represent 
the interventions in the situation being modelled.  
The upper portion derives from the findings of “Doing Windows: Non-
Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies” (Hayes & Sands, 
1997), in which the authors examines how military complex contingency 
operations can be executed in a way that supports long-term political 






The Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM) was the software 
(windows fashioned) built upon such requirements in order to plan and train 
military staff responses to complex emergencies (Figure 18 below).  
The networks created in SIAM can be used to identify important issues, 
actions, or factors that can influence a specific outcome in a given situation. 
SIAM uses Bayesian probability techniques to assess the relationships 
among factors, and as such its results are probabilistic, not deterministic, or 
better not predictive; it is a tool designed for performing “what if” analysis. 
 
 
Fig. 17 – SIAM screenshot 
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Hayes_Doing_Windows.pdf 
 
In this contest it is necessary indeed to understand the role of Static Models, Time, 
and Feedback Loops. 
Time flows in the real world and actions cause reactions. These reactions are 
feedback loops, sometimes acting to damp the original actions (negative feedback) 






Negative and positive feedback are clocked by time, which affects and drives 
decisions; population, friendly forces, insurgent – each of them view/perceive time 
its own way and pursue its objective according to such perception (Di Bella, 2019). 
Static models are representations of situations at a given instant and thus not 
capable of representing feedback loops. Modelling situations over time is directly 
addressed by simulation, e.g., discrete event simulation, time-stepped simulation, 
continuous simulation, or system dynamics (Fujimoto, 2000). Simulation models 
can include feedback loops; however, the existence of feedback loops is dependent 
on what was programmed to be a part of the model, not the fact that it is a 
simulation.  
A choice then must be done with regard to closed form models – which are built to 
run without human intervention – and Human in the loop models. Closed form 
models are easier to use and avoid the uncontrollable variability of human decisions 
inside the model run. Human-in-the-loop models allow for simpler formal models 
by substituting available humans’ mental models for portions of the total model. 
Human-in-the-loop models require increased complexity in their use to mitigate 
human variability and simply because of the increased staffing demand. 
Other issue to be addressed is the Complexity; more complex (i.e., complicated) 
models can support finer granularity. Finer granularity supports, but does not 
guarantee, more precision and accuracy (Sokolowski, 2010; Tolk, 2012); 
accordingly, more complex models require more input data and are harder to 
examine for problems. Simple models usually run faster and take less time to set up 
and analyse. A model of a complex adaptive system is different from a complicated 
one. Indeed, the underlying real-world system that is the subject of a PMESII model 
is a complex adaptive system; however, the PMESII model may or may not be 
constructed to address typical complex adaptive systems questions (Hartley, 2015). 
The problems specific to modelling DIMEFIL/PMESII factors can be divided into 
four categories: variables, relationships, invariants, and data. So it is necessary to 
answer the following questions: 
 Variables: What are the relevant variables and who says so? Which variables 
influence each variable and who says so?  
 Relationship: What is the functional relationship between influencing 






deterministic and which are probabilistic and who says so? What are the 
distributions for the probabilistic relationships and who says so? 
 Invariant: Which of these things are invariant with scenario because they 
describe “human nature” and who says so? How do the non-invariant things 
vary with scenario variations and who says so? 
 Data: What are the proper data to use as inputs and who says so? What do the 
“answers” mean and who says so? 
These problems are compelling and they impact the creation of models and the level 
of believability in their results, and make hard to build and use DIMEFIL/PMESII 
models. However, real people (governments) do make decisions in the problem 
space that DIMEFIL/PMESII models should address, and so, absent a formal 
model, these people use mental, conceptual DIMEFIL/PMESII models, which 
means that initially any formal model is based on a mental model; furthermore, a 
formal model can be more easily viewed as separate from the user and, thus, be 
used as an advisory tool.  
For what concern Verification and Validation (V&V) of PMESII models, V&V 
itself consists of processes that are difficult to perform for any model, with the 
corollary that a complete verification and validation of large simulations is virtually 
impossible. However, V&V for PMESII models must possess three key features 
(Hartley, 2015): 
 continuous, in the sense that they occur throughout the phases of model 
conceptualization, development, deployment, operation, refinement. 
However, this feature is applicable to any V&V process (Youngblood et al. 
2000; IEEE 2007; Roza et al. 2012; Bruzzone et al. 2017b; MSG 139 final 
report, 2018);  
 entrenched, meaning that it must be ensured that the users do not violate 
bounds such altering parameter settings, initial conditions or model choice 
(employ an inappropriate model);  
 people-centric” i.e., deal with education and training of model creators, 
users, supporters, customers).  
However, it is important to realize that the particular humans who are “in the loop” 
are part of the model. Their expertise (or lack thereof) informs their mental models 
which guide their actions. Some effort must be expended in identifying and taking 






In such perspective, the Modelling & Simulation User Risk Methodology (MURM), 
as developed within the frame of NATO MSG 139 (Youngblood et al., 2018) is able 
to assess the probability that inappropriate application of M&S results for the 
specific intended use will produce unacceptable consequences to the decision 
maker. This calls for the necessity to optimize the use of V&V resources to 
minimize risk associated with the application of M&S during the development of 
systems. In any case, it is important to keep in mind that the level of fidelity of a 
PMESII model to the real world cannot be expected to be as high as that of a kinetic 
model - we simply do not know enough about DIMEFIL/PMESII interactions to 
produce theories concerning these interactions that are as good as our theories about 
kinetic interactions (Hartley, 2015); for the reasons above, such models will be 
affected by an inferior knowledge when compared to kinetic models, and to the bias 
of value judgement. V&V toward PMESII should be able at least to register and 
possibly measure, at any moment of the model development process, any such 
influence. 
In conclusion, the DIME/PMESII taxonomy, with DIME integrated with Financial, 
Intelligence, and Law enforcement yielding DIMEFIL, and PMESII integrated with 
PT (Physical environment and Time), as a general concept is entirely adequate. 
Having DIMEFIL stand for all of the intervention options and letting PMESII stand 
for a set of descriptors of the situation, this allows us to organize our thinking when 
modelling Hybrid Warfare. 
 
1.5 MODELS AND SIMULATION RELEVANT TO HYBRID 
      WARFARE 
 
Having go past the necessary taxonomy, the next two paragraphs presents an 
extensive - however incomplete - review of multi-agent models of armed conflict of 
Irregular Warfare (IW), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and social 
behaviour models and simulations developed in the United States and in Europe 
since mid-1990s, in order to provide a general understanding of research trends in 
this domain. Most models selected can be characterized as increasingly mature 
efforts to develop basic multi-agent technologies for specific conflict contexts, like 
peace support operations like post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Some are 






standalone narrative or mathematical analysis: they all include concepts of agency, 
purpose, actions and interactions. Doctor Armando Geller (2016) provided a survey 
of those models, and NATO ET 43 Working Group deemed those models relevant 
to Hybrid Warfare. What follows it is a review of the current M&S tools relevant to 
Hybrid Warfare modelling, built in US and in Europe. In Appendix 1 it is reported a 
table which reports the main topics of the models. 
To facilitate model review, ET 43 has broken down the description of each model 
into three parts, corresponding to three stages of the life cycle of a model as: Vision, 
Development, Use.  
 
 
Figure 18 – Visualization of a Model’s Life Cycle 
 
Vision:  The first part dissects the vision—the purpose—that spurs the development 
and usage of a model. It summarizes practical and theoretical needs that give rise to 
a model; determines whose needs the model is designed to meet, who has built the 
model, and who has funded the development effort. It also discusses the uses for 
which the model is built, be it decision and analytic support, theoretical exploration 
or technology demonstration. Finally, vision examines the anticipated life cycle of 
the model and how the model is meant to integrate with existing platforms. 
Development: the second part, labelled development, is dedicated to making sense 
of the components of the model and the data and technology that go into building 
the model. In this part it is defined the scope of the model and detail various types 
of model agents and the model environment, and interactions between agents and 
the environment and between subsequent states of the environment.  
Use: the last part is called use. Here we delve into model verification, validation and 






developers, sponsors and third parties. Finally, the known strength and the known 
shortfall of the model/simulator are outlined. 
 
1.5.2 North American Models 
 
In this section we will describe 6 prominent models of conflict developed in the US: 
 Regional Threat Evaluator (RTE); 
 Senturion; 
 Political Science - Identity (PS-I) modelling platform; 
 Afriland & Rebeland; 
 FactionSim & NonKin Village; 
 A model of political economy of Afghanistan. 
 
Regional Threat Evaluator (RTE) 
Vision: In a joint effort, Defence and Academia developed the Regional Threat 
Evaluator (RTE), as a multi-agent network model of state failure (Louie & Carley 
2008). Research on state failure attracted US government funds because by mid 
2000s, defence establishment, homeland security agencies and intelligence 
community had quietly replaced simplistic explanations of international terrorism 
like “They hate our freedoms” with more nuanced, but empirically shaky, 
hypotheses, linking terrorism incidents to “grievances” of populations who were 
supposedly trapped in a vicious circle: dysfunctional states failed to provide basic 
services to their citizens; thus, radicalizing individuals, some of whom would resort 
to terrorism, weakening the state ever more to “failure”, at which point the state 
would crumble and turn into a safe haven for terrorist groups. 
RTE evaluates answers to questions such as: How does the likelihood of state 
failure change in the event of a natural disaster? How do increased levels of 
terrorism in a country affect the likelihood of state failure? These questions mean 
that at least in theory, the model was designed to address the link between terrorism 
in weak states such as Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The model is based on the 
integration of multiple theories of social, psychological, and economic behaviour 
that collectively account for why an agent takes action and what actions the agent 









Fig. 19 – RTE conceptual model (Center for Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems - CASOS) 
 
The basic idea behind RTE is that inter-group conflict is due to a combination of 
tension and social comparison, the effects of which can be modulated by social 
pressure. Perceptions of high tension and relative disadvantage with respect to other 
agents induce agents to engage in hostile actions whereas lower tension and higher 
advantage lead them to non-hostile actions. An influential agent can exercise 
influence over other agents to escalate or de-escalate the impact of tension and 
social comparison in their behaviour. Specifically, an agent who is influenced by 
others who themselves are tense or feel deprived feel tenser and more deprived than 
an agent surrounded by others who are less tense or less deprived. Social influence 
derives from shared attributes such as culture, knowledge, borders and goals, and 
co-evolves with those attributes. It follows that the more heterogeneous a 
population and the more the lines of differentiation, the greater the potential for 
hostility. When agents decide to take action, the action and targets are selected 
using a bounded rationality cost-benefit analysis subject to resource constraints. The 
costs and benefits of taking a particular action against a particular target are also 
modulated by social influence. Thus, agents are more likely to take the kinds of 
actions against the kinds of targets that social pressure suggests are appropriate and 






Development: in RTE, bounded rational agents interact and take actions to achieve 
goals. When agents act, they take into account what resources they have available, 
the cost and benefits of the action, and the opinions of others by whom they are 
influenced. Agent actions influence the likelihood of state failure at the national 
level, measured by a composite index of the following factors: lack of state 
legitimacy, potential for province secession, hostility, tension, level of corruption, 
level of terrorist activity, level of criminal activity, level of foreign military aid, and 
lack of essential services. State failure is measured at the province level by similar 
indicators. The model uses real-world data to ground the initial model parameters. 
Actors, or agents, then proceed to interact and take actions that consume or generate 
resources. Agent activities lead to changes in agents’ states and resources, non-
agent targets, and state failure indicators. For example, forced migration of a 
population from one province to another is likely to decrease tension in the province 
they have left, increase tension and hostility and decrease essential services in the 
province they have migrated to, increase tension in the population that migrated and 
decrease their resources. Data used to parameterize the initial conditions of the 
model and limited validation of model outputs for the cases of Indonesia and 
Thailand came from 32 different sources, among them: national agencies like 
Indonesia-Tourism.com, international organizations as the United Nations, the 
World Bank and the International Telecommunication Union, US government 
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy, 
news services such as the Bangkok Post and British Broadcasting Corporation, 
research and academic institutions such as Terrorism Knowledge Base and Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, and corporate and labour groups like Netcraft. 
Additionally, specific information on relevant entities and provinces are drawn from 
online news sources like the Washington Post and web services like Wikipedia. 
These data were used as a basis for 150 state indicators, 60 province or region 
indicators and 30 entity indicators used to initialize the simulation model.  Regional 
experts on Indonesia and Thailand were also consulted. 
Use: Regional experts from the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR), and the US Pacific Command (PACOM) were put together 
by DARPA to face-validate the model.  Face validation by these experts focused on 
whether the conditions represented in the model produced the expected outcomes in 






conglomerate of theories that raises questions of coherence; its scope is not entirely 
clear, for some parts can be read as if it is a conflict theory. Furthermore, it is not 
readily clear which parts of the model ontology are supported by evidence and data 
and which are not.  
 
Senturion 
Vision: another joint effort between Defence and Academia, Senturion is a game-
theoretic platform for predicting outcomes of competitive and adversarial 
interactions. The US DOD stance on game-theoretical modelling has oscillated from 
ardent support during the cold war, to neglect and benign suspicion in late 1990s; 
however, the resurgence and relative failure of data mining and machine learning 
approaches to provide insight on dynamics of adversarial and cooperative 
interactions in organizations, opened a small venue for behavioural modelling 
approaches. Senturion is a simulation capability that analyses the political dynamics 
within local, domestic, and international contexts and predicts how the policy 
positions of competing interests will evolve over time; the developers of Senturion 
view computational modelling as a way to improve understanding human behaviour 
and decision making (Abdollahian et al. 2006). Computational modelling should be 
based on reliable simulations of human behaviour that can be applied for unbiased 
predictions of potential threats, and form the basis of courses of actions as responses 
to these threats.  
Senturion is a platform and predictive analysis software to facilitate and pool the 
knowledge of subject matter experts in the government and academia. Senturion 
synthesizes political science and microeconomics into a real-world decision making 
tool. Instead of a statistical or probabilistic approach to predictive modelling, 
Senturion uses algorithms drawn from game theory, decision theory, spatial 
bargaining, and microeconomics. The combination of expert interviews, simulation, 
and game theory draws upon some of the most highly regarded approaches to 
predictive analysis. But in essence, Senturion is a multi-agent model that relies on 
dynamic and recursive estimation to mitigate risk by anticipation, to explain 












Fig. 20 Senturion: Six steps of the Modelling Process (from: "Senturion: Predictive Political 
Simulation Model" (2006), Defence and Technology Paper, 32, Centre for Technology and 






Senturion allows framing the relevant political issues and enriching them with 
subject matter experts’ knowledge and data; its methodology helps to improve 
subject matter experts’ track record by diminishing bias and increasing accuracy. 
Furthermore, Senturion quantifies qualitative stakeholder analysis in adversarial or 
competitive settings like negotiations, bargaining, and coalition and consensus 
building. For example, it can be used to model the negotiating stance of parties in 
mergers and acquisitions, collective bargaining agreements and sharing natural 
resources. 
Development: Senturion modelling cycle (fig. 20, above) works as follows: 
1. Initial stakeholder data; 
2. Multi-agent modelling; 
3. Anticipated dynamics; 
4. Modelling iteration; 
5. Anticipated outcome; 
6. Interpreting outcomes. 
Iteration stops once stakeholders see no further gains in discussions; if a majority of 
stakeholders coalesce around a position, there is a large degree of consensus, if not 
conflict will occur. 
Agent behaviour in Senturion is modelled after theories that provide evidence for 
how agents behave in the real-world political processes. Agents maximize payoffs 
and seek to create coalitions. While Senturion uses multi-agent modelling more as a 
heuristic than a social modelling approach, it transcends traditional stakeholder 
approaches by providing a consistent and systematic framework for exponentially 
increasing networks of interactions without reduction or oversimplification of the 
problem. For a given political issue, Senturion simulates the iterative political 
decision making calculus among stakeholders with different interests in and varying 
influence on the political process. It predicts how these bargaining dynamics play 
out across a network of political relations over time. The result is an analytical 
assessment of the likely extent of change and of the degree of stakeholder support 
for this outcome without relying on an ad hoc assessment. 
Senturion uses a rigorous elicitation mechanism to collect data from subject matter 
experts in order to assign stakeholders in a political landscape multiple attributes on 
their political position and potential influence, and their willingness and ability to 






explains how stakeholders arrive at a decision; evolve their interests and positions 
on an issue over time, or how a political outcome is achieved in within local, 
domestic, and international contexts by a sequential combination of elements 
relevant to the decision process. Senturion thus can provide a consistent framework 
for objective analysis of stakeholder politics, rather than relying solely on individual 
expert opinions about political outcomes (Abodollahian et al, 2006). Of course, 
analytical transformations cannot compensate for poor data. The reliance on 
stakeholder data - crucial to understanding human behaviour and stakeholder 
motivations - limits the temporal forecast horizon to approximately two years, as 
certain data elasticities can propagate error over time. In other words, the likelihood 
of exogenous shocks over the stakeholder list increases over time, and after two 
years becomes quite high. That said, Senturion allows the analyst to examine 
political dynamics to, first, gauge whether the policy options are politically feasible 
as designed and, second, identify tactics to shape the political environment and 
achieve a more favourable outcome; in conclusion, it can provide an assessment of 
multiple courses of action with a higher degree of confidence then previously 
available. 
Use: having described the methodology underlying Senturion, we now examine two 
of its famous applications: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Iraqi Elections of 2005. 
Based on the aftermath of OIF in April 2003, it was predicted that the situation in 
Iraq would worsen throughout 2003 and 2004 in terms of Iraqi attitudes toward U.S. 
presence as well as insurgent activity (Abodollahian et al, 2006). While the 
Senturion simulation indicated that OIF would produce a quick regime change, 
Saddam’s well-trained former military core was expected to provide the basis for 
violent and persistent resistance. The simulation anticipated that this resistance 
would receive broad and growing political support from numerous and otherwise 
opposing factions within Iraq, as well as that the Initial Shiite neutrality to the 
United States was expected to evolve into active hostility for important factions, 
including Al-Sadr. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi dissident during the Saddam regime 
who was sponsored by the United States in post-war Iraq, was not expected to be a 
reliable ally for the United States over time. Continued U.S. military presence was 
expected to unify many Sunnis and Shiites against a common foe, the U.S. military 






explanation of events after the fact, there was substantial disagreement about the 





Senturion simulations provided detailed forecasts regarding how stability and 
regime change in Iraq would unfold as a consequence of OIF and subsequent 
actions. The model produced very specific predictions about the behaviour of 
individual stakeholders and accurately captured the timing of unexpected defections 
as well as the potential support from unexpected allies. Applying Senturion to an 
unfolding political situation was a success, considering the limited access to subject 
matter experts (Abodollahian et al, 2006). 
In the case of Iraqui election in 2005 (Abodollahian et al, 2006), only open-source 
data from subject matter experts from the Intelligence Community and Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy have been used. The work focused on support for the 
January 2005 elections in Iraq, and all findings and predictions were generated 
using Senturion only. The largely pessimistic forecast for the elections held up well 
when compared to the actual flow of events. Table 1 below, summarizes all of the 
predictions based on data collected by the end of December 2004 and compares 
them to actual events that unfolded over the following two months. 
Fig. 21 Track record of Senturion predictions on Iraq (from: "Senturion: 
Predictive Political Simulation Model" (2006), Defense and Technology 











Its known strengths rely on the fact that model's outcomes have been validated in 
approximately 300 scenarios where it was able to provides insights into complex 
decision making and to identify second and third order effects. The methodology 
could be integrated with and leverage from other approaches such as social 
networks and system dynamics. 
Its known limitations are given by the fact that the model requires high-quality data 
and extensive subject matter expertise. This limitation is mitigated by a Monte 
Carlo analysis on the SMEs' input to produce a confidence interval on the outcome 
However, while Senturion offers unique capabilities for decision making and 
prediction of political events, it is hamstrung by the following shortcomings: 
Table 1. Track record of Iraqi Election (from: "Senturion: Predictive Political 
Simulation Model" (2006), Defence and Technology Paper, 32, Center for 







 The process of moving from agent decisions to political outcomes if not 
clearly defined.  
 The game theoretical model that underlies Senturion does not theoretically 
guarantee that using Senturion diminishes subject matter experts’ bias.   
 Answers by subject matter experts’ to questions that delineate agents’ 
preferences and issue salience to them result in a hard-wired system without 
facilities for sensitivity analysis or stochasticity. 
 Except for ad hoc calibration, Senturion does not theoretically guarantee that 
prediction error rates fall within a reasonable margin or that it does better 
than pooled subject matter experts’ predictions.   
 
PS-I (Political Science—Identity) modelling platform 
Vision: the developers from University of Pennsylvania (Ian Lustick and Vladimir 
Dergachev) conceived PS-I with the intent to make available to political scientists 
and other social scientists (with no programming skills and no previous background 
in formal modelling), an accessible agent-based modelling tools for exploiting 
theory, in order to analyse political phenomena. PS-I platform deals with issues 
such as how institutional frameworks determine goals, how violence arises, and 
what the trajectories of identity movements are (Lustick et al. 2004). Drawing on 
the constructivist identity theory (Onuf, 1997,1998 & 2002) to determine agent 
behaviour, PS-I tests popular theoretical propositions like “power-sharing explains 
the containment of secession better than repression.” PS-I simulation platform 
creates an artificial state in order to explore patterns of secession and secessionism 
through constructivist identity theory. This artificial state captures certain composite 
features of multicultural or multi-ethnic countries that may encounter threats of 
secession without corresponding directly to any particular country. Therefore, the 
simulated state should be regarded as a specialized tool that is useful for exploring 
the extent to which some patterns of ethno-political mobilization and secessionism 
can be accounted for by focusing specifically on “identitarian” processes and 
pressures. As the simulation moves forward in time, the rules governing agent 
behaviour permit the rotation and trading of identities as functions of changing 
advantages and disadvantages associated with individual identities and with local 
conditions. The model evaluates a variety of propositions on polarization and 






others under the following institutional schemes: repression, responsiveness, and 
representation. The simulation experiments explore relationships among 
institutions, ethno-political mobilization, secessionist activity and secession. It also 
evaluates the effects of the following three policy scenarios: repression; increasing 
responsiveness; power sharing by granting different degrees of autonomy to the 
potentially secessionist identity. Simulation results show that institutions, ethno-
political mobilization, secessionist activity, and secession are strongly inter-
correlated; that repression decreases secession; responsiveness produces more 
mobilization, but not necessarily more secession; and power sharing, 
representativeness, and semi-autonomous institutions decrease secessionist activity. 
These results indicate that non-coercive policies for reducing secessionism and 
secession may work only at the “cost” of a state accepting a significantly larger role 
in the public political arena for political expressions of historically “out-group” 
identities.  
Development: PS-I agents are inactive, immutable, bounded rational, but not 
strategic. They are divided into two broad classes of agents, Influential and Basic; 
each endowed with a repertoire of identities. The Influential class is further divided 
into three levels. Bureaucrats are drawn from Influential, exhibiting different levels 
of influence. They all have the incumbent identity. A small number of top 
bureaucrats have a level 4 influence; mid-level bureaucrats have influence level 3; 
lower level bureaucrats have a level 2 influence. There are three national identities, 
and depending on their role, region, and parochial identity, agents can have a higher 
or lower identity repertoire. There are also loyal opposition agents. All agents 
incorporate national, particularistic, and locally prevalent identities. An activation 
rate governs how “activated” agents view their own identity; thus, defining how 
prominent a particular identity is in a region. Agents are placed in a Moore 
neighbourhood1 and change identity as a result of interactions with others filtered 
through biases that represent a “mass-media” mechanism.  
 
Fig. 22. A Moore neighbourhood 
                                                 
1 In cellular automata, the Moore neighbourhood is defined on a two-dimensional square lattice and is composed of a 






Each agent registers the activated identities and influence levels of its neighbours 
but not the composition of their repertoires. Simple calculations of relative “identity 
weight” lead each agent to either remain activated on its currently activated identity; 
rotate into activation an alternative identity from its repertoire; substitute an identity 
from outside its repertoire for one inside its repertoire; or, in cases of a fairly 
overwhelming discrepancy in favour of an identity not in its repertoire, actually 
substitute and activate on an identity previously absent from its repertoire. 
The state is divided into four quadrants of overlapping identities that represent 
relationships of multinational democracy based on principles of federalism, 
multiculturalism or both. Each quadrant has a radiating web of bureaucracy. The 
southeast quadrant, however, is different from the others. It is controlled by the 
state, but inhabited by a disgruntled minority. Bureaucrats in the southeast have not 
incorporated the identity of the disgruntled minority and therefore cannot 
“understand” and respond to them appropriately. 
Use: as a theoretical model, PS-I does not distinguish between violent or non-
violent mobilization. However, it says a great deal about how evolving 
organizational patterns and trajectories might lead to conflict. The broadest and 
most compelling finding emerging from PS-I results is that explanations for 
variation in amounts of ethno-political mobilization, even by members of 
communities that seem primed for secessionism, cannot be expected to correspond 
to explanations for patterns in the variation of amounts of secessionism or outright 
secession. When compared to three historical cases of secessionism in Québec in 
Canada, Corse in France, and Kashmir in India, these results appear robust; in the 
case of secession of Ukraine eastern’ provinces bordering Russia and the seize of 
Crimea (2014), would be interesting to understand how an exogenous force (i.e. 
hybrid warfare) can deteriorate the political situation of region which however 
always enjoyed a high level of autonomy from the central government. However, 
against secessionism, Nation-states need to find trade-offs between repression and 
representation. Note that while the before mentioned Regional Threat Evaluator 
(RTE) uses a mix of social psychology theories that link individuals’ material 
position to their behaviour through perceptions of social advantage and 
disadvantage to investigate state failure, in contrast PS-I brings identity to the fore 
to estimate probabilities of secession, a specific outcome expected in some form of 






state might have to grapple with secession exactly because it has been successful in 
empowering a minority to demand separation, or another state could experience 
secessionism because have been targeted by forms of hybrid warfare. As such, at 
least in theory, PS-I can be used to model social and political fragmentation in 
countries with more stable governments and institutions that do not seem at the 
brink of state failure. 
Issues:  
 PS-I is highly unspecified. For example: Agents can be representing 
individuals, families, villages or any unit of political aggregation that may 
seem appropriate. 
 PS-I basis for changing identities is not well-grounded in evidence or theory. 
 PS-I cannot produce emergent behaviour. For example, regional 
arrangements are hardwired into the model: one region is the core, two are 
loyal, and one is disgruntled. 
 PS-I results and on the basis they are achieved are not subjected to even 
rudimentary tests of robustness. For example, secessionism is measured by 
the number of cells that border a given cell. How much would the results 
change, if this definition were altered? 
 
AfriLand and RebeLand 
Vision: modelling approaches in international relations often underspecify political 
actors, polities and externalities. On this regard, Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau (2009, 
2010) explored such issues in two related multi - agent models called “RebeLand” 
and “AfriLand”, at different levels of analysis. RebeLand is a model of an island 
polity with comprehensive structure and processes. AfriLand is a model of a region 
consisting of ten neighbouring polities. RebeLand aims at modelling socio-political 
behaviours in a coupled socio-natural setting; AfriLand, on the other hand, aims to 
analyse socio-cultural and environmental dynamics that transcend national 
boundaries and have a regional impact. RebeLand and AfriLand are thought 
experiment models that are intended to replay HADR (Humanitarian Assistance & 
Disaster Relief) scenarios in a local framework such as amongst herders and 
farmers. None of the models has empirical basis or an integrated modelling design. 
AfriLand is built atop RebeLand to represent the target system of East Africa (its 






As a polity consisting of a society and a government for managing public issues 
through policies, RebeLand dynamics rest on the idea that emerging public issues 
lead to varying levels of stress to which governments respond with stress-reduction 
policies. A government’s response capacity depends on available tax revenue that 
depends on job availability. Increasing levels of stress among the population and the 
government’s increasing inability to formulate mitigating policies can lead to the 
emergence of unrest and rebellion. Model dynamics derive their importance from 




Fig.23 - UML class diagram of the RebeLand-type polity model representing each of the 








Development: RebeLand consists of primary and secondary agents. Primary agents 
are the general population, cities and the state. Secondary agents include rebels 
recruited from the general population, rebel groups and governmental security 
forces. Each AfriLand polity functions in the same way as RebeLand. Borders 
among polities are explicit, migratory and permeable. RebeLand examines the 
stability and failure of a state made up of three provinces, each with population 
centres, resources, and transportation and communication networks, through three 
different setups: stable, contentious and unstable. In the stable setup, a happy 
population pays taxes, so the government can adequately respond with policies to 
societal issues. In the contentious setup, the population supports the rebels in 
sudden outbursts, because of inadequate government policies to solve societal 
issues. In the unstable scenario, government policies are completely inadequate, so 
the rebels take over and the state fails. Stability, instability and failure evolve from 
agent interactions; they are not predetermined outcomes. RebeLand is a light 
theoretical model and does not use any real data. 
Use: It is not known whether the model has found any users other than the 
developers themselves. AfriLand and RebeLand are based on intuition and are 
therefore theoretically and empirically underspecified. None is based on real data; 
none is validated. 
 
FactionSim and NonKin Village 
Vision: for the creators of FactionSim (Silverman, Bharathy and Kim, 2008), the 
starting point was the necessity for HBM applications to increase the realism of the 
synthetic agents employed. That requires the employment of thick models, which 
can integrate scientific know how from psychology, sociology and political science. 
FactionSim is a comprehensive modelling suite made up of cognitive, social, 
physiological and economic layers that can configure diverse theories of the origins 
and resolution of cross-cultural conflict, because no unifying social science theory 
supports the development of a single coherent model of conflict for training or 
analysis. The overall goal was to model how actions carried in the DIME power can 
influence the PMESII status of a given country of interest. As a generic game 
simulator for social scientists and policymakers, FactionSim is intended to 
synthesize the social and behavioural models that are needed to recreate real world 






support autonomous agents carrying out their lives in an artificial society. 
According to Silverman, Bharaty and Kim (2008), analysts can use FactionSim to 
rapidly mock up classes of commonly encountered conflicts or opportunities for 
cooperation. As default settings, FactionSim contains a collection of such models 
including agents, groups, organizations, and natural and manmade structures. It 
allows editing agent profiles according to cultural identity characteristics and 
demographics properties of the population. The modular structure of FactionSim is 
model-driven and makes it reusable for various conflict contexts and situations, but 
does not force it to follow a particular multi-agent or other modelling approach.  
NonKin Village (based on FactionSim) is an artificial society for cultural training in 
which trainees, often small-unit leaders and soldiers in squads or platoons, may 
learn the village culture through immersion and problem discovery and resolution. 
NonKin Village is populated by autonomous socio-cognitive agents whose 
behaviour is derived from social science theories. NonKin Village generator is a 
game world generator that brings life to agents of all factions in a “SimCity” style. 
It supports soldiers’ street-level interactions and dialog with village residents to 
learn their issues, needs and grievances, to assist them in countering the insurgents’ 
agenda, and to create a self-sustaining peace. 
 
 
Fig.24 – PMFserv architecture (Silverman et al. 2008) 
 
Development: a model called PMFserv deals with agent cognition in both Faction 
Sim and NonKin Village. PMFserv it is a human behaviour emulator that drives 
agents in simulation world, according to logics singled - out from the behavioural 
sciences (Silverman et al. 2008). It runs agents through the observe, orient, decide, 
and act (OODA) loop. Agents’ interactions are not hardwired into the system, so 






their conversation and transactions. PMFserv agents have profiles according to 
which they are instantiated and parameterized. Other model entities have mark-ups 
that allow agents to perceive and reason about the world. Subject matter experts’ 
opinions and data on agents’ past actor can also be used as guides for agent 
perception. Agents capture their own internal state and societal norms in a 
catalogue. 
Use: PMFserv have been successfully employed in domestic applications 
(consumer modelling, crowd rioting) and international applications (Intifadah 
recreation, Iraq DIMEFIL-PMESII). FactionSim game generator and its suite of 
social science models have been successfully applied in the past to recreate 
communities in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa. In over 
200 statistical correlations with real world communities, the developers claim it has 
been proved to be over 80% accurate at recreating the conflict and cooperation 
decisions of leaders for and against the groups they manage and follower 
membership action choices. FactionSim can also be used in cultural training of the 
US military small-unit leaders and personnel at the tactical level for cultures and 
contexts for which enough anecdotal evidence exists to create a convincing outline 
of do’s and don’ts, taboos, norms and conventions.  
However, FactionSim cannot handle operational training and planning or policy 
analysis; the former because it is not geared for persistent joint operations at 
multiple levels; the latter because it does not have facilities to express emergent, 
anticipatory norms. Issues:  
 The theoretical and data bases for Faction Sim and PMFserv that give rise to 
agent cognition and interaction processes are not articulated. 
 FactionSim is focused on predicting the aggregate behaviour of the society it 
models instead of forecasting the behaviour of individuals it models. 
 
A model of the political economy of Afghanistan 
Vision: Human, Social, Cultural and Behavioural Modelling (HSCBM) program of 
the US DOD had funded Armando Geller at George Mason University to create a 
multi-agent model of the political economy of Afghanistan, and to explore links 
between licit and illicit economies in order to capture how they fuel processes of 
insurgency (Łatek, Rizi, Mousavi and Geller 2010). The project aims to advise on 






 Policy: How important is drug trade to the livelihood of the Afghan 
population? How can we decrease drug trade in Afghanistan? How can we 
decrease its significance to the population? 
 Operations: How many men and for how long are needed to eradicate poppy 
fields, interdict drug shipments in a given province and prevent cultivation 
shift to neighbouring or other provinces? 
 Analysis: How much bribes and protection money from drug traders 
frequenting a given route will be gathered and by whom? 
Development: this model is a country-scale, house holder solution multi agent 
simulation with explicit biophysical data layers and heterogeneous population of 
three million farmer households, twenty thousand small-scale crop traders, a 
thousand medium drug traffickers and fifty major traffickers. These agents interact 
with each other and the urban population on a set of regional markets subject to 
monitoring by the insurgents and security agents such as the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA) and NATO assistance mission (ISAF).     
The environment for interactions and constrains for decision processes is 
empirically informed. Agents are adaptive in nature; ensure their own survival, and 
in a bounded rational manner maximize their income subject to the following 
factors: 
 Farmers choose what crops to cultivate and when to sell and buy more of 
crops they have cultivated and buy those they have not. They account for 
historically smoothed local prices of different crops; expectation of climatic 
conditions; government policy; availability of farm labour provided by 
family members or rented out from locals; household food consumption. 
 Traders are differentiated between opportunist, small scale traders and the 
more specialized opium traffickers and wheat wholesalers. The decision 
cycle for all traders is similar and includes monitoring a set of markets, 
collecting available buy and sell offers and determining the most lucrative 
trade opportunities; posting a buy or sell offer depending on the level of the 
stock of crops; and adjusting risk based on transportation costs, risk 
perceptions of losing crop shipments to bandits or government interdiction, 
the necessity to pay bribes if caught with illicit crops; and urgency to 






 The government allocates forces to districts and to poppy eradication and 
trade interdiction as counternarcotic policies. Government agents can be 
corrupted by traders and farmers.  
This project has innovated a customized approach to merge demographic and 
economic data in the war zone, and it informs the model by using statistical 
sampling methods for combining remote sensing data with local surveys, and 
recovering an “agentized” common data picture of the rural population in 
Afghanistan. This joined dataset has been validated with an independent source. 
Dataset merged include remote sensing data by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL), Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS), and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) on agricultural economy 
production and rural population; quantity and price spatial panel data for various 
drugs markets by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC); spatial 
panel data on security incidents in Afghanistan by the ISAF and behavioural 
surveys by the UN FAO. 
Use: Out-of-sample validation has been performed by replicating province-level 
poppy cultivation intensity and pricing in major markets during 1998-2008 when 
played against real climate and security conditions.  
 
1.5.2 European Models 
 
In this section we review ten models developed in the EU: 
 Combined Land Air Representation of Integrated Operations (CLARION), 
and his twin, Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-Warfighting 
Domain (DIAMOND); 
 Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM); 
 Strategic Management System (STRATMAS); 
 PAX; 
 Attitude changes and diffusion models; 
 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Models (HADRM): 
 Common-pool Resources and Multi Agent Systems (CORMAS); 
 Threat network simulation for REactive eXperience (T-REX ); 








Vision: Combined Land Air Representation of Integrated Operations (CLARION) 
models include a plethora of forces in various packages available to warring parties 
and cover the complete spatial and temporal dimensions of a conflict. CLARION 
was born in the mid-1990s out of the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) need for an integrated campaign planning tools at appropriate levels of 
resolution, applicable to various types of conflict and robust enough to support an 
evolving processes of combat in a 20-year timeframe. The Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL) developed a suite of simulation models for 
campaign planning and analysis under the rubric of the high-level operational 
analysis (HLOA) program. CLARION and DIAMOND (Diplomatic and Military 
Operations in a Non-war fighting Domain) are two components of this software 
suite (Taylor & Lane 2004). 
Development: CLARION at its core it is a two-sided model of land combat written 
in C++ and consisting of the following entities: headquarter; ground combat unit, 
often battalion or brigades of infantry and tanks, called close combat entity (CCE); 
reconnaissance; artillery; remote sensor; attack helicopter squadron; attack 
helicopter base; aircraft squadron; and aircraft base. Entities are grouped into proper 
military hierarchies and organizations that act as higher-level entities. Therefore, 
CLARION functions within a predefined command and control (C2) structure that 
helps model outcomes resemble reality more closely. Entities have local perceptions 
of the situation they face, augmented by information they receive from other 
friendly entities; they do not have access to ground truth, but rather to incomplete 
information acquired through their own intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Based on their information and goals, they define and 
execute sequences of scripted plans called missions characterized by activity type; 
operational, organizational and geographic constraints, time delays for assigning 
and communicating orders through organizations and criteria for success. Each 
entity tasks subordinate entities where applicable by a hierarchical task network 
(HTN) decomposition routine with reactive triggers and conditions that allow them 
to respond to enemy and friendly units’ success or failures. CLARION reduces the 
probability of unrealistic entity behaviour and simplifies the processes of mission 






from human intuition, for example, non-combat entities attempt to distance 
themselves from enemy combat units (Moffat et al. 2011). 
Use: CLARION has undergone extensive validation.  
 In an exercise in 1998, less than six months after CLARION 2.0 became 
available, CLARION outputs for several test scenarios were compared with 
predictions based on historical analysis. CLARION output on key measures 
of combat such as battle duration, casualty levels and advance rates broadly 
agreed with historical records. The exercise also helped CLARION remedy a 
flaw in its business logic: an attacker was required to destroy defending units 
it had defeated completely before advancing. Now the attacker simply pushes 
units it has defeated but not wiped. 
 Another validation exercise pitted CLARION output against those obtained 
in human-run war games with similar force packages and geography of the 
battle space. CLARION outputs appear to be militarily credible. 
 CLARION has been used within Analysis of Defence Capability (ADC), a 
rolling program designed to test U.K. military capabilities, to assess land 
campaigns since 1997. 
 
DIAMOND 
Vision: while CLARION focuses on the land campaign planning and analysis side, 
where two parties fight high-intensity conventional battles, DIAMOND (Diplomatic 
and Military Operations in a Non-war fighting Domain) is developed by DSTL as a 
high-level, multiple-party simulation model for analysing peace support operations 
(Bailey, 2003), focused on C2. DIAMOND generates mission and represents 
complex factional relationships and civil infrastructure in long-run scenarios. Like 







Fig. 25 - Diplomatic and Military operations in a non-warfighting domain (Curtis, 2005) 
 
Development: DIAMOND includes the following entities: 
 intervention forces tasked with peacekeeping and peace enforcement; armed 
forces of warring sides in a country or region called factions; 
 civil organizations including international and domestic governmental and 
non-governmental organizations such as aid and relief agencies; 
 commercial firms; civilians with different political affiliations and settlement 
status, for example, resident, refugee, evacuee and internally displaced. 
Entities interact with one another and the environment and exchange or consume 
key commodities for survival and to pursue their goals. In DIAMOND, 
peacekeeping operations and missions by intervening forces follow rules similar to 
that used in CLARION for land combat planning. 
Use: DIAMOND has undergone three validation exercises representing a 
remarkable mix of missions and variety of contexts with respect to the following 
real historical scenarios:  
 Peacekeeping in Bosnia in 1995: the exercise tested the feasible boundaries 
of scenario sizes that can be represented and analysed by DIAMOND; 
 Humanitarian aid in Mozambique in 2000: the exercise examined the 
humanitarian module of the model that distinguishes it from CLARION; 
 Peace Enforcement in Sierra Leone in 2000: the exercise examined the 






These validation exercises have shed light on the fitness of various components of 
the model. Since 2001, ADC (Analysis of Defence Capability) has also used 
DIAMOND to cover analysis of the humanitarian domain and it has been used as a 
starting point for further developments. UK DSTL funded an extension called the 
Hybrid War Model (HWM) that fully agentizes DIAMOND and endogenizes agent 
decisions at a more tactical scale (Moffat et al. 2011). The MITRE (MITRE is not 
an acronym) Corporation and Dynamics Research Corporation have produced a 
subsequently classified extension to DIAMOND called DIAMOND-US (Cipparone 
and Barry 2003), that has been used for scenario analysis and training by the Joint 
Chief of Staff J-8, US Army G-2 and Centre for Army Analysis (CAA). It was also 




Fig. 26 - DIAMOND: Study of the Iraqi Oil Infrastructure (Curtis, 2005). 
 
PSOM 
Vision: PSOM (Peace Support Operations Model), built by DSTL for the UK MOD 
to support force development and training (Marlin 2009), covers security and 
stabilization and counterinsurgency operations in conflict and post-conflict 
environments, as an interactive war game for other government agencies in the UK 
and allied countries. Like its non-interactive predecessor DIAMOND, it supports 
multiple parties such as military forces, government agencies, factions in the host 






information. Unlike DIAMOND, PSOM can have some of its agents controlled by a 
human in the loop (HTL). 
Development: PSOM characterization of NGOs, government agencies, private firms 
and humanitarian aid organizations as “factions” that are independent, aligned with 
insurgent factions or integrated with intervening forces or indigenous governments 
enables a realistic portrayal of their activities (Parkman & Hanle, 2008). The local 
population has specific dispositions toward each faction, and can be as diverse as 
needed to model real-world ethnic/religious groups such as the Kurds, Shia and 
Sunni in Iraq. Factions compete for power and legitimacy by “flipping” the 
population to their side. The behaviour of factions, especially intervening forces, 
originates from the UK and US counterinsurgency doctrine. Progress toward self-
sustaining stability in a conflict area is measured in terms of population security, its 
consent to the presence and its fear of each faction, and state capacity to provide a 
basis for a functioning economy. PSOM factions execute military and civil courses 
of action, from the construction of power plants and administrative training, to 
ambush and IED emplacement. Strategic decisions are intertwined with operational 
decisions that influence civilian state variables. The resulting outcomes in this 
contest for power are measured as population consent for the presence of various 
factions that can provide security and vital services. This allows all factions to wage 
operations for the population “hearts and minds”, by tactics that span from 
transition operations to outright terror. By focusing on the civilian population rather 
than on the interaction of military units, PSOM represents a wide range of political 
behaviours essential to create a comprehensive model. In order to provide a richer 
operational picture, PSOM represents as well the physical, human and 
organizational capital of a country. Finally, it records casualty metrics as the 
likelihood of violent death within the local and national population, the consent of 
the population to the activities of various factions, a measure of the level of state 
functionality achieved through reconstruction activity, and the level of perceived 
threat within a population. PSOM allows factions to raise and train units, and the 
power of insurgent and national armies to rise and fall after a few years of 
simulation game time. Monthly displays of all these measures allow players to 







Use: PSOM represents a broad spectrum of actors and their “forces” in a PSO. 
Interactions among factions are many-to-many; political allegiances can shift, 
coalitions evolve or collapse; factions can rise in power from being marginal 
spoilers to de facto national governments, or fail and be destroyed. PSOM uses 
HTL (Human in The Loop) to represent the leadership of major factions. An 
“intelligent Red”, for example, demonstrates the activity of “obstructionists to the 
peace process”. These can range from organized criminals, through incited disorder, 
warlords and militias and “traditional” insurgency, to the in-theatre effects of a 
“globalized insurgency”. These agents all have aims, characteristics, motivations 
and capabilities that can be portrayed in the game system. An expanded set of 
“target options” gives the spoiler player a realistic set of alternatives between 
opposing armed forces, infrastructure, or civilian populations. Military operations 
are represented by a range of irregular and regular units in both semi-symmetric and 
asymmetric combat. The value of intelligence-led and multi-sided HUMINT 
(Human Intelligence) can be shown alongside technical ISR capabilities. The 
importance of good intelligence is shown in a complex physical and human 
environment. The impact of collateral damage and deterrence is shown alongside a 
more traditional understanding of kinetic effects. Using a novel combat system 
based on current and historical data, PSOM combines the effects of a large number 
of low-level land combat operations. Political interference and logistics constraints 
restrict such operations for insurgents and intervention forces, while difficult trade-
offs between rules of engagement, force protection, and force effectiveness can 
force players to make realistic compromises. 
Its known strength: Completely driven by editable scenario and data files, PSOM 
provides an easy visual interface of the qualitative and quantitative results of the 
simulation. It includes military, information, economic, migration, criminality, 
deterrence, recruitment, and rioting models. It provides a platform for learning 
negotiation strategies and the whole-of-government approach to SSTR through war 
gaming exercises. Also allows for high-level game inputs representing the real-
world non-predicable events that drive irregular situations such as environmental or 
political decisions. 
Its known limitations: High-level, low-resolution model that may not capture real-








Vision: Strategic Management System (STRATMAS) is an interactive war-gaming 
environment and software development project that provides a modelling and data 
capture framework, and visual and formal synthetic representation of failing states 
(Christensson & Woodcock, 2004). It supports the generation of intervention plans 
and models interactions of such plans with the failing state. STRATMAS works in 
conjunction with a staff support tool called Cupol that guides a large distributed 
planning staff through the operational procedure steps of “effects based planning”. 
When a user issues an order through Cupol, it is sent to STRATMAS for 
simulation, optimization and gaming. 
Development: users can build an operational theatre by assigning values to 25 
indicators that describe a failing state. These indicators cover themes such politics, 
governance, economics, society, quality of life and environment encoded as raster 
with around 10-20 km spatial resolution. National media reports and their effects on 
the population of the failing state can also be provided to make scenarios more 
plausible (Christensson et al. 2005). STRATMAS represents population dynamics 
using a combination of spatial systems dynamics and cellular automata: variables in 
each cell evolve and interact with courses of action provided by users according to 
predefined, constant equations. While the underlying STRATMAS model 
represents disaggregated political actors explicitly, with Blue representing friendly 
entities and Red adversary entities, and requires that time- and spatially-encoded 
orders, it does not have an explicit C2 structure as CLARION and DIAMOND. 
STRATMAS works as a client-server software and can be reached from any client 
in buildings connected to the internal LAN where the STRATMAS game engine is 
installed. Current STRATMAS development focuses on elaborating the high-level 
architecture with a run-time infrastructure, standardized software library.             
This enables multiple country simulations and data exchange among models other 
than the default systems dynamics engine STRATMAS is shipped with. 
Use: STRATMAS has been tested in two different theatres: Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
STRATMAS was used to study post-conflict reconstruction for Afghanistan in 
January 2003. STRATMAS supported Exercise Iraq Future 2005 in April 2004. 
STRATMAS supported in March 2006 a major NATO Partnership for Peace 








STRATMAS was initially developed by an international team under the joint 
sponsorship of the U.S. Joint Staff and the Swedish National Defence College; 
currently however it is solely supported by the Swedish Armed Forces. 
STRATMAS clones are still developed by the Swedish National Defence College 
as Game Environment for Command and Control Operations (GECCO) and serve 
as inspiration for systems dynamics models that simulate the establishment of 
public order and safety in a post-conflict reconstruction or phase IV operations 
(Richardson et al. 2004). STRATMAS has the following strengths: configurable 
planning procedure with support for distributed analysis, planning, simulation and 
optimization; users perceive short training period to be productive; fast and 
responsive analysis time, quick and fast interactive analysis change, try, modify 
input and run analysis in less than a couple of minutes to broaden a viewer’s 
understanding. Its known weaknesses: not HLA compatible and does not support 
regional or continent based analysis, planning, and optimization. 
 
 










Vision: PAX is a multi-agent model of Peace Support Operations (PSO), developed 
by EADS Dornier, initiated and funded by the Bundeswehr and assisted by the 
Operations Research Division of the Bundeswehr Centre for Analyses and Studies 
(Lampe et al. 2007). A team led by EADS Dornier and sponsored by the 
Bundeswehr started to develop a PAX prototype after the Bundeswehr realized that 
attrition-based models previously used were not able to meet its needs to model 
human behavioural aspects, civilian populations and non-combat focus that are 
critical in peacekeeping operations. In order to achieve a measure of plausibility, 
experts in social psychology, systems theory, operations research and military 
advisors who are proficient in peace support operations have provided input to and 
participated in the development of PAX. Therefore, representation of civilian 
behaviour sets PAX apart from other multi-agent models of conflict. In particular, 
PAX represents how main psychological drivers such as anger, need and fear may 
be influenced by external factors from the environment such as soldiers’ actions and 
other civilians’ behaviours. PAX behaviour patterns and interactions are based on 
empirical knowledge about the evolution and de-escalation of aggression (Mosler & 
Schwarz 2005). 
Development: areas in PAX scenario maps at the meter-scale resolution grid may be 
defined in such a way as to limit the movement of agents across different fields: 
• Normal cells can be traversed by all agents. They may further be fine grained with 
areas of influence that range from 0 to 3, represented as light-grey, light-blue, pink 
and light-green accordingly. 
• Built-up cells serve as refuge for civilian agents who are frightened or have 
already received a supply package or cast a vote. 
• Barrier cells cannot be traversed by any agent and can be regarded as natural or 
man-made obstacles, such as a river, barbed wire or fence. Communication 
however, may still happen across the barrier. Currently PAX houses three types of 
agents: Civilian, Soldier and Supply Vehicle: 
• Civilian: the initial states of a civilian may be set up to be representative of a 
typical character through the parameters such as “Fear”, “Readiness for 
aggression”, “Anger” and “Need”. Civilians belong to different groups; therefore, 
PAX can model groups with different goals and leadership and study group 






• Soldier: the role of Soldier can be set to Normal, Admission Control or Reserve. A 
Soldier’s actions are governed by a specific rule set that remains constant during the 
run. 
• Supply Vehicle: the first scenario for which PAX was developed dealt with food 
distribution in peacekeeping operations. The scenario implicitly included a supply 
vehicle and a squad to guard and distribute food packages. No movement associated 
with the supply vehicle. However, PAX was later used to study a polling scenario, 
so the supply vehicle may now be defined as either of the two service agent types: 
the supply vehicle or the polling station. 
 
 
Fig. 28 - PAX Election Polling Place configuration (Curtis, 2005). 
 
Use: PAX can measure success of peacekeeping operations strategies using 
measures of effectiveness like: 
1. The overall escalation during the operation measured for example, by the acts of 
aggression performed against civilians; 
2. Amount of help provided measured for example, by the number of distributed 
food packages; 
3. Possible long-term effects of an operation measured for example, by the number 
of civilians willing to pick up arms or civilian grievances caused by the operation. 
PAX can be used to study a variety of complex scenarios, for example, the impact 






operating it. Example: each refugee is assigned a place in a tent that can house 10 
refugees; the civilians in the camp belong to the same ethnic group but different 
subgroups; use of force in the camp is governed by the force provider’s law and 
rules of engagement; the military distributes food to one representative per tent at 
specified and well-known distribution times in a dedicated food distribution area, 
which is separated from the rest of the camp by a barbwire fence. The performance 
of PAX on scenarios like this has been validated experimentally (Johnson et al. 
2009). PAX enjoys a 3D extension for scenario replay. Data farming capabilities are 
also available.  
Its known strength and limitations: as war-game, PAX has strong potential as a 
high-level staff and leader training tool and as a planning aid for course of action 
development. Within the confines of this study, the model proved limited in its 
ability to model changes in force capabilities. Due to its limited ability to model 
uncertainties in irregular warfare without the human-in-the-loop, or give multiple 
potential outcomes, further development and analysis is required before the model 
is used for large scale analysis (Marlin, 2009). 
 
Attitude change and diffusion models 
Vision: In a number of research projects, Wander Jager and his colleagues at the 
University of Groningen build models of how attitudes and opinions spread through 
a population, contending that such processes are crucial in understanding the rise 
and fall of interest groups, dynamics of political change and shifts in population 
preferences (Jager & Amblard, 2004). In such models, the authors forgo the 
substance of people’s opinions, and does not model how people argue for shifting 
their opinions or spreading certain attitudes and how they process such mental 
processes; instead, biased diffusion or social cascade processes are applied to 
various classes of social opinions, regardless of their substance. Jager justifies this 
assumption by arguing that the quality of people’s reasoning may determine the 
extent to which they are being persuaded by others; people often respond quite 
simply by favouring positions close to their own, rejecting more distant positions 
according to some pre-existing latent positions or following the crowed in voicing 
their opinions. While Jager’s recent work advocates the predictive power of such an 
approach in marketing and product innovation settings (Delre et al. 2010), most of 






Development: in a very popular piece, Jager and Amblard (2004) implemented a 
social networked version of the social judgment theory originally formulated by 
Sherif and Hovland (1961), to explain how and why individuals change their 
position after being confronted with another position. Agents in this model are 
endowed with a vector of attitudes, but are not purposive: they do not seek to 
maximize their influence or form coalitions, but simply passively broadcast their 
positions. The basic dynamics of the model describes a change of a person’s attitude 
that depends on the position of the persuasive message that he receives. If the 
advocated attitudinal position is close to the initial position of the receiver, this 
position is said to fall within the receiver’s latitude of acceptance and the receiver is 
likely to accept it as his own. This is called the assimilation effect. If the advocated 
position is distant to the initial position of the receiver, it is said to fall within the 
receiver’s latitude of rejection and the receiver is likely to shift away from 
advocated positions in his latitude of rejection. This is called the contrast effect. If 
the advocated position falls outside the receiver’s latitude of acceptance, but is not 
distant enough to fall into his latitude of rejection, it falls within the receiver’s 
latitude of non-commitment, and the receiver will not shift its initial position. This 
set of behavioural rules suffices to produce complex dynamics. Jager has also 
addressed the issue of data necessary to calibrate such models, in particular the data 
necessary to recover the social networks that underlie the attitude diffusion process. 
Collecting complete empirical network data is rather difficult, because it does not 
contain all influential relations. So Peter and Jager (2010) proposed a methodology 
to construct simulated networks on the basis of survey data that are easier to collect. 
These networks are later re-optimized with regard to common network properties 
such that they conform both to established theories and the constraints derived from 
the survey data. Such simulated networks are expected to provide a more valid 
representation of real social networks used in multi-agent modelling of attitude 
change. 
Use: the social judgment theory that underlies Jager’s work is tested extensively in 
small laboratory settings, but methodological limitations have hindered empirical 









Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) models 
Vision: this section reviews two similar models sponsored by US Air Force Office 
of Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the European Office of Aerospace Research 
and Development (EOARD). The first model results from a direct contract to a 
Czech university, and it is documented by Pechoucek, Marik and Barta (2003) at the 
Agent Technology Centre of the Czech Technical University in Prague. The second 
model, described in Smirnov et al. (2005), is developed by modellers from the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in Saint Petersburg. 
Both models are motivated by similar goals. They aim to support planning 
humanitarian assistance and relief operations (HADR) in the short run, up to a 
month. However, the difference is that the Czech model accounts for a large number 
of hardly collaborating and vaguely linked nongovernmental organizations, whereas 
the Russian model assumes a fully collaborative environment. This means that the 
Russian model focuses on engineering optimality, while the Czech model needs to 
find an alternative knowledge sharing solution first then tackle the coalition 
formation problem. Both models ultimately propose information sharing and 
planning procedures for HADR and test them on very abstract and fictitious 
scenarios. The Czech model addresses a hypothetical humanitarian scenario in 
which an island suffers from a natural disaster while several fictitious foreign 
governments are ready to help; the Russian effort models the health service logistics 
of deploying mobile hospital configurations in the Sudanese Plain. 
Development: The very special nature of the HADR domain in which individual 
organizations may eventually agree to collaborate, but are very often reluctant to 
share their knowledge and resources, the Czech modellers tried to reduce the 
complexity of the problem by splitting the community of agents into ex ante 
alliances formed exogenously to the model. They combine classical negotiation 
mechanisms with acquaintance models and social knowledge techniques in order to 
reduce the communication traffic and to keep some of the agents’ knowledge 
private. In particular, they represent the following classes of entities: 
• Resource Agents (R-agents) represent the in-place resources that are inevitable for 
delivering humanitarian aid, such as roads and airports. Unlike the H-agents defined 
below, the R-agents are passive and do not initiate any kind of humanitarian effort. 
• In-need Agents (In-agents) represent the centres of conflict such as cities and 






• Humanitarian Agents (H-agents) represent humanitarian agencies participating in 
a HADR effort. Like the R-agents, the H-agents contribute to humanitarian aid 
missions, so they may be regarded as a subclass of R-agents. 
However, the H-agents are proactive and they can initiate coalition formation 
processes. Each H-agent has some private and public knowledge and aims to share 
information with other H-agents and to form resource-sharing coalitions with them 
to fulfil the needs of In-agents in his neighbourhoods. The computational and 
communication complexities of forming such coalitions depend on the amount of 
background and processed information each agent possesses about other agents and 
on the sophistication of the agents’ capability to reason about other agents’ 
resources, plans and intentions. One interesting feature in this model is the notion of 
strong and weak information disclosures. Weak disclosure corresponds to 
straightforward information sharing. If an agent loses some type of private or semi-
private knowledge in the strong sense, it does so as a side-effect of some proactive 
step such as sending a request to other agents or making a move. This means that 
some H-agents can influence other H-agents or alliances of H-agents without 
explicit communications, avoiding situations in which direct attempts at 
communicating is rejected outright. The resulting distributed communication and 
planning procedure is called CPlanT and yields feasible distributed plans without 
breaking alliance constraints for any entity. 
The Russian model is called Knowledge Sharing Networks (KSNet) and assumes a 
network-centric environment, potentially without any hierarchies, but with all 
entities willing to collaborate with each other. KSNet constructs for each agent (a) a 
perception of the elements of the current situation, and (b) comprehension of the 
current situation by applying formalisms borrowed from Endsley’s situation 
awareness model (Endsley, 1995). It then uses the off-the-shelf planning algorithm 
ILOG to develop schedules and plans for each agent. Both models represent the 
needs of the underlying population that require relief as static requirement sets; 
none of the models accounts for strategic interactions among the segments of the 
population, among relief organizations and between organizations and populations 
segments. KSNet and derivatives for operational decision support are still being 
developed.  
Use: AFOSR, CERDEC and ONR programs that sponsored this research were 






communications networks. The use of particular HADR scenarios does not seem to 
have been the main focus for program managers. None of the technology has 
transitioned. 
 
CORMAS (companion modelling) 
Vision: this section describes a family of models, a software framework and a 
model building and application methodology developed by the Centre de 
Cooperation International en Recherché Agronomique pour le Developement 
(CIRAD). CIRAD is particularly interested in models for integrated renewable 
resource management (IRRM) and integrated natural resource management (INRM) 
in development contexts. The IRRM effort at CIRAD focuses on studying, 
educating and building awareness of (a) biological, climate and hydrological 
interdependencies, and their dynamics on different spatial and temporal scales; (b) 
technical and socioeconomic factors involved in IRRM decision and policy making, 
and (c) feasibility and usefulness of specific negotiation processes for establishing 
collective rules for local IRRM. The key innovation of CIRAD in addressing (a), 
(b) and (c) was to initiate the problem solving process by building and honing the 
companion modelling approach. 
 







Development: the key principle that informs companion modelling is developing 
simulation models that integrate various stakeholders’ points of view and using 
such models within the context of the stakeholders’ platform for collective learning 
(Barreteau et al. 2003; Becu et al. 2007). In this problem solving approach, 
stakeholders participate in the model building enterprise in order to improve their 
relevance to the overall effort by having their concerns addressed and their interests 
included in the model. Companion modelling is an iterative or cyclic process made 
up of three repeating stages: 
• Collecting input data and defining output measures: field investigations, literature 
search and observations supply information and help modellers to generate explicit 
hypotheses or scenarios for modelling; 
• Modelling Conversion of existing knowledge into a formal tool to be used as a 
simulator; 
• Experimentation Simulations, conducted according to an experimental protocol 
either on a computer or through a role playing game (RPG), challenge the former 
understanding of the system and identify key questions for novel investigations in 
the field. 
To support the companion modelling process, CIRAD has developed a multi-agent 
simulation software suite called Common-pool Resources and Multi Agent Systems 
(CORMAS). CORMAS represents interactions among individuals using renewable 
resources on a small scale on a Small Talk visual programming environment in 
which the modellers fast-prototype a model by (I) implementing classes from their 
UML class diagram, including specifying behavioural and communication rules of 
agents; (II) writing initialization and scheduling of simulation scenarios, including 
loading layers with GIS data on the environment, and (III) specifying means to 
visualize simulation scenario. A typical scenario for CORMAS simulations includes 
a few villages and a dozen decision making agents who interact over an extended 
period of many years. CORMAS assists modellers with detailed representation of 
agricultural and ecological cycles. 
Use: the companion modelling process helps stakeholders to play the game and 
understand the model. More precisely, companion modelling helps stakeholders to 
grasp the differences between the model and reality and the assumptions that drive 
these differences, especially their own interests, desirable end-states and policies 






simulations on the computer and propose scenarios to be assessed and discussed 
through further simulation runs. Companion modelling is self-validating: 
stakeholders examine the individual behaviours of agents, their interactions, and the 
properties of the system emerging from their interactions, and can propose 
modifications to these behaviour or interactions. In companion modelling, 
stakeholders modify their own behaviours; therefore, the predictions of the 
underlying mulita-gent model are fulfilled in the future. 
Sample works developed using CORMAS include the following: Mathevet et al. 
(2007) have used CORMAS to develop a tool in the context of a LIFE-Nature 
European Programme that aims to improve reed bed management for the 
conservation of a vulnerable heron, the Eurasian Bittern. This multi-agent model 
simulates the impacts of reed bed management resulting from decisions made by 
farmers, reed harvesters, hunters and naturalists. CORMAS has also been used to 
model rural credit practices and land rights management in village-level simulations 
of Thai and Vietnamese villages. In Africa, CORMAS has been used to create a 
multi-agent model of land use and irrigation management in Senegal (Barreteau et 
al. 2004) and a multi-agent simulation of hunting wild meat in a village in eastern 
Cameroon (Bousquet et al. 2002). Dray et al. (2008) have developed a slightly 
different and more abstract CORMAS model to study drug markets in Melbourne. 
Population data availability has turned out to be the key obstacle to applying social 
sciences in influence activities and outreach (IA&O). While IA&O requires sound 
knowledge of offline and online properties and behaviours of the target population, 
proper population data is rarely available and access to the target population is often 
limited. Yet, bits and pieces of data can be found in national and international 
organizations samples and surveys, and online data can be scrapped from websites 
and social media or tracked via commercial entities. Disconnected data on offline 
and online population characteristics and behaviours can be fused into descriptions 
of target populations amenable to support IA&O. The fusion process is called 
population synthesis and results in an all-life synthetic population. All-life synthetic 
populations maintain delicate balance between the level of detail necessary to 
support information and influence campaigns and sparseness that makes it possible 
to replicate the data product across multiple countries, and refresh it at low cost and 
with a small footprint. The knowledge of the population under study is often 






planning, critical incident management or public policy. A synthetic population 
addresses this type of data shortage: it is an image of a real-world population built 
by algorithms that fuse partial input data on the real-world population into an output 
dataset called the synthetic population. The output contains all the information in 
inputs and more information than any single input. In general, population synthesis 
creates a data product of a higher quality than any single source used in creating it, 
for example, an aerial image of a neighbourhood where the houses are overlaid with 
dots for individuals labelled by race, and income. The idea is to empower IA&O not 
by more data, but the right kind of information made available at the right moment: 
before the next crisis, conflict or war occurs. Data products should therefore be 
created by a data fusion process that combines data sources on individuals’ offline 
and online lives and unfolds in three steps. The first step of the process is to 
synthetize the offline population for the year of the last national census and update 
it using a microsimulation. The second step imputes average daily online time for 
every individual by a classifier that accounts for a person’s age, gender, location, 
educational attainment and labour market activity. The third step fuses the offline 
population with online activities. A microsimulation of an individual’s browsing 
produces online activity traces, including locations and access devices, session 
durations, visited websites and associated motivations. Methods that estimate every 
unit of a population are called population synthesis algorithms and the resulting 
estimates are called synthetic populations. Common methods of population 
synthesis rely on a maximum likelihood estimator called iterated proportional 
fitting, or a sampling technique called combinatorial optimization (Müller 2010). 
Network growth algorithms (Mussavi Rizi et al. 2012) and micro simulation (Latek 
et al. 2013) can also be used when micro samples are not available or data is sparse. 
Synthetic populations are routinely used in agricultural (O’Donoghue 2013), 
transportation (Guo & Bhat 2013), business (Hermes and Poulsen 2012) and public 
health (Barrett et al. 2011). 
 
T-REX: A Hybrid Warfare Simulator 
Vision: in order to better understand the implications of Hybrid Warfare and its 
nature and the potential for applying M&S, during NMSG ET-043 Meeting in 
Rome and along the NATO CAX Forum 2016, preliminary examples of capabilities 






Conventional Framework) addressing Hybrid Warfare by using its IA-CGF 
(Intelligent Agents Computer Generated Forces); the simulator was presented at 
NMSG ET-043 (February 2016, Rome) and exhibited at NATO CAX Forum 2016, 
as an example of the potential use of M&S in this sector. 
This Simulator is named T-REX (Threat network simulation for REactive 
eXperience) and it is a MS2G (Modelling, interoperable Simulation & Serious 
Game) that combines Complex System Modelling and intuitive Serious Game 
framework. T-REX is a stochastic discrete event, virtual interoperable simulation, 
able to perform fast time runs in order to evaluate vulnerability reduction as well as 
risk assessment respect hybrid warfare scenarios. T-REX includes meta-models 
dedicated to reproduce specific aspects (e.g. communications) that could be used for 
fast simulation or substituted by federating details models made by specific tools 
(example OPNET network simulator, by reproducing in details the communication 
protocols and hardware devices). 
 
Fig. 29 T-Rex: A Hybrid Warfare Simulator 
 
Development: The approach proposed by Simulation Team reproduces the context 
on multiple layers including people (single individuals and/or families) and interest 
groups (e.g. one political party, a leader, an industrial association, a religious group, 
a social class), each one with its own social network and mutual relationships. In 
addition to the socio cultural and economic layers the simulator includes other 






population behaviours. In addition, T-REX includes technological layers (e.g. 
power grip, communication networks). One very critical element of this simulation 
is represented by the layer reproducing the Cyberspace by modelling the ICT 
(Information and communications technology) and related interconnections. 
Cyberspace in T-REX is constituted by nodes and links, characterized among the 
others, by Integrity, Availability and Confidentiality Levels that evolve dynamically 
for each element; by this approach it becomes possible to conduct actions on cyber 
elements (e.g. an IP Address, a PC) and see the effects on the operational layer as 
well as on the social one. For the reasons above, T-REX is able to reproduce Hybrid 
Warfare in the cyber domain and to be federated with other elements to evaluate the 
impacts of actions and decisions. T-REX is used to simulate urban, as well as extra 
urban contexts over multiple domains including land, air, sea, space and 
cyberspace; indeed T-REX elements are driven by the IA-CGF that act and react 
based on their perception about the situation awareness and the boundary 
conditions; by the use of IA-CGF and different T-REX meta-models guarantee the 
possibility to consider media communications and to evaluate different assets by 
experimenting virtually alternative decisions in terms of COAs (Courses of Actions) 
within an Hybrid Warfare Scenario. 
The native HLA (High Level Architecture) structure of T-REX simulator 
guarantees interoperability and allows to keep this environment open for being 
federated with other simulators; indeed T-REX has been already tested integrated 
with JESSI (Joint Environment for Serious Games, Simulation and 
Interoperability), a virtual interoperable environment with many different models to 
simulate complex heterogeneous networks including traditional and autonomous 
platforms (e.g. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, drones, Unmanned Ground Vehicles, 
Underwater Unmanned Vehicles as well as vessels, aircrafts, land vehicles, 
missiles, etc.) that operates over a joint scenario (i.e. air, land, sea, space, 
cyberspace) . 
Use: T-REX demonstration during ET-043 workshop (Hybrid Warfare M&S 
Exploratory Team) has been performed on February 2016 in Rome, Italy, in a 
complex scenario reproducing threat networks, suspects and population over a small 
region and their behaviour driven by IA-CGF based on their status, human 
behaviour modifiers (HBM) and their specific life cycle. The scenario included a 






near the major town it was simulated a small port with an oil terminal, a tank farm, 
a desalination facility with multiple units, a power plant and the related security 
system (e.g. perimeter sensors/cameras/defence, ICT Network). The demonstration 
integrated also different UAV (Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles) in ISR 
(Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) respect threat network. The cyber 
layer of T-REX in this case included computers, laptops and mobile IoT (Internet of 
Things) as well as firewalls and procedures. The threat network was composed by 
terrorist agents able to adopt different operative modes such as “sleeping”, “stand 
by”, “planning action”, “preparing action”, “executing action” on different layers. 
In the simulation, the attack is based on diffusion of a sleeper virus, installed over a 
flash memory, infecting and affecting integrity just on specific systems. The goal of 
the cyber attacker is to have the virus compromising just one specific server (i.e. 
Port Security Server), accessing it from an infected computer through a remote 
supervisor access. The demonstration allowed to reproduce the diffusion of the 
virus and the actions of the threat networks, as well as the opportunities to capture 
the spill of information by the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(JISR), as well the evaluation of the impact of the attack to study vulnerability 
reduction, impact on population and effectiveness of offensive and defensive 
actions over the different layers. 
T-REX simulator represent an example of the potential of using advanced 
intelligent agents and multi-layer modelling in reproducing Hybrid Warfare 
scenarios, even to evaluate and test hypothesis and assumptions related to vague or 
uncertain factors. Hybrid Warfare (HW) is a complex context where the use of 
simulation and intelligent agents is probably the most promising investigation 
methodology. Despite this context is pretty new and requires tailored solutions, it is 
necessary to review researches and models developed along the years that could be 
useful in this framework, as for the task performed during the work of ET 43. 
During the TREX demonstration at NATO MS COE and CAX forum, emerged the 
importance to be able to conduct vast experimentation and define the criteria to 
create the scenario based on the available information and on the different 
hypotheses; by this approach it will become possible to evaluate symptoms and to 
study impacts of actions and reactions as well as to analyse their consequences 








Figure 30 T-REX Model reproducing different Layers, Modelling Population and 
Cyberspace as well as mutual interference over a complex threat scenario 
 
SIMCJOH 
Vision: SIMCJOH project was devoted to carry out R&D activities with the aim of 
understanding at which extent interoperable simulators can be used (in a multi-
coalition context) by a Commander and his/her Staff to address and solve specific 
problems where human factors are relevant. Modelling & Simulation makes 
possible recreating complex scenarios and carrying out what-if analyses with the 
aim of evaluating the effectiveness of several alternatives (Course of Actions, 
COAs) and therefore prepares the Commander and his Staff to face unusual 
situations. 
The SIMCJOH objectives are to study and develop new simulation models in order 
to support the decision makers in Joint and Multi- Coalitions scenarios, considering 
a strong involvement of Human Factors (either of friendly forces, opposing forces 
or neutral agents/population) effecting military Course of Actions (COAs) with a 
particular focus on issues of refugees and civilians in a theatre of military 
operations. The initiative get benefits from innovative researches in population and 








Figure 31 – SIMCJOCH screenshot. A Peacekeeping Patrol has been encircled by rather 
hostile crowd, which demands the surrender of weapons and vehicles. 
 
Primary SIMCJOH Goal is to provide a Commander with the capability to 
investigate the consequences of different decisions in terms of Collateral Damages 
in terms of PMESII second effects. Time constraint and uncertainty are the main the 
critical elements that the Commander has to handle in order to succeed in the 
simulation run. Secondary SIMCJOH Goals are: 
 To investigate impact of N2M2C2 and technology on Strategic Decision 
Making in Multi-Coalition Environments; 
 Interoperability issues (different C2 Maturity Levels, etc.) effecting Joint & 
Combined Coalitions’ Cohesion; 
 To demonstrate technological capability to combine Strategic Decision 
Making Models with other simulation Models for further developments in 
terms of CAX, Educational Programs and/or future Operational Planning and 
On-Line Decision Making. 
 
Development: SIMCJOH is a Stochastic High Level Architecture Simulator able to 
operate in different modes. It applies Innovative M&S (Modelling and Simulation) 
methodologies combining Intelligent Agents and Artificial Intelligence techniques. 







 CAPRICORN (Cimic And Planning Research In Complex Operational 
Realistic Network) Description: HLA Federation for DIME/PMESII 
Simulation over Geographic Regions; 
 DYTACCO (Dynamic Targeting Collateral Damages and Consequences) 
Description: Simulator of Dynamic Targeting Collateral Effects 
 GESI (GEfechts-SImulation System) Description: simulator of environment 
with simulated forces and groups, military and civil forces, NGOs, 
population and events. 
 IA-CGF (Intelligent Agents Computer Generated Forces) Family. 
Description: HLA Intelligent Agents reproducing HBM in a wide Spectrum 
of Applications 
 INDASTRIA Description: Simulation Model considering Regional 
Economic/Social Crisis; 
 NCS (Network Communication Simulator) Description: Discrete Events 
Simulator for operational network asset, analysis, Communication and 
Networking, testing. 
 PANOPEA (Piracy Asymmetric Naval Operation Patterns modelling for 
Education & Analysis) Description: Simulator of Multiple Coalition and 
Nation involved in Anti-Piracy; 
 PIOVRA (Poly-functional Intelligent Operational Virtual Reality Agents) 
Description: HLA Federation for HBM Simulating within Urban Area 
 PSYSOPS (Psychological and cultural Simulation Of Population) 
Description: 
 HBM Simulation within Urban Area considering Individual, Social and 
Cultural Factors 
 SGA (Scenario Generator and Animator) Description: subset of M&S 
Control Room, in conjunction with NCS allows to add a real-time simulation 








Figure 32 - SIMCJOH for Simulation based Military Training (Springer, 2017) 
 
Use: SIMCJOH Demonstration was carried out at the MS COE by presenting all the 
different models as well as the whole SIMCJOH Federation; indeed, SIMCJOH 
could operate also in stand-alone mode as well as on a local network of laptops. 
Demonstration consisted in presenting the evolution of MEL/MIL respect a Village 
Block in the fictional country named “Eblanon”, roughly corresponding to a Middle 
East realistic Scenario. 
The Stand Alone Mode allows Commanders to evaluate impact of different COAs 
and possible evolution of the scenario. The users benefit the combination of 
dynamically generated reports by Virtual Assistant, tactical situation and virtual 
representation. In HLA Mode is demonstrated the capability to federate in High 
Level Architecture the different Models providing a complete and flexible approach 
to address Strategic Decision in Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving Human 
Modelling where the Commander have to face criticalities. The demonstration is 
interactive and it is possible to change decisions and check consequence over 
dynamically generated stochastic scenarios. The SIMCJOH project reached several 
goals such as the involvement of military experts evolved along the project, in a 
kind of virtuous loop where users disseminate these results in the military 
community becoming good promoters of the Project and allowing to find and 






disciplinary team of military users with an increasing understanding of potential 
uses of innovative M&S techniques (i.e. IA-CGF) out of traditional and established 
areas of application of simulators; indeed, this project has provided an important 
contribution to disseminate the potential of using use M&S to face complex 
Military and Homeland Security issues.  
 
1.5.3 M&S Requirements for modelling Hybrid Warfare 
 
Before introducing the subject of the current paragraph, it is necessary to highlight 
that most of the activities (exercise on top) carried on within NATO have a security 
classification, and in accordance with that, the employed hardware and software 
simulation have to stick with such security requirements; this because NATO it is 
made up of a political and a military body, both requiring confidentiality when 
handling and exchanging information (figure 33 below). 
 
 
Fig. 33 – NATO Politic/Military Structure 
 
The foundations for establishing the M&S Requirements for Hybrid Warfare (HW) 
have been identified by considering the above described researches in terms of state 
of art, survey and experimental demonstrations. Considering the complex nature of 






strategic advantage. So, in order to counter Hybrid Threats at the Alliance strategic 
level, the following NATO processes need M&S support: 
o NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP); 
o Crises Response Planning; 
o Concept Development; 
o Doctrine Development; 
o Capability Package Management. 
In addition to these aspects, the following real life processes need M&S support for 
hybrid environments: 
 Strategic Level Awareness;  
 Decision Making Process at North Atlantic Council Level (NAC). 
For the support listed above, the following types of models and simulation need to 
be provided: 
 Conceptual model 
 Meta models 
 Discrete event simulations 
 Real-time stochastic (human in loop) simulations  
 Agent based dynamic simulation 
 
Fig. 34 -  NATO Crisis Management process 
 
Below the strategic politic level there are the operational and tactical military levels, 







 Individual Training; 
 Collective Staff Training; 
 Concept Development & Experimentation; 
 Decision Making Support 
 Exercises; 
 War-games. 
Actually, in terms of training, exercise and war-games, the M factor inside PMESII 
environment is already well addressed, while other parameters do not enjoy the 
same level of granularity as the military factor already achieved. This again calls for 
the necessity to take in consideration in our survey around MSHE the non-military 
factors of Hybrid Warfare. So, as example, the STRAT and POL simulation, which 
should adopt the Serious Game paradigm, has to implement the outcomes of the 
NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and vice-versa. The NDPP needs itself a 
type of dedicated simulation, which must adopt a dynamic paradigm based on the 
necessity to maintain the memory of prior inputs (i.e. decisions adopted in the past 
could orient the future ones), internal variables (i.e. the attitude of each government 
respect the situation on-going); for this reasons, it is evident that static models and 
simulations, where relationships do not change over time, are not adequate. The 
necessity to maintain memory of the past sticks very well with the paradigm of 
discrete event simulation, where event occurs at particular moment of time and 
determine a change of state in the system (Bruzzone et al. 2016a).   
In conclusion, when modelling Hybrid Warfare environment, to some pre-defined 
set of variables should be granted the possibility to change stochastically, within an 
assigned set of individual probability; to summarize, the simulation system should 
be dynamic, discrete event, stochastic. For these reasons, M&S requirements must 
be aimed at developing models and tools which tackle with the complexity of the 
hybrid environment. Such simulations of hybrid environments have to run in 
“isolation mode”, thus leading to the creation of a tool, able to operate for the 
purpose of individual and collective training, exercise, war-games and real time 
support to decision making processes.  
In the next paragraphs, models to describe the mechanics of hybrid warfare 








1.6 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR HYBRID ENVIRONMENTS 
 
In this paragraph it is described a conceptual model for hybrid environments 
(CMHE), developed by Bruzzone, Cayirci, Longo and Guinnarson (2016), which 
formalizes the salient findings of the NATO ET 43. The model can be visualized as 




Fig. 35 - Hybrid Warfare explained in terms of Capacity, Threshold, Willingness 
 
As it is showed above, a hybrid strategy is an offensive strategy (right side of the 
scheme). There are two key values related to the community/nation under attack, 
namely the Willingness and the Threshold. The willingness is the level of desire and 
stamina by the targeted community to engage with the offender. It also implies the 
support by the international community to the defendant. When the willingness is 
over the threshold, the targeted community approves tackling with the offender, 






of operations, unless the offender backs off. Of course, after this point, the 
offenders’ homeland may also become a theatre of operations, and hence, the 
conflict is not a proxy war for the offender anymore. In both cases, the hybrid 
environment witnesses the prevalence of the military operations. 
Those concepts expressed above, in particular threshold, match very well with the 
current UN Chapter VII provisions, titled” Action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. With regard to this subject, 
Karski and Mielniczek (2018), in recalling the legal discourse around hybrid 
warfare in international law, wrote that “it is technically possible to wage hybrid 
warfare without an armed attack triggering the right of self-defence. This does not 
mean that the states being subject to such actions are defence-less, but rather that 
such dangers require the so-called ‘flexible responsiveness’. In case one method 
merely constitutes a breach of non-intervention principle, it is possible to employ 
reprisals. Moreover, even if there are doubts as to whether certain actions reach 
the threshold of coercion, the retaliatory measures can be justified as retaliations. 
Especially in case of states too weak as to employ reprisals or retaliations 
effectively deterring the perpetrator, the idea would be to call allies to apply 
collective retaliations or reprisals”. Elaborating on the legal issues of Hybrid 
Threats, the Hybrid Centre of Excellence in its December 2017 Strategic Analysis 
Report (author Tiina Ferm, available at https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publication-
tags/strategic-analysis/page/2/), quoted that “The legal analysis of hybrid threats 
involves open questions and uncertainties due to the lack of agreed definitions and 
the state’s practice in responding to hybrid threats”.  
Therefore, for the defender it is necessary to identify univocally the offender and 
the related vectors he is manipulating: STRATCOM, Hybrid and non-Hybrid 
actions (Cayrci, Bruzzone et al. 2016). From its side the offender, the owner of the 
strategy, aims to keep the threshold as high as possible, while managing the 
willingness as low as possible. Vague environment, denial and all sort of perception 
management are the main tools for this (Bachmann & Gunneriusson, 2015). 
Strategic communications (STRATCOM) is a key both for the defence and the 
offence in hybrid environments. Apart from STRATCOM, the offender can take 
hybrid actions which can be denied, and may have to take also non-hybrid actions 
from time to time. Of course, non-hybrid actions increase the willingness and 






The defendant aims completely the opposite, i.e., decrease the threshold and 
increase the willingness. The main reason for this is that the capacity of the offender 
depends on the difference between the threshold and the willingness. For this, the 
defendant needs to clarify and prove what the reality is. All the components of 
diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, law enforcement and 
intelligence (DIMEFIL) domains should be used to achieve that. The aim is to 
stabilize the alliance/nation under hybrid attack and to gain the international and 
legitimate support for eliminating the hybrid threats. Therefore, comprehensive 
approach and STRATCOM are the main tools for the defendant; for the attacker the 
main tools are his narrative, the power he can project over DIMEFIL, and the 
exploitation of potential weakness of the defender such as political, ethnical and 
religious divisions. In Figure 31, the results of the actions are shown as “increase or 
decrease threshold/willingness”. However, there is a well the option for the 
defender of being passive (i.e., no action is taken); if the defendant is passive and 
takes no comprehensive action or does not have a proper STRATCOM narrative, 
the willingness decreases and the threshold increases, so favouring the attacker. 
 
1.6.1 Relation between Capacity, Threshold and Willingness 
 
The capacity χ of the opponent (aggressor) to continue with a hybrid strategy 
depends on the threshold τ and the willingness ω. This is given in Equation 1: 
 
When χ ≤ 0, it is expected that the aggressor backs off or an armed conflict starts. 
The aggressor struggles to maintain the capacity χ over zero (i.e., χ > 0), until he 
reaches the desired level of destabilization of the targeted nation/community, 
creating the environment to reach its geopolitical and strategic objectives (END 
STATE). 
Threshold is built around four parameters: 
- the normalization ν of the current level of instability (i.e., the defendant is getting 
used to the situation); 
- STRATCOM by the opponent so; 






- the power pΣ of the defendant in all DIMEFIL domains: pδ (diplomatic), pι  
(informational),  pφ  (military), pε  (economic), pλ  (law enforcement),  pσ  
(intelligence) as given in Equations 2 and 3.  
The weight μ of each DIMEFIL domains in overall power pΣ of the defendant may 
be different from each other. In these equations, so, sd and pΣ are real numbers 




STRATCOM is everything that can pass the messages according to the narrative; 
this includes not only verbal or written messages, but also all actions taken. Social 
computing is a critical media to disseminate the STRATCOM narrative by the 
defendant, as well as the disinformation by the opponent.  
In Equation 4 and 5, the normalization parameter ν depends on the history, the types 
of the opponent’s actions and their frequencies: 
 
It may change from community to community how well and how long the history is 
remembered. We call this parameter as the memory parameter ρ. The number of 
events (i.e., hybrid and non-hybrid actions taken by the opponent) n in the last 
period i that the normalization parameter is evaluated for, and the length ti of the 
time interval between the last normalization evaluation and current time give the 
frequency (n/t) of events. Please note that the unit (i.e., months, weeks or days) for 






event in every time interval and therefore the length of time intervals is not a fixed 
value. 
It is also an important parameter how disturbing α an action is. This parameter 
represents the difficulty, which needs categorization of events in space and 
character. In the model, the number of categories m is not a fixed value and may 
change in every evaluation period i as the length of time intervals do. 
The frequency (n/t) is typically controlled by the designer of the hybrid strategy.    
On the other hand, the memory parameter ρ and the degree of difficulty α change 
from community to community, and there is an uncertainty associated with them.   
It is not easy to treat this uncertainty in aleatory domain at least for the time being. 
Still we refer them as random variables, i.e. ρ:Ω→ℜ+ and α:Ω→ℜ+, where Rρ (Ω, 
ℑρ, Pρ) and Rα (Ω, ℑα, Pα) are the related random processes, Ω is the set of positive 
real numbers between 0 and 1 and including 0 and 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ Ω ≤ 1), ℑρ is the set of 
values for how much the past influences the perception about the current situation 
(i.e., the weight of the past on the current perception), ℑα is the set of values for 
how difficult to normalize an event, Pρ and Pα are the probability density functions 
and statistics that fits best to the defendant. 
The other important parameters for calculating the normalization factor ν are 
ethnical and religious divisions d (i.e., the number of ethnical and religious groups) 
and how much these divisions discriminate or tolerate (or even to support the 
opponent) h each other. The division parameter d is a positive integer greater or 
equal to one (i.e., d∈Z and d ≥ 1). The discrimination parameter h is a real number 
greater than zero and less than or equal to two (h∈ℜ and 0<h≤2). 
Please note that there is at least one event in each category c (i.e., for ∀c, mi ≥ 1). 
Otherwise the category does not exist. Therefore, ν is a real number between 0 and 
1 (i.e., ν∈ℜ and 0≤ν≤1). 
 
1.6.2 Parameters affecting the Willingness  
 
The following parameters affect the willingness: STRATCOM by the opponent so, 
STRATCOM by the defendant sd, the power pΣ of the defendant in all DIMEFIL to 
clarify and communicate the facts, the effectiveness of the comprehensive actions 
ad by the defendant, hybrid aon and non-hybrid aol actions by the opponent as 






(i.e., ad∈ℜ, aol∈ℜ, aon∈ℜ and 0≤ ad ≤1, 0≤ aol ≤1, 0≤ aon ≤1). The division d and 
discrimination h parameters already explained in the previous subsection.   
A part nl of the number of events n are non-hybrid, and the other part nn are hybrid 




1.6.3 Tests on Model Behaviour    
 
Through Monte Carlo Simulation, the authors observed how the model behaves   
when independent parameters change. In the experiments, random numbers had 
been generated for the memory parameter ρ and the degree of difficulty α according 
to normal distribution with various mean values. The sensitivity of the threshold τ, 
the willingness ω and the capacity χ against the changes in the other parameters of 
the CMHE was examined. The results are provided and analysed below.  
In Figure 36, the sensitivity against the changes in frequency (n/t) of the actions by 
the opponent is depicted and the values assigned to the other parameters during 
these tests are given in the caption of the same Figure. As expected, the community 
gets used to the hybrid environment as the frequency of events increase, and 
therefore the threshold increases, which also means better capacity for the opponent. 
As the frequency gets higher, its effect on the threshold gets lower. The sensitivity 








In Figures 37 and 38, the relations between the capacity and STRATCOM are 
shown. Both the threshold and the willingness are affected by the effectiveness of 
the STRATCOM by the defendant. Better defendant STRATCOM results in an 
increase in the willingness and a decrease in the threshold and the capacity. An 
opposite relation is observed between the threshold and the STRATCOM by the 
opponent as expected. There is another difference between the effects of 
STRATCOM by the opponent and the defendant, which is the sensitivity of the 
willingness against the changes in STRATCOM by the opponent is much less 












In Figure 39, the results from the tests for the discrimination parameter h are 
illustrated. How much the divisions in a community discriminate each other is an 
important weakness that can be exploited easily by the opponent. This is clearly 
observable: when the discrimination is higher, the willingness of the community to 
tackle with the opponent is lower. On the other hand, the higher the discrimination 










As shown in Figure 40, as the actions by the opponent gets more difficult (i.e., more 
disturbing) for the defendant, the threshold decreases, because those events are 
more difficult to be normalized (i.e., more difficult to get used to). The willingness 
of the community changes in positive direction but much less comparing to the 
threshold. 
 
The last experiment was about the effectiveness of the comprehensive actions by 
the defendant. They do not change the threshold but the willingness, which gets 
better as the comprehensive actions by the defendant becomes more effective. 
However, the effectiveness of the comprehensive actions is not much if they are not 










1.6.4 Further Inquiries 
 
In a hybrid warfare, the adversary uses all available means, very often from the 
black/covert side, in order to exploit the vulnerabilities of the defendant and to 
destabilize it by creating ambiguity, denial and disabling the defendant in time 
sensitive decision making process.  
The attacker, i.e. the owner of the Hybrid Strategy, manages two parameters against 
the defender, threshold and willingness. In doing so he tries to meet its objectives 
without an armed conflict, and as well without a major change in its diplomatic and 
economic relations toward the targeted state. Eventually, he gets engaged in an 
armed conflict at the minimum possible level, however without triggering the 
reaction of the international community; this because he is aware that the 
willingness is also strongly related to the international community’s desire to 
support the defendant. When the willingness is over the threshold, the strict hybrid 
part of warfare is over one way or the other, i.e., either the adversary backs off or 
has to face an armed conflict with the defendant. Therefore, the attacker does its 
best to raise the threshold as much as possible without losing the control on the 
willingness. As such, the Attacker can modulate the friction through the time by 
adjusting the level of the threshold, according to its political will. However, it is 
hard to foresee how long the Attacker can keep up with such strategy, that over time 
can result in the defender getting acquainted/developing narrative and physical 
countermeasures, or arriving to the depletion of the resources of the Attacker 
himself. In order to succeed, a Hybrid Strategy must be developed according to an 
operational plan that phases - over a pre-defined time span - together all the 
different means and tactics such as: cyber-attacks, disinformation, limited military 
actions, economic sanctions, diplomatic threats, espionage, subversion, 
assassination of named individuals, etc., most of them under the common 
denominator which is the denial of responsibility. 
Further issues to be taken into account when modelling the system is that, even a 
positive narrative through STRATCOM, will find the adversity of the public 
opinion in case of staggering losses (being either human or materiel) suffered by the 
enemy (Bruzzone et al. 2019a); on such regard, the defender in any case will meet a 
limit in its legitimate right to counter the aggression. On the other hand, if the 






that it can rely on a unified and strictly vertical chain of command (which is both 
his strength and his weakness), while the defender(s), even though initially 
fragmented and supposed to work within the UN chapter VII and (in some cases) 
NATO article 5 rules, (only) once it realizes the threat can effectively cope with it.  
The above consideration however brings inside the model the time perspective as 
the critical factor for both (Bruzzone et al. 2019b; Di Bella, 2019), because: 
 
a) the attacker should expect to run more and more out of time, so he has to 
accelerate the speed of confrontation when needed, and should be able as 
well to abruptly decelerate at the threshold, if he wants to avoid to wake up 
the “dormant”; 
b) the defender increases its strength through time (unless he chose for 
whatever reason to stay inactive), by realizing he is under threat and so 






Fig. 42 - Graph of PMESII over time: past the threshold, the risk of an all-out military 
conflict rises. 
 
In a few words, the model describes very well the hybrid conflict, and stops at the 






so called “conventional” one. Further elaborating on this, it is possible to speculate, 
as it is depicted in the figure 42, about the risk that the Attacker lose control of the 
system, i.e. not being able to decelerate quickly enough when the defender is 
rapidly building up his response, with both victims of an unpredictable escalation 
into an all – out conflict (unfortunately, as already seen, example in the crisis of 
July-August 1914 that ignited WW I). The point to highlight here is that, even 
though no-one wants a full-scale war (a moot point in itself), it can still occur in the 
event of political and military misunderstanding and miscalculation (Roberts, 2019; 
Bruzzone et al. 2019b); so, it is could result very difficult or impossible to control 
the DIMEFIL/PMESII vectors/status once the threshold is passed. 
 
1.7 HYBRID WARFARE: THE ORDINARY DIMENSION OF 
      FUTURE CONFLICTS? 
 
Switching from a NATO perspective to a European contest, we meet the description 
of Hybrid Threats given by the European Union in 2018: “Hybrid threats combine 
conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be 
used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific 
political objectives. Hybrid campaigns are multidimensional, combining coercive 
and subversive measures, using both conventional and unconventional tools and 
tactics. They are designed to be difficult to detect or attribute. These threats target 
critical vulnerabilities and seek to create confusion to hinder swift and effective 
decision making. Hybrid threats can range from cyberattacks on critical 
information systems, through the disruption of critical consciously refrains services 
such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in 
government institutions or the deepening of social divisions. As attribution is 
difficult, these challenges require specific and coordinated measures to counter.  
The above description matches very well with the one given by Cayirci, Bruzzone 
et al. (2016), however it is indeed true that it gives a description of the phenomena, 
rather than a strict definition (Bekkers et al. 2019).   
However, it is necessary to remind that Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. primarily view at 
any hybrid confrontation as the “black side” of the NATO Comprehensive 
Approach. The NATO Comprehensive Approach was introduced in the contest of 






adopted. In particular, it was underlined that lessons learned from NATO operations 
show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach 
involving political, civilian and military instruments; military means, although 
essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to 
Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance 
NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of 
the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to contribute to 
stabilization and reconstruction (NATO Lisbon Summit 2010; NATO AJP, 2017). 
Now in the paragraphs below we will examine two interesting contributions which, 
while they not deviate by large from the findings of the NATO ET 43, however 
offer interesting insights, proposing the concept that Hybrid is a form of 
confrontation not new at all, and that Hybrid Threats can build themselves up into a 
Hybrid War.  
 
1.7.1 Hybrid Threats rather than Hybrid Warfare 
 
 
Fig. 43 – Little green men and drones (pictures from: Hybrid Threats: The New Normal? 
publications.tno.nl/publication/34627573/imXFNr/TNO-2019-hybride.pdf) 
 
In their analysis of Hybrid Threats, the authors (Bekkers et al. 2019), avoid the term 
“Hybrid Warfare” in favour of “Hybrid Threats”; this because according to them it 
is necessary to maintain a distance with the (traditional) military ways and means to 
wage war, which are far too limited. Elaborating their perspective, authors have 
identified in the DIMEL acronym the different instruments of power which are used 
within the frame of any conflict: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, 






the added ‘F’ stands for Financial and the ‘I’ for Intelligence; when using DIMEL, 
these factors are included under respectively the economic or the information 
instruments. As such, they can be used in multiple dimensions and on multiple 
levels simultaneously. However, they are all aimed at the same goal and 




Figure 44 - Variety and intensity in DIMEFIL (Bekkers et al. 2019) 
 
On the horizontal axis we find the different instruments that can be used, and in the 
vertical axis there are the variety in the intensity of the use of each instrument.             
So ideally in the process of using hybrid means, an actor can escalate by 
intensifying the use of a certain instrument (vertical escalation) or escalate by 
switching to a different instrument (horizontal escalation). Such model of horizontal 
and vertical escalation seems very promising for the research; however, such new 
perspectives in order to be exploited necessitates of an analysis about the relation 
among the different instruments in conjunction with time factor, in order to enquiry 
about the capacity of the model to represent the real system.  
In conclusion, the take away which is offered by the authors is that “as a concept, 
the use of hybrid strategies and hybrid tactics to influence or coerce opponents is of 
all ages. However, continued globalization, the transition to the information age 
and rising geopolitical tensions have put new emphasis on hybrid hostilities that 
manifest themselves in a contemporary way”. So, recalling the name of the article, 






Globalization and technology in the contest of hybrid confrontations, coupled with a 
diplomatic framework where open aggressions are discouraged because of the 
provisions of UN Chart and NATO article 5. For such reasons, Western adversaries 
are acting in ways and through technological capabilities designed to avoid a full-
scale conflict (Roberts, 2019), so going Hybrid. 
 
1.7.2 A Causal Loop Model for Hybrid Warfare Modelling 
 
According to Balaban & Mielniczek (2018), the use of Modelling and Simulation 
(M&S) is aimed at representing past and emerging hybrid conflicts by identifying 
the factors and deceptive mechanisms leading to the accumulative effects, so 
preventing, mitigating, and finally winning the confrontation. Authors share the 
perspective (Murray & Mansour, 2012; Lamb & Stipanovich, 2016; Bekkers et al., 
2019) that hybrid conflict is not an entirely new phenomenon, offering a few 
historical examples. However, hybrid warfare encompasses a wide range of 
activities, pursued by state as well as non-state actors (and possibly individuals), in 
order to gain Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, 
Physical environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) advantages - interesting here is to 
notice that time as been taken into account, introducing it into the PMESII model. 
The flow depicted in figure 41 below shows dependencies with a Causal Loop 
Diagram (CLD), adopting concepts proposed by: 
 Thiele (2015): hybrid warfare combines four instruments of power across 
DIME;  
 Pawlak (2015): identification of the transition from a hybrid conflict to a 
hybrid war as a situation where hybrid threat evolves and intensifies to overt 
use of conventional force; 
 Rácz (2015): there are three phases in a Hybrid Conflict: 
1) preparatory phase: political and operational preparation dimensions; 
2) attack phase: exploding the tensions, ousting the central power from the 
targeted region, and establishing alternative political power; 
3) stabilization phase: focused on political stabilization of the outcome, 
separation of the captured territory from the target country, and lasting 






 Cirimpei (2016): PMESII battlespace operational variables are used to assess 
country’s vulnerabilities to a potential hybrid threat; 
 Vaczi (2016): levels of intensity of threats and intentions of actors involved 
are studied to distinguish between hybrid threat, hybrid conflict, and hybrid 
war. 
By examining the diagram proposed in the picture below, the threshold, as 
identified in the model of Cayirci Bruzzone et al. (2016), could lie somewhere 
between the accumulation of Hybrid Warfare into a Hybrid Conflict and the 
Hybrid Conflict intensification into a Hybrid War. However, in the Balaban & 
Mielniczek model the circumvention and the deliberate willing to ignore War 
and Humanitarian Laws is considered a sort of a “chemical” by-product of the 
Hybrid Warfare, rather than one of its pillars, or preconditions to be met; 
instead, the circumvention of International Law in the Hybrid Warfare Model by 
Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. (2016), was instrumental for the denial of responsibility, 











The conceptual model proposed by Balaban & Mielniczek it is based on a 
theoretical Causal Loop Diagram of Hybrid Conflict, as depicted in Figure 45 and 
46. In the loop, the intensity of hybrid attacks is controlled by attacker hostile 
objectives, and under those objectives increases with the expanded attacker hybrid 
warfare capabilities. The increase of intensity of hybrid attacks results in a higher 
damage to target, however increasing the intensity of countermeasures.                
The strictness of war laws (which however has not been imported into the diagram) 
defines the line between the Hybrid Conflict and Hybrid War, and it positively 
affects a perceived danger of conventional war. The perceived danger of 
conventional war increases with a growing intensity of hybrid attacks and with a 
growing intensity of countermeasures, but additionally generates feedback links 
decreasing both of its causal factors. The damage to target has a negative effect on 
its relevant defence capabilities, which has a positive relation with intensity of 
countermeasures. Both, intensity of countermeasures and relevant defence 
capabilities have positive relation with damage to attacker.  
 
 







Finally, the higher the damage to attacker the lower the attacker hybrid warfare 
capabilities, which has a positive relation with damage to target.  
With only nine factors at a very-high level this conceptual model has eight dynamic 
loops: six reinforcing and two balancing, which indicates a high dynamic 
complexity of the system. 
Figure 47 below shows implemented model of HC using Dynamic Bayesian 
Network (DBN). The model allows for temporal reasoning by including a number 




On that regard, Karber (2015), proposed four levels of HW intensity: 
I)    political subversion; 
II)   proxy sanctum; 







III)  intervention; 
IV)  coercive deterrence.  
The first three levels are used in the node intensity of hybrid attacks. Levels one and 
two align with the HC definition, while the third level with the hybrid war. The 
open use of force threatening political independence or territorial integrity of a state 
is prohibited by Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter (UN 1945), which can explain the 
deceptive behaviour on the part of HT trying to circumvent UN. Attacker hostile 
objectives node considers these two objectives of HT. Threat against territorial 
integrity places a strong influence on intervention phase in the intensity of hybrid 
attacks node as compared to threating against political independence, which resorts 
to influencing political subversion and proxy sanctum phases. Attacker hybrid 
warfare capabilities are based on definition of HW. These four categories modulate 
intensity of hybrid attacks. Subsequently, attacker hybrid warfare capabilities along 
with intensity of hybrid attacks determine severity of damage to target, which are 
mapped along the same four PMESII categories, this time representing damage to 
target. Damage to target lowers relevant defence capabilities of the target. 
Conditional probability tables (CPT)s that define intensity of countermeasures 
should be based on a defence strategy against HT. For instance, if attacker uses 
political subversion then its target may want to counter this subversion and, 
probably even more importantly, take actions to prevent escalation of intensity of 
hybrid attacks into proxy sanctum level by employing appropriate, anti-proxy 
sanctum, relevant defence capabilities that will in turn lower attacker hybrid 
warfare capabilities. If attacker or defender considers to escalate beyond HC 
defined by Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter (UN 1945), they should perceive danger of 
conventional war. Given a sufficient evidence of ‘bending’ or violating UN laws 
both, attacker and defender risk, at least in principle, punishments by international 
community. Unfortunately, current war laws are not very strict and precise, 
inducing minimal negative feedback effects on intensity of hybrid attacks and 
intensity of countermeasures. The non-intervention principle enshrined in Art. 2(7) 
of the UN Charter leaves a large window of using HW as lawful, which encourages 
development of even more sophisticated HW. This, in a long-run, is a risky 
proposition. From a legal perspective, the authors argue that non-conventional 






principles of international humanitarian law, and because the window of 
interpretation may be large, the legality of warfare used may need to be analysed.  
However, such analysis could be unsuccessful for many reasons, first of all, because 
before being legal it is political driven, and second because the International 
Community very unlikely will agree on a common understanding of what is legal 
and what is not on this particular, very divisive subject which is Hybrid Warfare. 
From this point of view, indeed many in the West look at Hybrid as a concept 
vague, un-helpful and even misleading (Van Puyvelde, 2015; Radin, 2017), even 
not suitable as an analytical tool for assessing, in particular, Russian military 
capabilities or foreign policy intentions (Renz & Smith 2016). Indeed, Russia’s 
successful use of non-military instruments, in the annexation of Crimea was the 
reason why the ‘hybrid warfare’ label has gained so much traction in its aftermath, 
even though the military component, with the seizure of airports, barracks etc., was 
instrumental for the success of the operation. 
 
 







Seizure of Crimea should be considered as a singularity, but still in the paradigm of 
Hybrid Warfare. This because it began as a covert military operation, combining 
ambiguity, disinformation, with more traditional aids such operational surprise and 
electronic warfare, followed by a traditional military invasion of the peninsula, 
carried out by Russia’s airborne, naval infantry, and motor rifle brigades. This 
operation was unique, because Russia’s Sevastopol naval base, status of forces 
arrangements (SOFA) in Crimea, and additional agreements on transit of troops in 
Ukraine enabled deployments and tactics that would not otherwise have been 
possible. However, the success achieved by this operation is not easily reproducible 
elsewhere; so, more than an example, it represents a paradigm, the pinnacle of 
Hybrid Warfare (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015).   
For the reasons above then, according to the author, Hybrid Warfare paradigm is a 
tool to examine any conflict/attrition, not limited to be applied (and least of all, to 
be applied because of ideological reasons) to this or that country in particular, but 
overall it is an instrument to gain awareness of the reality. In such contest, political, 
civil and military leaders and their staff are in the need to exercise themselves with 
M&S tools in order to test and refine various ideas and procedures on how to deter 
and counter Hybrid Threats from whatever direction they arrive. This because one 
must think like in terms of HT to understand its objectives, potential phases of 
conflict, actions, and decisions (Davis Jr., 2015). In the current situation, more work 
on simulation models of HC is needed in order to allow the development of higher 
predictive and prescriptive models, that will enable preventive, early warning and 
retaliatory countermeasures against Hybrid Threats. At the moment, the time 
required to develop such complex capacity is prohibitive and so new technological 
approaches are required to face this challenge. The M&S environment should be 
able to represent complex Hybrid Conflict at multiple levels: political, strategic, 
operational and tactical - not limited to common principles of warfare and common 
hierarchy of combat models. A combination of multi-method (Balaban 2015b) and 
multi-resolution (Petty et al. 2012; Rabelo et al. 2015; Zeigler, 2017) M&S is likely 












The Hybrid Conflict Modelling proposed by Balaban & Mileniczek (2018) has the 
merit to be very comprehensive at describing through Causal Loop Diagram the 
accumulation of Hybrid Threats and the consequent transformation into Hybrid 
Warfare and then War. It describes very well a theoretical model of a Hybrid 
Conflict employing a Dynamic Bayesian Network to demonstrate its application. 
More arguable is the speculation about what is legal and legitimate in a Hybrid 
Conflicts and what is not, this because the inherent political and highly divisive 
meaning of the concept. In any case, because one of the main objectives (for the 
aggressor) in Hybrid Warfare is avoid the direct military conflict, the model of the 
threshold, as proposed by Caiyrci, Bruzzone et al. (2016), remains critical to 
comprehend Hybrid Warfare and its unforeseen escalation into a full armed conflict. 
Moreover, inside the model proposed by Balaban & Mielzniczek, the “strictness of 
law” - which marks the boundary between Hybrid Conflict and Hybrid War - 
appears quite static if matched with the dynamicity and flexibility of the above 
mentioned threshold model, that for such reason is able to capture the evanescent, 
blurring line between Hybrid Warfare and the so called “Conventional Warfare”. 
In both cases, the modelling of Hybrid Warfare within DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT 
domains proposed by Cayirci Bruzzone et al. (2016) and by Balaban & Mileniczek 
(2018) are a courageous tentative to import, into the domain of particularly poorly 
understood phenomena like social, politics (and to a lesser degree economics - 
Hartley, 2015), the mathematical and statistical instruments and the methodologies 
employed by the pure, hard sciences. However, just using the instruments and the 
methodology of the hard sciences it is not enough to obtain the objectivity, and is 
such aspect the representations of Hybrid Warfare mechanics meet their limit: this 
is posed by the fact that they use, as input for the equations that represent the 
Hybrid Warfare, not physical data observed during a scientific experiment, but 
rather observation of the reality that assumes implicitly or explicitly a value 
judgment. Especially memory and frequency of past aggression, ethnic and 
religious division, narrative of the events – to name the most difficult to handle – 
imply a value judgement which has to be translated into a real number in order to 
act as input of our equations. Such value judgement it is subjective, and not 






the academic researcher it can introduce a bias; such bias, other than introduce an 
unacceptable distortion of the reality and so making useless the research for the 
purpose of the Science, it could be used to enforce a narrative mainstream, that 
contains a “truth” which lies outside the border of the Science. However, the author 
believes that going through a rigorous Verification and Validation process (V&V), 
M&S scientist can discover the impact of value judgement inside the model under 
development. Under this perspective, the importance of VV&A process is explained 


































2. M&S tools and techniques for Hybrid Warfare  
 
In the first paragraph we will examine simulation models for Hybrid Warfare 
through the employment of TREX simulator, while in the second paragraph – with 
the support of the DIES IRAE simulation architecture - we will describe the 
phenomena of mass migration, and how it could be added to the arsenal of the 
Hybrid Threats. In the third paragraph, we will examine a Joint approach to model 
Hybrid Warfare to support multiple Operations. In the fourth paragraph, with the 
support of CAPRICORN simulator, we will address the problems related to long vs 
short time strategic achievements. Moreover, it will be discussed the time factor in 
the contest of the Hybrid Threats and its effects on the development of National 
Defence and Foreign Policy, and how the nascent discipline of Strategic 
Engineering can support strategic planning for homeland security. 
 
2.1. Simulation Models for Hybrid Warfare: T-REX 
 
The security environment, or at least his perception, has been continuously 
changing and deepening in complexity during the last twenty years (Vos Fellman et 
al. 2015). The evolution of Internet and media channels as well as globalization 
emphasize the impact of specific concurrent actions carried over different channels 
(e.g. political, social, financial, cyber, etc.); for these reasons, the (NATO) Alliance 
is studying intensely these new phenomena often aggregated under the name of 
Hybrid Warfare (Baker, 2015). Indeed, one of the main characteristics of this kind 
of warfare is that it includes several types of means, activities and actors combined 
each other; civil as well as paramilitary, military and irregular actors, try to achieve 
political and strategic objectives trough overt and covert actions and conventional 
and unconventional means. This contest has been addressed very well by Russian 
Army Chief of Staff, General V. Gerasimov, when he affirmed that “countries bring 
a blend of political, economic and military power to bear against adversaries” 
(Gerasimov, 2013). 
Hybrid Warfare focuses often to complicate the decision-making process, being 
especially effective against organization that are slow in their decision process, 
because of their inherent structure or due to their pluralistic or multinational nature. 






order to avoid a direct military confrontation. It is evident that the modern concept 
of Hybrid Warfare is pretty complex and requires specific models and studies; due 
to these reasons the NATO Foreign Minister in the December 2015 meeting 
approved a specific strategy addressing hybrid warfare, which involves the full 
Diplomatic/Political, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, 
Legal (DIMEFIL) spectrum. In this case the war is conducted in all battlegrounds 
(Liang & Xiangsui, 1999), involving conflict zone population as well as home front 
population, so the models of engagements are the most different; considering the 
nature of the Hybrid Warfare, it is necessary to conduct an analysis over a spectrum 
of alternative multiple layers (McCuen, 2008; Weitz, 2009; Gerasimov, 2013; 
Bachmann & Gunneriusson, 2015; Davis Jr., 2015). 
The actors of hybrid conflicts belong to different types including both state and 
non-states; from this perspective hybrid warfare is a concrete and actual phenomena 
in many conflict zones, and it is supposed that any belligerent is using hybrid means 
and strategies. On that regard, it is worth remembering that one of the pillars of 
hybrid warfare is to avoid direct military conflict - as much as it is not necessary – 
preferring overt military actions just as coadjutant to the whole plan. In order to 
investigate this context and study possible scenarios, it is evident the potential of 
Modelling and Simulation (Christman, Di Giovanni and Wells, 2015; Schmidt 
2015; Balaban& Mielcnizek, 2018). Simulation is an important methodology to 
study such complex environment which includes different domain and layers as 
well as stochastic factors; for instance, the human behaviour as well as cyber, 
conventional and information warfare should be covered by specific models. All 
these aspects have been studied extensively in modelling and simulation, even if the 
complexity related to their mix within Hybrid Warfare is a new subject of research 
and investigation. 
Several researches about complex scenarios had led to the creation and the use of 
Intelligence Agent (IA) for recreating model of human behaviour since many years 
(Shonkwiler et al. 1986; Avalle, Bruzzone et al. 1996,1999; Castelfranchi & Conte, 
1996; Dascalu et al. 1998). The intensification of the use of the IA conducted to the 
development of several tools to support modelling development (Resnick 1996; 
Ferber et al. 1998; Parunak et al. 2006; Bruzzone et al 2014a, 2014b; Zhang 2016). 
More recently, the use of Multi Agents and Intelligent Agents allowed to reproduce 






al. 2008; Bruzzone & Massei 2010; Macal & North, 2010; Joo et al. 2013; Cai et al. 
2013). Simulation Team has been extremely active in the field of Human Behaviour 
Modelling: it has developed complex models about PSYOPS, CIMIC Operations, 
Civil Disorders, Decision Making, etc. The peculiarity of IA-CGF NFC (Intelligent 
Agent Computer Generated Simulator Non-Conventional Framework) developed by 
Simulation team is that the Agents are able to take advantage of specific events for 
their operational planning (Bruzzone 2013d; Massei & Tremori 2014; Bruzzone et 
al.2015b; Di Bella 2015).  
In particular T-Rex (Threat network simulation for REactive eXperience) is an 
interoperable MS2G (Modeling, interoperable Simulation & Serious Game) 
solution developed by Simulation Team. T-REX is a stochastic discrete event 
simulation able to act in stand-alone way or federated with other HLA simulators. 
T-REX could be executed in real time or fast-time, and in this second case it allows 
to conduct multiple runs to investigate alternative solutions for vulnerability 
reduction respect Hybrid Warfare. The proposed simulator is currently 
demonstrated over a scenario related to a desert area bordering with sea and 
including five towns; the simulation includes multiple layers simulating population 
(e.g. individuals and/or families) as well as interest groups (e.g. industrial sectors, 
religious groups, social classes); these elements are structured within social 
networks and regulated by mutual relationships expressed by fuzzy variables in 
terms of attitude and intensity.  
 
 








T-REX includes also other layers interoperating with the socials, in particular the 
Entity & Units reproducing military units and assets that influence population 
behaviors. The proposed scenario includes the power grid, cyberspace and 
communication network. Indeed, the Cyberspace is reproduced modeling the IP 
address of all fixed and mobile ICT (Information and Communications Technology) 
elements as well as their related interconnections; each node and link could be 
attacked by compromising its availability, integrity and/or confidentiality and it is 
possible to conduct defensive, offensive and restoring actions. In T-Rex all elements 
evolved dynamically and are driven by the IA-CGF reproducing a Hybrid Warfare 
situation; in addition, the simulator could be federated within an HLA Federation 
with other models. Currently the scenario includes also traditional and virtual assets 
on the area as well as a Power Plant, a Desalination Plant, and a tank farm that are 
critical infrastructures in the area.  
 
 
Fig.50 - T-Rex: caption of port security issues 
 
In conclusion, it emerges that the most innovative researches within modelling and 
simulation community could be strategic for addressing almost all the areas of 
different layers of Hybrid Warfare. So actually, there are favorable conditions to 
implement and develop models of Hybrid Warfare, such as the T-Rex, in order to 
develop tools and war-games for studying new tactics, collective training and to 










2.2. Hybrid Warfare: Weaponization of Mass Migration 
 
We have seen in the model of Hybrid Warfare proposed by Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. 
(2016) how the parameter “d” –  dealing with ethnical and religious divisions – and 
“h” – dealing with how much such divisions bring tolerance or discrimination - 
may help the owner of the Hybrid Strategy. It is evident that a massive, quick 
dispatch of migrants across one’s border country can alter dramatically the above 
two parameters in favour of a potential aggressor; further elaborating on those 
parameters, it is then necessary then to look how mass migration can (an 
unfortunately, will be) “weaponized” in order to ignite a crisis. 
 
 
Fig. 51 - Fleeing Syria, 2011-2018 https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/syria 
 
Let’s now reconnect with the description of Hybrid Warfare made at paragraph 1.1 
in order to recall that any element of the Hybrid Threat is not necessarily be illegal 
or pose a threat in their own right, but their combination could threaten individual 
Governments or a whole Alliance; having clarified that, we are going now to 
examine a current situation. 
In the second week of October 2019, the attrition between Republic of Turkey and 
ethnic Kurds located within the confines of Syria escalated due to a cross-border 
military operation conducted by Turkish regular armed forces (allegedly supported 
by irregular/militia hostile to Kurds), resulting in a tense situation, foreshadowing 
unpredictable and dangerous outcomes. The response of both USA and European 






threatened to flood Europe with refugees as the humanitarian crises become more 
and more acute (https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/10/politics/syria-turkey-offensive-
displaced-intl-hnk/index.html); however, this means practically “weaponizing” 
mass migration, and so applying a “Hybrid” pressure on his own allies (in NATO). 
Turkish President knows very well how the phenomena of mass migration struck at 
the gate of Europe. An (unexpected?) ally for him could be the block of the so 
called either “populist” or “sovereigntist” parties (on the rise across Europe), which 
have easy arguments in accusing European Union and established parties of selling 
out the nation’s cultural core to migrants (Lochocki, 2018). 
The phenomena of “weaponization” of mass migration has been extensively 
analysed in the eponymous book of Kelly M. Greenhill (2016), in which it is argued 
that foreign policy decisions in some cases resulted in the exercise of a particular 
kind of covert coercion, which is the intentional creation, manipulation, and 
exploitation of real or threatened mass population movements; such means are 
widely deployed but mostly unrecognized as an instrument of state influence. 
Examples of how often this type of coercion has been attempted, how successful it 
has been, who employed this tool, to what ends, and how and why it works etc., are 
presented. The conclusion drawn are that the owner(s) of a coercion strategy based 
on exploitation of mass migration want to affect target states' behaviour by 
exploiting the existence of competing political interests and groups, and so 
manipulating the costs or risks imposed on target state populations. This strategy 
deploys two effects: the first relies on alarming the public opinion with threats of a 
massive refugee flux, overwhelming a target's capacity to accommodate those; the 
second, a political blackmail by cynically exploiting the existence of legal and 
normative commitments to those fleeing violence, persecution, or privation.  
Useless to say, international migration flows towards developed countries are 
continuously growing creating complex scenarios from several points of view 
including security, social, political and economic aspects (Ratha et al. 2016).           
In particular, the global labour market, immigration policies and geopolitical 
situations are crucial drivers that affect these aspects since several years (Johnston 
1991; Fehr et al. 2004; Castles 2004; Samers 2004; Smith 2013). It is interesting to 
consider the specific situation of Europe that is currently affected by impressive 
flows from Africa and that is trying to identify actions to regulate this phenomena 






phenomena are analysed by geopolitical point of view or just by statistics (Samers 
2004). Therefore, the presence of so many factors dynamically interacting and 
affected by human behaviour and stochastic factors suggest today to develop 
quantitative models able to address these scenarios as it has been done already in 
similar cases (Bruzzone et al. 2014a). 
In the present paragraph it is proposed a modelling approach to represent the 
complex reality of mass migrations, which stands in a blurring area where the 
borders among Defence, National and International Security vanish; as such, and for 
the reasons exposed above, (unfortunately) it could be employed as a hybrid tool 
(Bruzzone et al., 2017e). The demographics and generic statistics are used as input 
data, while human behaviour models are used to represent the phenomena as well as 
the interactions among the different key factors; the development of the conceptual 
model addresses the migration flows between Africa and Europe with a focus on a 
specific case inspired by the proposal of an agreement between EU and Nigeria, the 
so called “Migration Compact” (2016). Due to these reasons, it is proposed the use 
of advanced Human Behaviour Models based on dynamic stochastic simulation to 
address a specific context, which is the European African Agreement in matter of 
migration and consequence on the social situation (Mountford & Rapoport, 2016). 
In particular, the proposed case addresses a specific African area, inspired to 
Nigeria case (Parfitt 2016). Useless to say, the consequences of wrong decisions in 
terms of policy are very dangerous, affecting the whole population in terms of 
economy, security, stability, equality, sustainability in host Countries as well as in 
origin Countries. Due to these reasons the presented work has been titled “Male 
Nostrum”: a word pun from Latin around the name “Mare Nostrum”, that is the 
original name of the operation to protect Mediterranean Sea Border and to 
guarantee safety of life at sea for African immigrants sailing to South Europe on 
poor boats (Bjarnesen 2015). However, “Male Nostrum” is to vocative case related 
to Our Bad Problems and is a pretty synthetic expression dealing with the critical 
aspects related to properly act respect migration flows: a framework so 
interdependent, complex and big to require simulation even just to understand the 
whole boundaries of the problem and the potential of the different Courses of 
Actions. 
The proposed model combines previous cases based on Intelligent Agents - 






a preliminary research on modelling complex immigration scenarios considering 
human factors and stochastic elements related to multiple layers. 
 
 
2.2.1. Models of World Demographic 
 
Along the last decades the immigration flows in Europe were subjected to a 
continuous increase due to many reasons, among them the economic ones are 
usually dominant (Borjas & Crisp 2005); indeed, these flows are mostly moving 
towards the richest parts of the European Continents from some major directives as 
summarized in table 2 (DESA 2013; 2017). These phenomena are results of the 
world wide demographics and several social and political aspects (Ratha et al.2016; 
Joly 2016). Also the simple pressure related to the world population growth is by 
itself a very important factor considering that is expected to increase from the 
current 7.4 billion to 10 in 2053, as proposed in figure 52 (DESA 2013; Infoplease 
2016, PRB 2016). In this context of demographic pressure, the economic 
inequalities should be considered in order to identify motivation to move and 
migrate (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Bourguignon & Morrison 2002). Indeed, it is 
possible to adopt a very simple model about these elements inspired to GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product), GNI (Gross National Income) and GNDI (Gross National 























Table 2 – Overview of migration flows to Europe 














Table 3 – Regions and People under average income 










Equation 9 – calculation of NAIC 
 
It is evident that this approach is very simplified and miss to consider important 
aspects such as internal inequalities, relative purchasing power, etc. (Arghiri 1972; 
Fox 2012; Kakwani & Son, 2016).  
It is interesting that while NAIC should be used to consider the differential between 
nations to estimate desire to migrate of the population, the advances in 






towards most attractive countries on a global scale considering global differential. 
Due to these reasons it is introduced a factor corresponding to Global Average 
Income (GAI) that is expressed as: 
 
Equation 10 – GAI calculation 
 
The GAI could be used as a rough estimation of country population desiring to 
migrate comparing their NAIC with GAI as threshold level; obviously this provide 
just an order of magnitude to estimate the quantity of people motivated to move. 
From this point of view, it is important to consider that just 2.08 billion people 
(28%) live in countries that are over NAIC (around 15’690 USD/year) of the whole 
planet based on some available data as proposed in figure 2 (DESA 2013; 
Infoplease 2016, PRB Report 2016, CIA World Fact Book 2016). Considering the 
improvements in communications and mobility this obviously generate a huge flow 
that is expect to growth in future despite specific spot events (e.g. wars, revolutions, 
famine) occurring periodically (Ratha et al.2016; UNHCR 2015b; Kegley & 
Blanton, 2015). Indeed, these statistics are mostly reconfirmed even by more recent 
analysis (DESA 2017) and highlight a huge flow overpassing 70 million people 
arriving mostly from Easter parts of Europe as well as from Asia and Africa. 
The aging of the population in rich countries, (a fact that is even present in poor 
world due to improvements by health support despite the medium long period 
effect), are another important drive to compensate the labour force need of 
consolidated economies (Johnston 1991; Magnus 2012; Paradiso 2016).  
It is evident that these phenomena need to consider human factors, religion, ethnics, 
cultural background in order to evaluate consequence of these decisions and not just 
statistics (Levine et al. 1985; Levitt 2007; Bruzzone & Sokolowski, 2012). From 
this point of view simulation could contribute providing a framework to develop 






quantitative results that could support evaluation of risks and effects of alternative 
decisions (Bruzzone & Massei 2010). 
 
 
2.2.2 The proposed model architecture: Dies Irae  
 
Human Behaviour Models could rely on different data provided by Subject Matter 
Experts (SME), Sociometric Data, etc (Moreno 1951; Jennings 1987; Capone & 
Mey 2016); recently use of Internet of Thinghs (IoT) and Social Networks are 
enabling new opportunity to model Human Behaviours (Eagle & Pentland 2006; 
Lane et al.2010; Kalter 2016). In facts the use of intelligent agents for creating 
HBM resulted very flexible and effective (Bonabeau 2002; Bruzzone et al.2011b).  
Based on these considerations it was decided to adopt a multi-layer approach able to 
combine different Modelling and Simulation (M&S) techniques including stochastic 
discrete event simulation and agent driven simulation. In particular, it is proposed 
the tailoring of the IA-CGF through the creation of a NCF (Non-Conventional 
Framework) simulation derived from DIES IRAE (Disasters, Incidents and 
Emergencies Simulation Interoperable Relief Advanced Evaluator) used in previous 
scenarios (Bruzzone et al.2016a). Indeed, the architecture is similar to that one 
developed for SIMCJOH project (Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations 
Involving Human Modelling) adapted as proposed in Figure 3 (Bruzzone et al. 
2015b). In facts the DIES IRAE is based on MS2G (Modelling, Interoperable 
Simulation and Serious Game) Paradigm (Raybourn 2012; Bruzzone et al.2014d) 
and it is composed by different simulators that are open to be federated in HLA 
(High Level Architecture): 
 DIES IRAE VIS (Virtual Interoperable Simulator): as stochastic discrete 
event agent driven simulation based on IA-CGF; this model includes 
HBM and simulates the actions of components, equipment, units and 
population.  
 DIES IRAE VIC (Virtual Interoperable Commander) is a Virtual 
Simulator adopting Serious Game approach that generate the Synthetic 
Environment where the events are occurring in order to be able to support 






 DIES IRAE SOCKS (Social Kinematics Simulator) is a discrete event 
model able to take care of demographics and social dynamics to 
incorporate the high level models of social dynamics.  
 
 
This extension of DIES IRAE is further expendable by the use of HLA (High level 
Architecture) interoperable standard that allows to federate this structure with other 
models and simulators; for instance, it could be possible to combine this simulation 
with other war-gaming solution to support Experimentation, Policy Definition, 
Operational Planning as well as training within CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise).  
Indeed, as proposed in Figure 3 the DIES IRAE could operate in multiple modes 
including among the others:  
 Stand Alone: Just DIES IRAE VIS simulating by IA-CGF the population 
dynamics of the migration in the scenario  
 Strategic Decision making NCF: combining DIES IRAE VIS and SOCKS 
to reproducing strategic dynamics as well as impact of COA (Course of 
Actions)  






 Full DIES IRAE: DIES IRAE complete NCF combining VIS-VIC-SOCKS 
to include also virtual representation  
 DIES IRAE Fully Federated also with external LVC Simulators: in this 
open case the HLA allows to federate the whole DIES IRAE NCF also with 
other Simulators (Live, Virtual, Constructive) compliant with HLA.  
So by this approach it is possible to use the simulator from stand-alone structure to 
fully federate, so the architecture is flexible and supports from a single user to a 
wide distributed simulation.  
Indeed, among the factors considered to be included in the DIES IRAE SOCKS, the 
following variables are considered:  
 Independent Variables  
o Birth Rates  
o Family Structures  
o Population at Origin Country  
o Population at Host Country  
o Distribution of Incomes per capita at Origin Country  
o Distribution of Incomes per capita at Host Country  
o Existing Migration Flows  
o Percentage of Regularized Immigrants  
o Political Situation in the Country of Origin  
o Political Situation in the Host Country  
o Criminality exploiting Human Trafficking  
o Unemployment Rate at Country of Origin  
o Unemployment Rate at Host Country  
o Attitude of the Security Council Members  
o Special Interest of major Players (Western Nations Europe / China and Russia)  
 
 Directly Controlled Variables  
o Immigration flows from Africa along the period 2026-2030 from sub-Saharan 
Areas  
o Evolution of Migration Flows  
o Evolution of Population at Origin Country  
o Evolution of Population at Host Country  






o Change in Distribution of Incomes per capita at Host Country  
 
In addition to the Controlled Variable by applying DOE, it could be possible to 
estimate the following Key Performance Indexes (Montgomery 2008):  
 
o Influence of Birth Rate on Migration Flows  
o Influence of unemployment on Migration Flows  
o Influence of per capita income on Migration Flows  
o Influence of social policies of countries of origin and destination countries on 
Migration Flows  
o Effect of the Migration Compact in EU Migration Flows  
o Xenophobia Level in host countries  
o Success Rate of Populist Parties  
o Terrorism Level in Host Countries  
 
In facts, the final goal for the decision makers is to investigate the impact of 
different factors on the scenario, for instance in terms of effectiveness of Migration 
Compact between Europe and African Countries; as alternative it could be 
interesting to investigate the potential of applying alternative solutions such as a 
“Marshall Plan for Africa”, as it has been done by USA at the end of the Second 
World War with the ERP (European Recovery Program, popularly known as 
Marshall, behind the name of the pro tempore US Secretary of State, George 
Marshall), in order to prevent/contain an “immigration phenomenon from them and 
to control the policies and economies of the countries beneficiaries of the plan” 
(Muller, 2016). 
It could be interesting to evaluate the position and influence of other major players 
in Africa scenario such as China in case of failure of Migration Compact.  
It could be important also to evaluate in European countries, the GDP and income 
evolution, the evolution of debts and the need of cheap labour for supporting 
economic growth; in general, it could be possible to evaluate indicators able to 
define the decline/rise of EU both in political and economic terms.  
Indeed, the model should support also estimation of impact of critical events such as 
famines, floods and epidemics, civil wars due to ethnic and religious fragmentation 






Katanga (Abi Saab 1978). These stochastic elements could be defined based on 
probability distribution influenced by simulation variable (Bruzzone, 2013d). 
 
2.2.3. Migration flows & data for a realistic case study: Nigeria. 
 
As example of available data to create a case study for completing the Verification, 
Validation of the model, it is proposed hereafter a realistic case study of migration 
based on current situation. This case is dealing with current migrant flows to 
Europe, with a special focus on African Western Routes involving Nigeria (see 
figure 4).  
 
 
In facts Nigeria is the Africa's most populous country, with a rapidly growing 
population. In 2016 Italian Government proposed an agreement named “Migration 
Compact” between European Union (EU) and Africa’s countries, with the scope of 
stabilizing the migration flow, trough legalization of the arrivals and a redistribution 
inside the EU of the migrants. The agreement however hasn’t been implemented, 
but in its place was adopted the “New Partnership Framework (NPF), which has 
driven in the last four years the EU migration policy. Meanwhile, experiences and 






expectations about future migration flows have been extensively analysed both at 
international and national level, based on latest developments (Bjarnesen, 2015).  
The data described below are the base that will be used to create the scenario for 
simulation; these data set are based on public domain sources available from 
Institutions and International Organization (UNHCR 2015, 2015b; ACLED 2016a, 
2016b; IOM 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d; Sabbati 2015; UNICEF 2016).  
Therefore, despite the specific value adopted it is evident that the proposed models 
could easily accept different values and hypotheses. Let’s now examine the country. 
Nigeria Facts: 
 Nigeria population: Nigeria is the 9th most populous country in the world 
with an estimated population of 150 million of people, one out of five 
Africans is from Nigeria. The country has been undergoing explosive 
population growth and has one of the highest growth and fertility rates in the 
world; current estimations are corresponding to 182 million inhabitants in 
2015 and 399 million forecasts for 2050 (DESA 2013).  
 Nigeria Economic Situation: Nigeria is one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world. Petroleum and oil resources play a large role in the Nigerian 
economy. The country is the 6th largest producer of petroleum in the world; 
it is the 8th largest exporter and has the 10th largest proven reserves of it. 
Moreover, occurrences of uranium have been discovered in North-eastern 
states of Bauchi, Adamawa and Taraba, and as well as in Plateau, Kano and 
Cross River States.  The government is planning to resuscitate its moribund 
cocoa factories at Idanre, suitable for chocolate with huge potentials for the 
production capacity.  
 Social Situation: Nigeria possesses a huge inequality in terms of wealth and 
poverty among population (UNICEF 2016). Indeed, while the Country has 
vast oil wealth, the large majority of Nigerians is poor: 71% of the 
population living bad on incomes less than one dollar a day and 92% on less 
than two dollars a day. The local life expectancy remains petty low and is 
estimated to have further decreased from 47 years in 1990 to 44 years in 
2005.  
 Political Situation: Along the last years Nigeria experienced military 
dictatorship, corruption, political instability and poor governance; these 






infrastructures and basic services that are totally inadequate respect the 
population needs. In addition, the corruption is very diffused and represents 
one the principal challenges in Nigeria. However, while the Government has 
been conscious of this problem the efforts to combat corruption have been 
not really successful.  
 Population and Collective Security: Along last months and years several 
thousand people have died in attacks led by insurgent and rebel organization, 
especially by Islamic State-aligned Boko Haram (BBC 2016). Indeed, the 
group has separatist aspirations that have further growth recently; they final 
goal is the establishment of a “State” where to impose Islamic law; the 
related successes in several northern areas of the Country have embedded 
divisions and caused thousands of Christians to move away. According to the 
“Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project”, between 1997 and the 
end of 2015 in Nigeria there have been 50,157 violent deaths 
(https://acleddata.com/tag/nigeria/) 
 Nigeria Migration and Human Traffic: Indeed, there are many reasons to 
migrate from Nigeria. From this point of view, the major host of people 
moving out from Nigeria is Italy, where many of the migrants arrive from 
South Sea Border; this corresponds to the fact that Italy has the record of 
Nigerian asylum applications. Based on recent available data over 12 months 
(December 2014 - November 2015), the Nigerians who have applied for 
asylum in Europe are 31,460, of which more than half in Italy (17,895 equal 
to 57%). An important aspect of the increase in human trafficking form 
Nigeria has been the growing involvement of crime that is responding to the 
business opportunity emerging from the urge to run away from the origin 
country. Although men are also victimized in this process, the overwhelming 
majority of those trafficked people are women and children. From this point 
of view most of them are teenagers or just little older girls (between 15 and 
24 years) according to IOM reports. Most of trafficked women arrive directly 
in Italy from very specific areas of Nigeria (e.g. the area of Benin City and in 
general from the South of the Country), for being used in forced labour, 
domestic servitude, or sexual exploitation. Indeed, the traffic of human 
beings, especially women and children, has become one of the most 






traffic and arms smuggling (Salt, 2000). Therefore, the trafficking always 
involves exploitation and the willingness of the victim to leave the country is 
almost always obtained through the use of deception, or coercion; indeed, the 
human being traffic represents a modern form of slavery and an affront to 
human dignity. From this point of view, the checklist compiled by IOM to 
recognize victims of trafficking includes following elements:  
o Gender: the victims are mostly women  
o Age: often young and children aged between 15 and 24 years; however, 
many victims claim to be adults although they are obviously minor  
o Nationality: majority of human traffic are from Nigeria and their origins 
is especially from Edo State, but also Delta State, Lagos State, Ogun 
State, Anambra State  
o Place of departure;  
o Level of Education: normally this level is pretty low with big difficulties 
even in communications;  
o Economic Status: often these victims are belonging to particularly needy 
families with economic problems;  
o Family Status: the victims are often the first daughters of large families;  
o Health Status: often the victims have evident physical signs of violence 
and even torture;  
o Personal Attitude & Behaviour;  
o Many behavioural problems (e.g. aggression-introversion);  
o Normally in a group, these victims are the most subservient and silent  
o Self-Description: They claim often to be orphans o They claim often that 
they have not paid the journey o They are have difficulties in telling their 
journey, especially in the final part, from Libya to Italy o They often 
declare that they have to reach a relative (sister or brother) or a friend in 
Italy or in Europe. 
 Migrations & Asylum in Nigeria Case: Although many Nigerians crossing 
the Mediterranean are undoubtedly in the condition of fleeing from the 
danger of death or from the exploitation or violence, despite to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(CE, Rome, 04.11.1950), the recognition rates for asylum and protection are 






and overall about 25% get protection in the various forms provided for by 
national law.  
 
In modelling the scenarios for Decision Makers on Migration Flows, it is evident 
that every human being has the inherent right to live and he owns the right to escape 
from situation where he is threatened by wars, famines, oppressive forms of 
government; obviously under these extreme conditions menacing life, the resulting 
flows becomes a survival solution generating almost unstoppable population stream, 
and unfortunately the world is expected to experience such phenomena until these 
problems will exist. Nigeria represents from this point of view a big challenge. 
Europe, as a proximity continent, is obviously a preferred destination for these 
migration flows, and so it is affected by those. However, the demographics 
presented above confirms that phenomena have a big inertia and should be not just 
attributed to temporary crisis situation; especially in the case of Nigeria, the crisis 
situations result, unfortunately, almost endemic and persistent. By the way this last 
consideration confirms the necessity to plan actions devoted to address and solve 
these issues concurrently with management of migration flows in order to win this 
challenge. The observation of the terrible events and the impressive quantity of 
drowned people in the Mediterranean Sea represents a dramatic example of the size 
and complexity of this situation, as well as the impotence of European Union and 
other major International Organizations and Non- Governmental Organization in 
dealing effectively with these phenomena. In addition to these elements, the 
complexity of social and political framework of the EU countries affects the 
capability to integrate and employ the migrants; economy, security and cultural 
issues are strongly influencing the public opinion generating opposition movements 
and social tensions (Lochocki, 2018). 
From this point of view, it could be interesting to consider also solutions for Africa 
based on the similitude of what USA did at the end of World War II, in order to 
prevent Europeans to immigrate massively in the United States. Borrowing the 
same perspective, all European Countries should help to find solutions to the 
problem, even if probably more efforts are expected to be required by those Nations 
and Corporations that have, or are continuing, to received special economic benefits 
from the exploitation of the riches of the African continent by aggressive policies. 






be planned and ruled in order to be manageable and sustainable; in addition, Europe 
should also consider the position and plan of other major players such as China, 
very active in Africa Continent, USA and Russia in order to succeed in its own 
global objectives.  
These considerations should be the basis to develop the scenario, to model the 
drivers and degrees of freedom that should be included in the simulation in order to 
be able to complete experiments useful to support the decision makers. 
 
2.2.4 V&V applied to Nigeria Case study  
 
This research is currently based on reorganizing the previous models and to develop 
new conceptual representation to reproduce the population dynamics; therefore 
some preliminary model about flows change due to stochastic factors has been 
introduced and model by applying discrete event Monte Carlo simulation; in this 
case, it was carried out a measure of the experimental error due to the pure 
influence of stochastic factors also in order to apply ANOVA (Analysis of 
Variance) to the simulator (Donohue 1994); the graph proposed in figure 56 
confirm the stability of the simulator and the acceptable confidence model of the 
preliminary version of the simulator DIES IRAE SOCKS in reproducing the 
migration flows.  
 
 






In the figure proposed, the average monthly flow to Europe since the starting year 
has been calculated for over 5 years; it is important to state that the predictive 
capability of the simulator is obviously limited respect complex target functions 
(e.g. social key performance indexes), therefore it is evident that migration flow 
quantities could be properly estimated over medium periods. 
This paper proposes the development of simulation models of migration flows 
based on Human Factors and Intelligent Agents; the complexity of the context is 
pretty hard, therefore previous researches in the field demonstrated the potential of 
this approach and the obtained results are pretty good. However, this research 
represents a first step to create scenarios, data set and models to conduct an 
experimentation where potential actions and policies are suggested in order to 
provide guidelines and support to decision makers. 
 
2.3 Joint approach to model Hybrid Warfare to support Multiple Players 
 
Hybrid Warfare is demonstrating its impact on vulnerability of the modern society 
especially related to social networks and innovative technologies, and it is strongly 
related to many different fields including economy, politics, strategic 
communications & media, cyber defence, social networks. The players on this game 
are required to master different techniques and subjects; due to these reasons this 
paper proposes an integrated approach devoted to be able to combine different 
models and elements within a simulation framework. The proposal provided by 
authors describe the model architecture as well as some model examples and an 




Nowadays the new technologies and social evolution are enhancing the impact of 
the phenomena that are usually defined as Hybrid Warfare (HW).  HW is based on 
non-linear actions (McCuen,2008; Racz, 2015; Thiele, 2015; JWC, 2015; Cayirci, 
Bruzzone et al. 2016; Radin, 2017) carried on in terms of discontinuities respect 
crisis evolution and in terms of actions across the DIMEFIL spectrum. Hybrid 
Warfare Strategists considers the whole common interconnected comprehensive 
environment (Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. 2016) as the place where carrying out 






favourable decisions without the need to be engaged in traditional warfare (Galeotti 
2016; Blinka 2017). The hybrid approach has been extensively used in the past 
(Hoffman 2009; Murray & Mansoor, 2016); indeed, even if there are still concerns 
about the proper use of the term Hybrid Warfare itself (Van Puyvelde, 2015), it is 
evident that the current world represents a very promising framework to experiment 
these techniques in new ways (Cayirci, Bruzzone et al. 2016). In facts the use of 
modern media and communication channels, directly reaching the population 
almost without intermediate control, allows to diffuse real and fake news, 
information and strategic messages that could heavily influence the behaviour of a 
Nation or an International Organization, as it was impossible just few years ago.     
A very good example is provided by the case of 2016’s USA presidential election, 
where it was scientifically measured (Enli, 2017) the greater influence of web social 
networks respect TV media in terms of capability of targeting specific messages on 
the electors (Bond et al. 2012). It is evident that the use of scientific models able to 
predict the reactions of populations, as well as that one of Institutions and 
Organizations, represents a strategic advantage.  
This scientific approach makes evident the potential of Modelling and Simulation 
(M&S) for studying HW and for related Educating & Training (E&T) of the 
decision makers. Therefore, as anticipated, Hybrid Warfare is based on concurrent 
actions that evolve based on a not progressive approach in terms of escalation; in 
HW the actions are characterized by discontinuity in attacking, concurrently, 
different elements of an opponent such as finance, media, cyberspace, population 
trustiness, politics (Keeton &McCann, 2005; Bachmann & Gunneriusson, 2014).    
In a hybrid environment characterized by high operational tempo and driven by 
acceleration (Di Bella, 2019), the actors are requested to operate on multiple layers, 
involving experts of the different domains, to maximize the impact of the actions 
over time; due to these reasons, it is proposed here a joint architecture to address 
this problem that is based on interoperable simulation and leads to create a common 
framework for virtual experimentation. An innovative approach has been 
undertaken by utilizing these concepts and a simulation architecture able to support 
its implementation; in facts, there are already examples of simulators able to address 
HW Scenarios where multiple players could introduce their expertise and test 
hypothesis and settings to play simulation based table top exercises, devoted to 






Indeed, this approach allows to evaluate reliability of available info and data by 
testing them on realistic virtual scenarios; in this way it becomes possible to finalize 
studies, comparisons and analyses based on validated and verified common 
simulation frameworks. In particular, it is proposed to use MS2G (Modelling, 
interoperable Simulation and Serious Games) as paradigm to develop new intuitive 
multi-layer environments where different players could interact dynamically 
(Bruzzone et al. 2014b).  
 
2.3.2 Complexity in Hybrid Warfare 
 
Different kinds of complexity are present in Hybrid Warfare; some are strongly 
related to the inner difficulty to identify the principia ruling some component as 
well as to model them (Cayirci, Bruzzone et al.2016); a very good example of that 
is related to modelling economics as well as rational and emotional processes ruling 
this framework (Rosser 1999; Bossomaier et al.2000). Therefore, other kinds of 
complexities are related to the high number of interactions among many entities that 
affect the system introducing emerging behaviours difficult to understand and 
predict (Bossomaier, Bruzzone et al. 2009). Obviously among the most complex 
elements it should be counted the population as well as human factors that is a 
corner stone in Hybrid Warfare (McCuen 2008; Baker 2015; Di Bella 2015; Lamb 
2016). All these aspects result today much more sensitive to HW respect the past 
especially due to responsiveness and vulnerability of social networks, web 
applications, mobile solutions and Internet of Things (Hashem et al. 2015; Turban 
2015; Larosiliere et al. 2017; Silva et al. 2017). 
For instance, it is very interesting today to develop models about the diffusion of 
real and fake news through social networks and the related trustiness evolution 
(Bruzzone et al., 2013a). So far, it is crucial to model these elements, and the 
present research track is focusing on the need to identify and model these multiple 
complexities and their interactions. It is fundamental to adopt an approach that 
enables the creation of innovative simulators able to reproduce these scenarios and 










2.3.3 New vulnerabilities  
 
Today, there is an “explosion” in terms of technological advances and new 
dependencies of the modern society respect to informatics, social media, satellites, 
power grid, etc. This aspect made the States and Population much more vulnerable 
at possible new types of HW attacks with catastrophic impacts (Davis 2015). 
Therefore, often it is not just necessary to conduct a real attack, but it could be 
devastating even to diffuse fake news driving fear and dissatisfaction among the 
population. This concept is much reinforced by the loss of credibility of most 
institutions or by their latency in reacting to such phenomena; it is sufficient to 
mention cases such as Iraq (supposed) weapons of mass destruction or the Anti 
Vaccination campaigns to realize that people do not have that much trustiness 
versus official Institutions and Organizations (Dadge 2006; Bennett 2016; Kadam 
2017). From this point of view, the Internet is a very effective channel able to 
diffuse so many information and to correlate them in a way that is possible to create 
consistent big data sets able to saturate the understanding critical capabilities of a 
large part of the population. In addition, this context is reacting very quickly to the 
actions; in facts while in case of traditional media (TV, Radio, Newspapers) it was 
required a lot of time and efforts to diffuse a message, the interactive nature of the 
web allows the individual to be targeted personally, but also to react actively by 
investigating and interacting with friends and opinion leaders. Syria Civil War 
presentation to media is a very good example of this fact (Fisk, 2017) and the 
“media war” on-going from the different actors with their specific interests are 
pretty evident to an expert eye as their ineffective approach respect young 
generations moving on the web that have a different perception (not necessary more 
correct. The point is that when trustiness is gone, it becomes very hard to recover; in 
such situation a ruthless, smart player could diffuse easily fake news and reinforce 
their credibility by properly preparing the web context in advance, for instance 
posting preliminary info and constructing source and expert credibility. These 
techniques have been experimented in entertainment industry with success; 
examples are the promotional campaigns for television serial as “Lost” and “District 
9” (Jones, 2007; Kapstein, 2014).  
Coming back to the Hybrid Warfare, it results evident that attacks does not have to 






could happened if it is diffused fear about a pandemic among the population (e.g. 
health care structure saturation, transportation and service shutdowns); in the USA, 
this was experienced with the campaign on Anthrax letter (Nunn, 2007).              
The government however,  in 2001, deemed on that regard to run an exercise to 
address the issue (code name Dark Winter) at John Hopkins University Centre for 
Civilian Biodefense Strategies (https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-
work/events-archive/2001_dark-winter/). 
From another point of view, cyber-attacks could result able to crush the power grid 
for some time (e.g. fridges and telephone not working, phones disabled, ATM and 
credit card network down, computers not available etc.) or in obscuring the 
satellites (e.g. GPS not working, communications breakdown), which represent just 
a few dramatic examples of the situation (Ottis 2008; Kallberg 2016). In facts, it is 
expected that in future the different actions characterizing hybrid warfare will be 
conducted in strict synergy to maximize their impacts on forcing the opponent to 
accept the conditions imposed by the attackers, in order to reduce the damages and 
maintain stable his society and infrastructures. So in the near future cyber and 
media attacks could be combined with attacks on other PMESII-PT layers and it 
could be necessary to create models able to reproduce these combined phenomena. 
In such kind of scenarios, it is very important to be ready to face the possible critical 
events in order to minimize the damages and to guarantee the keep control of the 
situation, solving the problems as fast as possible. Furthermore, the multitude and 
variety of the possible actions that could be carried out over the different layers 
represents a big challenge that requires multiple models and skills to be connected 
together. 
 
2.3.4 Multilayer and multiplayer architecture 
 
Obviously the difficulties in modelling all the different elements, the uncertainty 
affecting these contexts, as well as the mutual influence of many factors, suggest the 
development of new interoperable simulation solutions to support decision makers 
as well as experts. Indeed, the use of simulation allows to obtain results that are of 
great benefits in the analyses of these phenomena by recreating possible scenarios 
and evaluating risks and vulnerabilities. By this approach it becomes possible to 
investigate the influence of alternative hypotheses and boundary conditions respect 






in this sector the innovation, creativity, as well as previous experiences, have a 
crucial role in the study of Hybrid Warfare. So, any instrument able to share this 
kind of knowledge will represent a strategic advantage; in addition to this fact, the 
synergy among users, experts and simulation scientists guarantee to advance the 
researches and understanding of HW as well as to improve model capabilities in 
addressing such complex subjects. In general, it is evident that this context is a 
complex system and that simulation is the prime methodology to deal with it, 
however it is quite difficult and hard to maintain the development of a large 
standalone simulation system. In addition, the very eclectic nature of HW context 
requires to engage many different SME that are often not familiar with M&S 
techniques nor with HW; so in order to develop and validate the models it is 
necessary to create an environment that should be able to be intuitive and direct in 
presenting the scenario evolution to all these different subjects (Bruzzone et 
al.2017b). In this framework the use of models and technologies to develop 
effective capabilities, new doctrines and to develop valuable training programs is 
fundamental; in particular, the proposed approach is based on the idea to create a 
mosaic made by interoperable models able to be combined as tiles to cover an 
extensive part of the Hybrid Warfare, and even to propose to users an interactive 
and intuitive environment based on modern Serious Games (Raybourn 2012; 
Bruzzone et al.2014a, 2014b). 
 
2.3.5 A HLA Mosaic Architecture 
 
The metaphor adopted for this simulation is the “mosaic”: a mosaic where each 
component or layer, such as power grid or web social networks, serves as a tile able 
to interoperate with other ones. So it is evident that the risk in this approach is to be 
unable to play the game if some tile is missed. In order to avoid this problem, meta-
models should be adopted to cover each subject and substituting missing tile in 
order to be able to finalize the execution of the simulation in all conditions 
(Bruzzone et al. 2009; Barton 2015). Meta-models should serve as simplified 
representations of specific domains; each of them should use the same objects, 
attributes and interaction adopted by the overall simulation in order to be 









Figure 57 - A “mosaic” HLA Federation 
 
This approach enables to adopt different meta-models, more or less detailed, based 
on the need or, even, to substitute them by sophisticated models or simulator when 
required. A very important element of this approach is to guarantee the possibility 
to integrate also other simulators, already available, as well as real equipment in 
use, to present the situation to decision makers in a familiar way. Due to these 
reasons the it is suggested to define as interoperability requirement the adoption of 
IEEE 1516-2010 “evolved” that is the updated version of HLA standard (High 
Level Architecture). In order to be able to run a such complex federation, it is 
fundamental to automate the execution of the different federates; in facts the use of 
man-in-the-loop on this subject will result in requiring many simulation operators 
connected to run a single experiment and it will increase drastically the execution 
time, probably requiring to operate real-time. In addition to these elements, such 
traditional approach introduces also subjective components due to the human player 






this context it is fundamental to be able to run fast time simulations in large number 
to create a virtual expertise over this new subject; this could be achieved by 
introducing IA (intelligent agents) driving the simulation (Bruzzone 2013d). 
Therefore, the SME Players are still a fundamental element of this simulation, but 
they need to act based on the concept of the man-on the-loop, supervising the 
operations without getting lost in details. Indeed, in this case, the players are 
expected to supervise the simulation execution, while it is running fast time, just to 
assign high level tasks to the IAs as well as to introduce general attribute changes. 
Due to these reasons, it is necessary to include in the models, advanced IAs able to 
deal autonomously with the scenario evolution based on their own perceptions and 
their specific objectives. Simulation Team accumulated large expertise in this field 
by using the IA-CGF (Intelligent Agents Computer Generated Forces) in several of 
these subjects such as PSYOPS (PSYSOP Simulation, Psychological and cultural 
Simulation Of Population), CIMIC (CAPRICORN Federation, CIMIC And 
Planning Research In Complex Operational Realistic Network), Strategic Decision 
Making (SIMCJOH Federation, Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations 
involving Human Modelling), etc. (Bruzzone et al. 2009; Mastrorosa et al. 2012; Di 
Bella 2015). Indeed, the impressive IA-CGF capabilities in human behaviour 
modelling to support population simulation, as well as their native HLA structure, 
suggest to adopt them as core engine in this application; therefore, the open 
architecture of the proposed federation guarantee the integration of even other tools 
and solutions (Bruzzone & Sokolowski, 2012). Obviously it is fundamental, from 
this point of view, to provide users with an understandable picture of the scenario 
evolution, so it is evident that an additional and very important element of this 
federation should be an Intuitive & Immersive Mixed Reality Serious Game 
(I2MIRSEG). This module is devoted to create a synthetic environment intuitive for 
the different players representing the scenario dynamically evolving. Most players 
are expected to evaluate and interact directly with the I2MIRSEG federate and to 
get many information through a Mixed Reality (MR) interface presenting terrain 
and entities as well as additional information. In this MR representation, the overall 
situation could rely on different model tiles embedded in multiple federates and 
open to interact with external simulators. So, by this approach the overall simulation 
is a federation while the tiles will become parts of the federates, each of them will 






used effectively. It should be considered the fact the many of the domains to be 
covered could have already expertise subdivided in different heterogeneous pieces 
and framed in different formats, including not digital or computerized models.  
 
 
Fig.58 – I2MIRSEG Augmented Representation in T-REX Simulator 
 
These aspects suggest to proceed progressively in creating the meta-models 
corresponding to the different tiles by implementing the existing knowledge into 
them. Even very simplified models should be adopted when necessary to guarantee 
consistency, usability and maintainability. Indeed, the data availability could result 
sometime critical to finalize validation and verification as well as to guarantee the 
capability to keep updated the models (Amico et al. 2000). For each tile, it should 
be defined the set of objects representing the key elements as well as their attributes 
and the interactions to be adopted to modify them. For instance, for the federate 
incorporating the cyber-tiles the following objects could be included with relative 
attributes: 
 
 Cyber Defence: 
o Defensive Team Resources 
o Defensive Team Responsiveness 
o Defensive Team Efficiency 
o Defensive Team Effectiveness 
o Anti Virus Diffusion 
o Anti Virus Resilience 






 Cyber Attack: 
o Attack Team Resources 
o Attack Team Responsiveness 
o Attack Team Efficiency 
o Attack Team Effectiveness 
o Virus Dynamism 
o Virus Initial Injection 
o Virus Infectivity 
o Virus Resilience 
o Virus Level 
 
Specific interactions should be activated to allow to increase or decrease each of the 
scalable variable attributes by defining impact, lead time and duration; so for 
instance if it is decided to increase the number of the defensive team resources it 
could be used the interaction: modify_defensive_team_resources( dm, lt, dt) 
dm:  change in number of defensive resources 
lt: lead time required to start the to increase the resources 
dt: delta time required to complete the increase on the resources 
In similar way, interactions should be used to change the level of cyber assets to be 
targeted by a virus or the initial injections of the virus. The players in this game 
expected to interact with the scenario through their specific tools and simulators as 
well as through the common I2MIRSEG covering different domains; for instance, 
in the proposed case, it is expected to engage SME with different operational issues, 




 Cyber Defence 











2.3.6 T-REX: hybrid threats in multi-layer scenarios 
 
In order to conduct the experimentation, it is defined a scenario derived from 
previous researches carried out on these subjects, employing the T-REX Simulator 
(Bruzzone et al. 2013b; 2016a; 2017d); it involves a region (in a desert 
environment, so the water treatment facilities result particularly critical for the 
population), with different towns where a threat network operates. In this mission 
environment there is the presence of several interconnected critical infrastructures, 
i.e. power grid, water resources and oil supply chain, that the terrorist/threat 
network are supposed exploit, acting on different ways: cyber-attacks, use of small 
drones against critical infrastructures, coordinated attacks on media. 
One hypothesis assumes that the threat consists in a wing of small drone 
quadcopters equipped as IED in order to deliver explosives, in coordination with a 
cyber-attack, which has the objective of introducing viruses acting on data integrity 
to disable the defensive capabilities of the critical infrastructure compound. At the 
same time the threat network could diffuse over different media channels and web 
social networks real and fake news about the critical situation of the region and the 
vulnerabilities, spreading fear, mistrust and suspicion among the population. In any 
case, even though the drone attack on the critical infrastructure hasn’t been 
successful, the threat network can leverage on the media network corruption in 
order to display a massive damage; in case of successful attack, this fear will be 
further reinforced by additional media material creating a direct impact on water 
and oil distribution as well as on power availability in the houses. 
 






This is an example where different actions could be applied to create pressure on 
the opponent without forcing the situation to move into an armed conflict (Cayirci, 
Bruzzone et al. 2016b), even though the resources used by the threat network and its 
attack coordination capabilities makes it evident that the aggressor is much more 
than a group of terrorists. 
In this scenario, the IA-CGF are used to model the population that act 
autonomously based on their predefined life cycle (e.g. sleep, wake up, breakfast, 
moving to work, work, pause for lunch, work, moving back home, relax, having 
dinner, entertainment) in regular conditions and react to the crisis; in facts, for the 
agents the life cycle is not fixed and in case of perceiving critical events or changes 
in boundary conditions they react based on their perception and their own 
characteristics including psychological factors, human behaviour modifiers and 
previous experience. The adopted model has been integrated with the IA-CGF, 
therefore the IAs reproduce not only the people, but also their social networks and 
the corresponding interest groups (e.g. a leader, a religion, a social class, a 
generation, an ethnic group, etc.) to guarantee a proper representation of the social 
dynamics (Bruzzone 2013c). In this case, in addition to population models, it is 
present also an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) network 
mapping the Internet of Things (IoT) interconnected, and for each of these element 
and each of the links are defined variables mapping the levels of confidentiality, 
availability and integrity. These variables could be attacked by virus or other cyber 
actions, as well as restored by automated defences or cyber defensive resources; the 
events on the cyber layer interoperate with that ones on the physical space including 
power grid, water resources, strategic communications, etc. The threat network is 
hidden among the population and false alarms are generated as well as spill of 
information captured by HUMINT or ELINT, web watching and other intelligence 
resources. In facts, threat network members have their multiple operational statuses 
including dormant, stand by, planning, preparing, acting and they move on the 
terrain as the regular people; they could be hidden or detected and/or tracked and 
often they interact with regular people as well as with the ICT network based on 
their access capabilities.  
For the proposed scenario, the critical infrastructures are concentrated into a “safe” 
compound facing the sea and protected by different automated and traditional 






UAV and USV available for patrolling the area and investigated on suspects in case 
of alerts, in addition the area is protected by an air defence system, EW capabilities, 
surveillance systems & cameras and finally, the traditional security guards. In facts 
specific IAs are in charge of controlling these entities and units that interoperate 
autonomously in the mission environment based on high level tasks. As anticipated, 
the IEDs used by the threat network are small drone-quadcopters operating 
individually or as a swarm, and potentially directed by different control systems 
(e.g. prefixed GPS coordinates, inertial system). The simulation operates fast time 
and real time, making possible to slow down or accelerate execution speed by the 
user, to better understand the dynamics of the events. 
As I2MIRSEG support it is adopted the SPIDER (Simulation Practical Immersive 
Dynamic Environment for Reengineering), a virtual immersive interactive 
interoperable cube where virtual and augmented reality are integrated to propose the 
simulation to the user. Indeed, the SPIDER has been developed as CAVE (Cave 
Automatic Virtual Environment) by the Simulation Team to be interoperable 
through HLA with all the IACGF NCF (Non-Conventional Framework) and it 
represents an effective solution to achieve a clear operational picture of the whole 
situation (Bruzzone et al. 2016b). This interactive CAVE allows also to investigate 
details on specific assets, entities or elements of the networks by touch screen 
technologies as proposed in figure below.  
 
 
Fig.60 - SPIDER CAVE used as I2MIRSEG Solution 
 
The immersive IA-CGF NCF used for this simulation could also propose to users a 
virtual representation of the cyberspace, augmented by presenting the dynamic 
evolution of integrity, availability and confidentiality characteristics of each 








Fig. 61 T-REX: Cyberspace representation with Node Attributes 
 
2.3.7 Dynamic experimentation 
 
The test scenario to support dynamic VV&T (Verification, Validation and Testing) 
considering the following general independent variables:  
A Virus Resilience 
B Virus Infectivity 
C Anti-Virus Diffusion 
D Anti-Virus Share 
Last parameters represent the ratio between strong and regular Anti-Virus installed 
on the ICT resources.  
The target functions included three different factors:  
• CPT (Cyber Penetration Time): Time required to compromise the Critical 
Infrastructure ICT Network 
• CPV (Combined Physical Vulnerability): Number of Critical Infrastructures 
disable due to the combined Cyber and Physical Attack 
• PTD (Population Terror Diffusion): Diffusion of the terror among the population 









Fig. 62 T-Rex Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The experimental error of these target has been investigated through the temporal 
analysis of the Mean Square Pure Error while a CCD (Central Composite Design) 
has been experimented to finalize the sensitivity analysis (Montgomery 2008).        
In figure 62, it is proposed the sensitivity analysis expressed in terms of contrasts 
respect CPT target function; in this case the values above zero represent direct 
influence of the corresponding variable on the output while the others result to have 
a negative proportional influence. The analysis confirms the consistency of the 
overall model; the high number of combined factors influencing the target functions 
confirms the complexity of the problem. 
In conclusion, it has been proposed a joint approach for creating a synthetic 
environment able to simulate Hybrid Warfare scenarios. The case proposed 
represent a first example among many possible examples and the related 
preliminary experimentation confirmed the potential of this approach and the 
validity of the models. The future goal of this initiative is to create a joint team of 
top experts able to support these developments as well as to continue to add new 











2.4 Time management in Hybrid Warfare: rise of Strategic 
      Engineering  
 
Time, in its physical dimension and social perception, appear nowadays often 
neglected in Military Operations because of other overwhelming concerns, such as 
firepower and geometry of the battlefield; instead we would like to highlight that 
time is a critical concern as well for a military commander, from tactic to strategic 
levels. “Commodity of Warfighting is Time”, remarked Scott Swift (ret. USN Adm) 
during the panel discussion at DARPA’s sixty anniversary in September 2018 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33VAnIEjDgk) . 
This paragraph reviews, based on current operations, some of the critical issues to 
be addressed in order to develop a strategic capability based on innovative 
technologies; the aspect of time and timing is outlined as one of the main factors 
that lead to success as it is well known not only in military operations, but even in 
the everyday life. 
It is evident that the approach proposed based on introducing science and models 
into this context emerges as one of the crucial elements to succeed, as well as the 
necessity to let decision makers and experts to interact within common immersive 
and intuitive interactive simulation frameworks. These considerations suggest the 
need to develop Strategic Engineering as a new discipline addressing these issues 
and preparing new generations of decision makers and scientists. Indeed, today 
technologies sound as great enablers; however, it is very important to decide how to 
use and to shape new solutions, and thus evaluating up-to-date situations as well as 
consolidated knowledge to identify a need for developing new capabilities based on 
quantitative approaches. 
Sun Tzu define the importance of completing proper quantitative analysis by saying 
that “the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the 
battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes, but few calculations 
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to 
defeat”. 
It is evident that today, the calculation capability mentioned by Sun Tzu relies on 
advanced modelling and simulation used to support decisions as well as on data 
science and smart techniques to support decisions. These aspects are obviously 






business and it is fundamental to guarantee access to this capability by preparing the 
“calculation” systems, the people that have to operate and feed them as well as the 
decision makers that should be able to get benefits from their usage. 
In the next paragraphs it is proposed an approach to develop new capabilities in 
strategic engineering of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), in which 
hybrid and asymmetric threats are present. In facts one of the scarcest resource in 
developing strategies is often the Time, and we consider it in its wide definition, 
including physical and human phenomena that affect execution of plans. It is 
evident that Time could often make difference between success and failure respect 
strategy development. 
 
2.4.1 Fight by the minutes: Time and the Art of War, Robert Leonhard, 
1994-2017 
 
"I act not by laws, but by minutes." - Alexander Suvorov (1729-1800). 
 
In this paragraph, we will frame the phenomena of Hybrid Warfare inside the 
remarkable theoretic work of Lieutenant Colonel (Rtd) US Army R. Leonhard, 
which introduces his book “Fight by the minutes: Time and the Art of War” written 
in 1994, with the phrase: “My thesis is simple: the most effective way to perceive, 
interpret, and plan military operations is in terms of time, rather than space”. There 
is no doubt that, according to the author, that traditional military history has dealt 
with the subject of warfare just from a spatial perspective, a three-dimensional box 
shaped by length, width, height. But there is a fourth dimension in warfare, time. 
From such perspective, addressing the dimension of time allow to understand the 
four temporal characteristics of Warfare: duration, frequency, sequence, and 
opportunity, and to master at a nation’s advantage. If that holds true, the corollary is 
that adopting a temporal perspective in conflict management can make the 
difference in warfare. Such innovative contribution ideally reconnects his thought 
with a remarkable military leader of the past, Napoleon, who was always busy at 
mastering the time while denying such scarce resource to his adversaries on the 
battlefields. “The loss of time is irreparable, in war...Space you can recover…time 






In the Preface to 2nd edition (July 2017), Leonhard highlight that “Time factors 
remain largely unexplored”. More than ever, duration, frequency, sequence, and 
opportunity aspects continue to frame war, peace, and the murky middle-ground 
that some have named “the grey zone”; more recently Thiele (2015) expressed that 
“grey is the new colour of war”, this because although in the past irregular warfare 
have been often used due to the weakness of the actor with no sufficient means to 
engage using conventional warfare, future brings challenges where hybrid warfare 
is used not only by weak states and none-state entities, but also by powerful and 
capable states.  
According to Leonhard, in order for the US to meet their strategic obligations, it is 
necessary to compensate for decreasing mass (because of the decline of the US 
military presence oversea since the end of cold war) with increased velocity: 
Strategists then are challenged by the problem of accelerating the movement of 
mass over time. From this perspective, the advantages in terms of time savings 
derive in peace time from good planning and exercising (see Figure 63).  
 
Figure 63 - Timeline of Crisis: acceleration 
 
However, once a crisis has sparkled, acceleration (m/s2) express how fast a unit or a 
system can change speed, direction, verse. Again, a high capacity for acceleration is 
valuable to a commander in war, but it drains rapidly scarce resources (such as 






acceleration and mass have an inverse relationship: the greater the mass, the less the 
acceleration and vice-versa according to Leonhard. The two major military 
operations carried out in the last 20 years by US Army - Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - have witnessed a high capacity of 
“acceleration” (understood as the capacity to plan and execute a projection of large 
combined forces across land, sea and air), followed however by a sort of 
deceleration in terms of decreased mass and speed of execution. From this 
perspective then, while the timeline of crisis is driven by acceleration ((m/s2), the 
timeline of decommissioning is driven by an almost endless deceleration (-m/s2) 
(fig.64, Di Bella, Strategic Engineering for Defence and Homeland Security, 
Strategos Workshop, Rome 16th September 2019). 
 
Fig. 64 - Timeline of decommissioning: deceleration 
 
In order to understand the figure above, it is necessary to inquiry about the meaning 
of END STATE. It represents, according to the US (DoD JP3-0), “The set of 
required conditions that defines achievement of the Commander’s objectives”; so 
the successful completion of any military operation must be matched against it, as 
defined in campaign plan and eventually achieved during the campaign’s execution. 
End State, kept secret or not, looks like then pretty militarily in its essence, but 






military commitment is not necessary anymore (decommission of the force). Years 
of campaign without the achievement of the desired End State can result in the 
change of the End State itself into a new one and so on, for an un-precise numbers 
of years, assuming that the intervening country can afford politically, socially, 
economically and military such exhausting struggle. So, any “conflict” engineering 
should take into account this inherent limit, which not known at the beginning of 
the engagement, but if disregarded can bring serious consequences (Di Bella, 2019). 
For the above considerations is imperative then, for the professional military but 
also for the civilian policy makers and for those employed in Defence apparatus as 
scientists, engineers, administrative staff etc. - to first comprehend and then master 
the temporal characteristics of warfare. 
Conflicts, as we have seen, both in their pure military but also hybrid form, have a 
duration. That is, they have a beginning and an ending, often not well defined; this 
is very important mainly for the civil and military actors called to react, identifying, 
in case of a Hybrid Threats, if attacks have escalated into an open aggression or are 
kept under the threshold without triggering the UN Chapter VII provisions (Cayirci, 
Bruzzone, et al. 2016). However, the duration of a war/hybrid confrontation is 
managed by the top political level of a country, and as well by the military 
establishment, the last though a function that describes how well that war is carried 
out by the troops. In addition to that, there are a number of independent variables—
some obvious, some hastily reduced to nuances in order to over simplify the issue, 
and some even unknown at the beginning —whose product determine the duration 
of a war.  
It makes sense then following statement of Von Clausewitz: “Both belligerents 
need time; the question is...which of the two can expect to derive special advantages 
from it”. Mao Tse Tung in 1937 in his book Guerrilla Warfare, commenting about 
the conduct of operations during Chinese Civil War, quoted: "Why a protracted 
war? "The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation is there. 
But... the enemy's advantage can be reduced and his shortcomings aggravated by 
our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our 
shortcomings remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert 
subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated”. And it was so! 
However, duration brings as well attrition, exhaustion, and capitalizing on the 






to unleash grave consequences to both victor and vanquished. Wars that last longer 
than expected challenge constitutions, destroy domestic harmony, and cause 
governments to fall; World War I, the Great War, it is a clear example (four empires 
vanished: Austrian, German, Turkish and Russian, leaving back enough embers to 
ignite a bigger fire). But as the statesman and commander contemplate the factors 
leading to duration, it is likewise imperative that they remember the consequences 
of it for the armed forces, the state, the economy, and the people. Indeed, in 
Western Countries we are taught – and we were used to thought - that a war has a 
beginning and end, marked by declaration of war and armistice/peace treaty. 
However, contemporary dimension of conflicts, starting from LIC, MOOTW, PKO, 
Proxy Wars and finally Hybrid Warfare often blurs into something not clear and 
which does not belong to the obsolete categories of War and Peace, at least as they 
were intended and categorized until the XIX century. The definition of Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC) is then very interesting for our discourse: LIC it is defined 
as “A political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below 
conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It 
frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. 
Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force” (Leonhard, 
1997). But, as Leonhard promptly warns, “Low Intensity Conflicts must not be 
translated into Low Importance Conflict”. According to US doctrine, LIC breaks 
down into four broad categories: insurgency/counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, 
combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. Insurgency warfare 
pits unconventional, usually well-organized military/political groups against an 
established state's government, police, and armed forces. Peacekeeping operations 
(PKO) involves the positioning of a neutral (usually multinational) armed force 
between two states or factions in order to lessen the chance of conflict (the typical 
UN Mission, starting from UNTSO - Unites Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization established in 1948). Combatting terrorism is aimed at preventing 
terrorist attacks (i.e., antiterrorism), and reacting to terrorist attacks (i.e., 
counterterrorism). Finally, PCO, Peacetime Contingency Operations (Leonhard, 
1994-2017). In this contest, in 1993 the US Field Manual 100- 5 introduced a new 
army term to address the problem: Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Although 
not exactly synonymous with LIC, OOTW certainly comes closer to addressing the 






In conclusion of his work, Leonhard states that “At each level of conflict, from the 
technical to the strategic, a temporal perspective will reveal new challenges, new 
opportunities. My hope is that interested students of war, both in uniform and out, 
will glance at their watches and get to work. Leonhard clearly calls for innovation, 
indeed in a very sober as much as vibrant style: “Armies don't innovate; people 
innovate. The single most important quality in a professional military officer is the 
ability to innovate. In an age of increased technological advancement and socio-
political upheaval, the number of transitions in military art and science will 
multiply, with the result that in the span of an officer's career warfare will undergo 
several dramatic changes. The failure of the officer corps to keep up with change 
can result in national disaster. But how can a military establishment—by its very 
nature a conservative establishment—systematically and consistently train its 
officers to innovate?” (Leonhard, 1994-2017). The question posed by Leonhard has 
not been answered yet; however, the author believes that Modelling and Simulation 
tools and technique can represent the safe “tank” where innovative and advanced 
technical solutions can be tested, exploiting the advantage of doing it in a synthetic 
environment.  
 
2.4.2 Models for supporting strategies 
 
The main goal of this paragraph is to consider the issues related to Time within 
different kinds of operations with special attention to Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW) and to consider it respect other Measures of Merits (MoM). 
From this point of view, it is interesting to consider the potential of a new emerging 
discipline such as Strategic Engineering in supporting achievements of strategic 
goals respect existing risks and stochastic factors, especially into unusual mission 
environments such international mission, asymmetric or hybrid warfare. It is 
important to outline that this context have been already investigate by the authors in 
terms of creating simulation solutions able to support analysis as well as new 
doctrine development respect complex mission environments (Bruzzone et 
al.2016a); these results have been presented both to Nations and NATO and resulted 
a successful example of models that could be effectively used for creating a 
Strategic Engineering Capability. The T-REX Simulator operating from an 






proposed to allow analyst to investigate a complex scenario involving threat 
networks population behaviour, cyber warfare, critical infrastructures (i.e. power 
grid, oil resources, water resources), autonomous systems on both side. 
In this sense the authors participated in experimentation of innovative solutions 
based on new paradigm MS2G (Modelling, interoperable Simulation and Serious 
Games) devoted to support Commander and his staff in Strategic Decision Making 
respect SIMCJOH Project (Di Bella 2015). Figure 65 propose the example on how 
cooperative decision making is carried out immersed - with the employment of 
SPIDER- in the scenario dynamics by interacting with the simulator and population 
behaviour, as well as with the virtual humans representing Commander’s staff 





2.4.3 Strategy: long vs short term achievements in Capricorn simulation  
 
As starting point, it could be interesting to remind the definition of Strategy; the 
word derives etymologically from Greek and results from combining στρατός 
(army) and ἄγω (leading); indeed, based on classic definitions, Strategy relies on the 
capability to develop effective plans able to achieve success in challenging 
situations such as business, politics, war, etc. Looking back to quotes from the past 
a very good definition is provided by General Jomini in his “Prècis de l'Art de la 






Guerre” (1838): “"La Stratégie est l'art de bien diriger” (Strategy is the art of well 
leading”); Carl von Clausewitz in Der Krieg (1832) wrote that “We need a 
philosophy of Strategy that contains the seeds of its constant rejuvenation, a way to 
chart strategy in an unstable environment”. Now the necessity to develop a 
conceptual approach and methodologies to continuously control strategy evolution 
respect a very dynamic and unstable environment, makes evident the actuality of 
this consideration. 
If we look to the words of one of the major text in strategic planning, Militarische 
Werke (Von Moltke, 1871), it is clearly outlined the challenge to keep plan up dated 
respect evolving situation and the need to proper develop this capability: “No plan 
of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main 
hostile force”. In addition to hostile force dynamics, it should be even considering 
the difference on mission environments requiring specific approaches and avoiding 
possibility to generalize single case. From such perspective the Russian 
Commander (and professor at the military academy) Aleksandr Svechin (soon after 
victim of the Stalin’s Great Purges), wrote in his book on Strategy in 1927 that “it is 
extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary 
to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, 
demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some 
template".  
So, the importance of Strategy was known and concepts formalized since centuries 
ago; however, it seems that nowadays there are problems to apply such knowledge 
to current operations. For instance, many modern conflicts result into a mess 
because of the non-application of strategic knowledge: French Indochina, Korea, 
Vietnam, Gulf Wars (Betts 1978, Mueller & Mueller 1993; Summers 2009; Pauly 
2017), while the standoff in Iraq and Afghanistan are more recent examples. From 
this point of view, even humanitarian operations and large plan often fail in many 
contexts, even related to small regions when resource applied appear to be huge 
(Muchemi 2017; Bruzzone et al., 2017d). To many, the “apparent” failures and 
difficulties into achieving strategic goals are related to the real complexity of the 
problems; this topic is even more popular nowadays, in a period where political and 
cultural movements, currently defined as “populist”, apply severe simplifications 
often without strong foundations, in some way emotionally reacting to partial/total 






Experts. Currently as reaction against this attitude, it is becoming very popular 
among so called “experts” the sentence “complex problems have simple, easy to 
understand wrong answers”. Now, this absolutist statements are currently promoted 
by opponents of populism reacting exactly on the same mood, in facts such 
assumption sounds questionable as “involution” of a much more acceptable 
sentence “we should be careful about simple solutions to complex problems” 
(Statell, 2014). Despite author’s personal point of view and the evidence that we 
need good capabilities and skills to solve problems, it is important to consider that 
thinking back to history, we can find many cases where simple solutions solved 
pretty complex problems, at the price however to upturn cultural and social 
orthodoxy; among the cases, the Gordian Knot (solved by Alexander with a single 
slash of his sword), which represents a metaphor for an intractable problem. 
This consideration should allow readers to reject all polarized approaches such as 
Black/White, or Simple/Complex, but to apply lateral thinking realizing that things 
need to be analysed considering their specific nature and characteristics; nowadays 
conflicts (Hybrid Warfare the most), carried out across DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT 
spectrum/vectors, are inherently complex, following non-linear dynamics (Von 
Fellman, Bar-Yam & Minai, 2015).  
Let’s now return on the example of Alexander the Great (not just the Gordian Knot 
episode, but his whole life) as we try only qualitatively to dig in a little bit on what 
“Complexity” meant in the fourth century B.C.  Here we have a man (Alexander), 
born into a court where assassinations and intrigues were common and the 
capabilities required to survive were gigantic, not to forget collective phenomena as 
plague, famine and recurrent wars. So looking at Alexander just as a “great general” 
and “gifted horseman warrior” it is an evident simplification, considering that his 
capabilities were much more articulated just to allow him to survive in early years 
and become an entrusted King. Moreover, from the military side, it is not to 
undervalue the transformation he made out of the Macedonian “phalanxes” into an 
army able to travel the world and conquer gigantic empires, usually located at a 
distance that today could require more than two months by forced march on roads 
that at his time don’t even exist. This consideration leads to point out that the 
complexity on past time was not at all so little respect our modern world, so we 







Another aspect to be mentioned is the problem in taking decisions due to the 
necessity to satisfy a too wide community of heterogeneous stakeholders. In this 
contest another contestable sentence is that we have “too much democracy” and that 
dictatorship systems are more efficient. Indeed, the importance to have a common 
plan and single mind in charge is well known, as well known are it limits, as it was 
the case of the “Dictator”, role that Roman Republic assigned pro tempore to a 
highly qualified person, to serve as magistrate entrusted with the full authority of 
the Republic in order to face a military emergency or a crisis (in facing the threats 
posed by Hannibal of Carthage, the system didn’t prove to be so effective, 
however). For the reasons above, the success of strategies does not rely on just 
dictatorship approach. The current main problem then is related to common 
decision making coupled with short terms goals versus long terms achievement, and 
the necessity to satisfy a wide audience of supporters without the 
authority/possibility to lead them.  
This issues are addressed very well inside CAPRICORN simulation (figure caption 
below), set in the Afghan province of Kapisa, in which the commander should 
achieve short term goals (Quick Impact Project as the excavation of water dwells) 
vs. long term ones (End State: pacification of the province); the Commander so has 
at the same time the necessity to secure the province from the insurgents and to 
realize water dwells and other welfare facilities. Both objectives are important; 
achieving one, but not the other, brings to failure. 






2.4.4 Strategic Engineering and Strategies 
 
It is clear that the issues in terms of lack of strategy and poor leadership of cadre 
and elites, outlined above, need to be addressed by the cultural, political and 
military establishment of a country. On that regard, it is worth mention an emerging 
new discipline, defined as Strategic Engineering, which represent comprehensive 
approach to design, develop and use new solutions in order to achieve strategic 
results against risks, uncertainty, competitors, diminishing resources, threats and 
within critical environments (Bruzzone 2018; Bruzzone and Di Bella, 2019). 
Indeed, Strategic Engineering is based on the integrated use of innovative 
technologies such as M&S (Modelling and Simulation), AI & IA (Artificial 
Intelligence and Intelligent Agents) and Machine Learning as well as Data Science 
to face Challenges & Uncertainty in Complex Systems and have a wide spectrum of 
application fields from Defence to Homeland Security, from Government to 
Industrial Applications; obviously these capabilities are based on enabling 
technologies and advances that make possible to collect, analyse and process data in 
models as it was impossible in past years. Therefore, strategic engineering addresses 
also the crucial issue to create transdisciplinary teams where scientists and decision 
makers could work together, so it requires an evolution on the skill and methods in 
use within these categories; obviously, new Education and Training (E&T) 
programs will be necessary to prepare new generations to get benefit of this 
integrated approach.  
 
2.4.5 Tempus Fugit: Time as crucial element in strategies 
 
Among all challenges in Strategy Development, it is evident that one of most 
crucial element is represented by time constraints as well as the capability of 
achieving specific results in accordance with the planning; these elements represent 
probably one of most crucial element for the final success. Indeed, despite the 
impossibility to generalize cases, it is evident that examples are very useful to 
improve general understanding if the above mentioned considerations are kept in 
mind; so in the following, some examples are proposed.  
Today, a disgruntled Public Opinion in the Western Countries is witnessing the 19th 
year of the US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan. In such contest, time, 






neglected factor in the political and military analysis in the Western Countries; this 
is witnessed by the current statements of US and NATO officials, which are putting 
the emphasis on “conditions based” end of both Resolute Support (NATO) and 
Enduring Sentinel (US) operations in Afghanistan. Of course not any time lapse can 
be pre-determined or pre-imposed, but for the same consideration it cannot be 
endless. Such approach however, necessary for the achievement of mission 
objectives (short term goal), could potentially introduce big risk of wasting a scarce 
resource in conflicts such as Time, marking a turn down in its comprehension and 
management. In any case Time, intended as physical and human phenomena, it is 
ineludibly and its eventual mismanagement poses serious hindrances in strategy 
development (long term objectives). The final line is to propose a time management 
in military operations vs other measurable indexes of effectiveness, by the 
contribution of the surging discipline of Strategic Engineering, which has the 
potential to achieve strategic results against risks, uncertainty in the management of 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), other types of Asymmetric 
confrontation, and Hybrid Threats.  
 
2.4.6 Challenging scenarios 
 
There are examples of regions, along centuries, that resulted in very challenging 
scenarios for military operations. Classical cases are Russia (e.g. Russian 
Campaigns from Napoleon to World War II) to Vietnam (e.g. Vietnam War, Sino-
Vietnamese War), where it is possible to observe that the geographical region in 
terms of terrain and population spirit result to have a fundamental role against 
opponents, even when they belong to a major well trained force (Goscha 2017; Sar 
Desai 2018). 
Afghanistan is another good example of a region able to provide many troubles to 
several strong players such as British Empire, former Soviet Union, United States 
and even NATO. Afghanistan has been going through many conflicts during 
history, such as Anglo Afghan Wars in the XIX century, Afghan Civil War and 
Soviet Unit intervention in the XX century, War against terror and Civil War in the 
XXI century (Jalali, 2017). Therefore, it is interesting to note that in previous 
centuries, when satellite and drones were not even a dream, Alexander the Great, 






quite different approaches; as anticipate we don’t want to over simplify, but it is 
evident that strategy could be successfully applied even in challenging scenarios. 
 
2.4.7 CAPRICORN: CIMIC simulation in Afghanistan  
 
“Throughout the ups and downs of this conflict, it's become evident that the United 
States is not going to defeat the Taliban insurgency, even though it can prevent a 
Taliban victory” (The Washington Post, 1st September 2018). 
 
Let consider a brief exposition of the current situation in Afghanistan as for 2019 
(from Press and OSINT). Nowadays, US Government feels indeed the necessity to 
bring to a close an 18-year-old war, even though its efforts seem to be jeopardized 
by the political upheaval in Kabul and the stalemate in the confrontation between 
Insurgents (Taliban, ISIS K etc.) and the International Community - backed 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The much expected 
negotiation between US officials and Taliban is not likely to take place any time 
soon, after the face turn of US administration in August 2019. Subsequent steps in 
order to re-open talks between US administration and the Taliban (with an 
embarrassed GIROA in the middle) have been taken between end of 2019 and 
beginning of 2020, without however any concrete outcome, so far. 
This case it is a good example of how quantitative analysis based on reliable models 
should be applied to consider human factors and timing in strategy development. 
Indeed, the authors were involved, respectively as Project Leader and Military 
Expert, in the development of innovative M&S solutions applied to Kapisa region 
in Afghanistan to support operational planning for CIMIC and PSYOPS in strong 
connection with the general plan. The simulator CAPRICORN (Cimic And 
Planning Research In Complex Operational Realistic Network) was a stochastic 
simulator, federated with other HLA models and able to reproduce CIMIC and 
PSYOPS operations as well as their interactions with the human factors of the 
whole population in the region as well as military units, paramilitary entities and 
insurgents as proposed in figure below (Bruzzone et al. 2013d). The data and the 








Fig. 67 -  Groups, People and military Units in Capricorn 
 
Capricorn is based on the IA –CGF paradigm, developed by Simulation Team, and 
it is aimed at the creation of CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) simulator able to 
consider key operational and territorial factors. CAPRICORN allows the user to set 
up a new mission environment, therefore enabling him to change and test 
hypothesis about new contests; in particular, users are entitled to define the 
operational planning and execute the operations in a contest of influencing the 
population behaviour in the affected area. Moreover, the population generated is 
consistent with user hypothesis and statistical data publically available; from this 
perspective, IA-CGF allows to define and generate, through Montecarlo techniques, 
ethnic, religious, political, educational and health status of each specific group of 
the population.  
 
 2.4.8 Time management in Hybrid Warfare and MOOTW 
 
It was already clearly stated that according to the author, time is the major aspect in 
strategy development, and now we have to consider the specific concept of Time 
Management in Warfare (either classical/symmetric or asymmetric/hybrid form). 
In the Modern era, Napoleon should be credited as the first modern Strategist that 
derived from the management of the forces on the battlefield an insight about the 






of time in war is irreparable. Space you can recover…time never”, he once 
asserted”. In the contemporary age, the credit to have re-introduced meaningful 
considerations about time and its impact in the military operations has to be given to 
Robert R. Leonhard, which elaborated the concepts in his opera “Fighting by 
minutes: Time and the Art of War”, (Leonhard, 1994). 
Indeed, based on this considerations, Time could be considered as the leading factor 
in the Strategic Engineering analysis of Hybrid Warfare and MOOTW. This is 
especially true in conditions where the asymmetric threats could obtain support 
from local population and get reinforced while regular forces are worn down over 
time; obviously this situation could be capsized by getting support of the 
population, condition that is hard to achieve in case of time delaying operations and 
long term warfare, as happened in some scenarios (Galula 2002; 2006). As such 
condition happen, as in the case of Afghanistan, Time turns to be a decreasing 
resource for the so called “Western Powers”, which are affected by internal public 
opinion, current alliances framework and neighbouring country attitude, and last but 
not least, economic sustainability. 
The consideration about Time drives immediate consequences about the desired 
End State. For instance, while a short time span corresponds to a classic military 
confrontation (symmetric warfare), over long time instead could evolve into a 
MOOTW or Civil War frame. Both of them as a certain point could potentially 
crash against the available Time resource; obviously this resource is not known in 
advance, and it is continuously decreasing. Indeed currently the authors are 
considering to develop a model that hazards a correlation among the time necessary 
to reach the End State and the most critical parameters; among these it is considered 
for sure the human development index of the Country to be stabilized, the GDP of 
the intervening country, the intervention limit threshold, identified in terms of 
power (e.g. task force, battlegroup, etc.) beyond which the level of commitment of 
the intervening nation is subject to the scrutiny of public opinion. All these elements 
are strong affecting the time scale and to delay specific achievements could result in 
losing support of public opinion, decision makers or even of your own troops. 
In any case, usually the weakest among the competitors try to get more time, in 
order to overcome the disparity, especially if he could count on some external 
support (e.g. environmental conditions, local population, domestic public opinion of 






In the proposed asymmetric confrontation ongoing in Central Asia, the time works 
against the Western Forces, while it is almost a bottomless resource for the 
Insurgents. From the other hand, time in Symmetric Confrontations among Global 
Military Powers (US, China, Russia, etc.), not mediated by any form of Hybrid 
Warfare, it is non-influent variable, since the power unleashed from the respective 
arsenals in their conventional, nuclear and cyber dimension, could rapidly (matters 
of days, if not of hours), determine the war exhaustion of one or both sides. 
 
2.4.9 Strategic Engineering for Hybrid Warfare & MOOTW 
 
As anticipated, the Strategic Engineering is the process of using engineering 
approaches and technologies in the designing and analysing new solutions in order 
to achieve Strategic Results against time constraints, risks, uncertainty, and multi 
faced threats in critical environments. Obviously MOOTW are very good examples 
of this complex scenarios, where it is necessary to develop Strategic Engineering in 
order to guarantee its capability to offers an effective body of knowledge 
(Discipline) for this purpose. Strategic Engineering as discipline should be 
structured in order to be able to cope with planning, execution, evaluation, 
assessment and lead of MOOTW and Country Building Operations, at Political and 
at Military Strategic levels. In a future it could be expected to have in the future a 
Strategic Engineering Cell, located inside a Provisional or Transitional Civil-
Military Authority, with the mission to identify and build the parameters necessary 
for the Stabilization Requirements, developing new strategies, with an eye to the 
hourglass. As example, in the stabilization of Afghanistan, the Western Powers 
have so far followed the traditional approach, which is the one adopted at the end of 
WWIIs: win militarily, then initiate the dissemination of western style democracy 
together with an aided economic development. This was indeed right for a 
symmetric confrontation, where the challenge it was winning the military 
confrontation in its geometric domain, but has proven so far unsuccessfully in 
asymmetric conflicts, where instead the time, in its physical and human dimension, 
it is the dictating size. So far then, the security has been the primary concern to 
address before all the others, with a constant difficulty by the military establishment 
to comprehend that even overwhelming victories of the Coalition/Government 






In any case, the paradigm of any military operation has always been the defeat of 
the opposing forces. The focus has always been the defeat of the military 
component of the enemy, with little or to late efforts to cope with the country and 
the time constraints; mismanaging of those aspects lead to the disaster suffered by 
the French during the Peninsula Campaign (1808-1814), passing through Vietnam 
War and arriving to current struggle in Afghanistan. Indeed, as the long and costly 
US and NATO commitment to Afghanistan drags itself on rather than with a clear 
ending (spanning over a temporal dimension which encompass a generation), this 
brings further evidence that pretending to extinguish a complex conflict (which it is 
a jigsaw of ethnic and tribal rivalry, civil war, criminal panels, country/institution 
building issues, unfriendly neighbours etc.), with military means coupled with 
“throwing” money at the problem, - well, this has been proven to be not successful.  
 
 
Fig. 68 – Afghanistan: throwing money at the problem (The Economist, 2015 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/10/07/afghanistan-15-years-on). 
 
Strategic Engineering in such contests has the potential to introduce a new 
dimension in the military operations, by integrating in the conflict management the 
capacities deriving from Quantitative Modelling for to Decision Making Support, 






3. SIMCJOH: a run (time) against the clock 
 
3.1 Project Overview  
 
In January 2015, with the document "Gap Analysis Report on Modelling and 
Simulation in Support of Military Training", NATO emphasized how "Success in 
today's conflicts can no longer ignore the exact perception of human behaviour", 
and that it was therefore necessary “by creating specific behavioural models, 
assessing the impact of the human factor's influence in crisis or conflict situations”, 
finally admitting that “the behaviours and motivations of both the Allies and the 
Insurgents are not adequately considered in the field of training, both individual and 
collective.” From this perspective, the “Global Wargame”, the annual exercise-war-
game executed by US Navy, challenges the participants with complex scenarios for 
which there are not easily identified Courses of Actions (COAs), since the mission 
deal with military, political and social objectives (Levis & Elder, 2016). 
It was in this context, therefore, that the "SIMCJOH" project was born.       
The SIMCJOH project was devoted to carry out Research & Development (R&D) 
activities, with the aim of understanding to which extent interoperable simulators 
can be used by a Commander and his Staff to address and solve specific problems 
where human factors are relevant. Modelling & Simulation makes possible 
recreating complex scenarios and carrying out what-if analyses with the aim of 
evaluating the effectiveness of several alternatives (Course of Actions, COAs) and 
therefore prepares the Commander and his Staff to face unusual situations, in an 
environment which is both “Hybrid” and “Other Than War” (Bruzzone et al. 
2016a). The SIMCJOH objectives are to study and develop new simulation models 
in order to support the decision makers in Joint and Multi- Coalitions scenarios 
(Peace Keeping, Low Intensity Conflict etc.), considering a strong involvement of 
Human Factors (either of friendly forces, opposing forces or neutral 
agents/population) effecting military Course of Actions (COAs) with a particular 
focus on issues of refugees and civilians in a theatre of military or hybrid operations 
(Bruzzone et al. 2015). The SIMCJOH project witnessed the involvement of 
military experts along the project, with an increasing understanding of potential 
uses of innovative M&S techniques (i.e. IA-CGF) out of traditional and established 






DSEEP), the involvement of users from the early steps of a simulation is the best 
support. In developing SIMCJOH together with other SMEs, the author merged the 
suggestions coming from the opera of Leonhard with the categorization of time in 
simulation identified by Fujimoto in his book “Parallel and Distributed Simulation” 
(2000); in particular, Fujimoto distinguish among physical time (which refers to 
time in the physical system), simulation time (an abstraction used by the simulation 
to model physical time), and wall-clock time (refers to time during the execution of 
simulation). Having said that, it was of capital importance to import into the 
SIMCJOH conceptual model and inside the simulator later on, a tempus fugit 
perspective, meaning that the player should be feeling the pressure to deal with 
multiple inputs and make vital decisions in matters of simulation time minutes. 
SIMCJOH simulation saw then the application of the idea “to forecast the future 
behaviour of a system and determine what it can be done to influence its behaviour” 
(De la Mota, Guasch, Mota, Piera, 2017). From this perspective, Human Behaviour 
Modelling (HBM) and Interoperable Simulation are proving their value as an 
effective combination to investigate impact of operations on the population 
(Bruzzone et al. 2011b); it is fundamental the use of proper models representing not 
just people statistics, but even their complex dynamics and social interactions at 
different levels (Stocker et al. 2002; Bruzzone 2013b). 
 
 
Fig. 69 – SIMCJOH screenshot: an angry crowd is gathering. Will the Commander be able 







From an interoperability point of view, below are reported a list of findings: 
a) Easy integration through the HLA standard; 
b) Testing and improvement of integration mechanisms to cooperate with other 
simulators;  
c) Configuration and use with a hybrid HLA federation; 
d) Applications working with HLA Evolved and in HLA 1516; 
e) Flexible customization; 
f) Proper cooperation among different types of simulators, each of them working 
with a different set of data and different time synchronization system; 
g) Possibility to set up Hybrid HLA federation with evolved and not evolved 
components working together. 
Reusability is another pillar of SIMCJOH, since the work done for developing 
SIMCJOH_VIC can be reused in other projects. In particular, the development of a 
UNITY3D-HLA bridge represents a valuable asset for other projects where the 
integration of UNITY3D based simulations and HLA is required. Similarly, the 
federate development phase, specifically the connection with the RTI, has been 
opportunely automated and this could be an additional benefit for future project 
activities and products. 
SIMCJOH is made of 2 modules: SIMCJOH VIS and SIMCJOH VIC. 
 
 
Fig. 70 – SIMCJOH VIS Starting Screen 
 
SIMCJOH_VIS (Virtual Interoperable Simulator), represent the main core of 
SIMCJOH federation, and is constructed in a way that could lead to the 






and Serious Games) able to use Human Behaviour Models (HBM) interoperating 
with other simulators to recreate complex scenario. SIMCJOH_VIS can be used to 
create new dynamic scenarios for different applications, including situation 
awareness, education and training; as example, providing case studies where the 
human factors could be related with decisions and events, in order to train and 
improve situation awareness of hybrid environments in different geopolitical and 
cultural contexts. SIMCJOH system was released as a HLA federation, where future 
developments are open for further integration of SIMCJOH federation and/or of the 
SIMCJOH federates to other existing simulation assets.  
SIMCJOH_VIC (Virtual Interoperable Commander) as part of the SIMCJOH 
federation, is the first milestone for the development of a ready to use product 
(namely an advanced serious game) for the education and training of those 
commanders that work in multi-coalition scenarios where human aspects are 
relevant. SIMCJOH_VIC can be further extended also to allow education and 
training of the commander staff and advisors, etc. (Bruzzone et al. 2014a; Bruzzone 
& Massei, 2017). Considering that the entire SIMCJOH system is released as an 
HLA federation, future developments also regard the integration of the SIMCJOH 
federation or the connection of the SIMCJOH federates to other existing simulation 
assets in the defence domain; collaborations with different agencies, research 
institutions and companies were the real “added value” of the SIMCJOH project, 
especially in the field of constructive simulator and on the ways to federate them.  
 
 






The SIMCJOH_VIC federate is a quite complex simulation that includes multiple 
models and technologies working together. SIMCJOH_VIC is developed by using 
C# programming language for the simulation engine and the 3D virtual 
environments are powered by using UNITY3D. It is worth saying that UNITY3D 
natively works with C#, therefore this architectural choice has supported the 
integration of the SIMCJOH_VIC simulation engine within the 3D virtual 
environments. In this phase most of the work, modelling and programming effort 
was devoted to implement the simulation functionalities and to develop realistic 3D 
geometric models (including buildings, vehicles, terrain, human models, etc.) and 
Virtual Environments. As far as the 3D Geometric models and virtual environments 
are concerned, the Virtual Environments should host and interact with three-
dimensional geometric models. The implementation of the geometric models was 
quite a complex task. Geometric models currently used in SIMCJOH_VIC include 
buildings, roads, bridges, helicopters, vehicles, terrain and a number of different 
human models characterized by different animations. Note that textures utilization 
is strictly connected with the implementation into the geometric models of high-
resolution and low-resolution graphic detail levels and with objects realistic 
representation. The SIMCJOH_VIC virtual world contains hundreds of objects that 
mean hundreds of geometric models and thousands of polygons. Each geometric 
model may have multiple textures (in order to have a realistic representation). 
The interactions that take place into the Virtual Environments recreate the evolution 
over the time of the MEL/MIL as well as of the COAs. As mentioned before, such 
evolution is implemented as part of the simulation functionalities that have been 
developed by using the C # programming code. Consequently, the Virtual 
Environment provides an interface C# coded, and this was the reason to use 
UNITY3D as graphic engine because it provides an interface for C# programming 
language. 
 
3.2 SIMCJOH VIS & VIC features and goals 
 
The SIMCJOH Project is devoted to perform R&D activities with the aim of 
understanding at which extent interoperable simulators can be used, in a multi-
coalition context, by the Commander and his Staff to address and solve specific 






Modelling & Simulation makes possible recreating complex scenarios and carrying 
out what-if analyses with the aim of evaluating the effectiveness of several 
alternatives (military term: Course of Actions, COAs) and therefore prepares the 
Commander and his Staff to face unusual situations (Bruzzone et al. 2014a; 
Bruzzone & Massei, 2017); SIMCJOH aims at developing capabilities in the area of 
Military Operation Planning by using CGF (Computer Generated Forces) based on 
Intelligent Agents (IAs), in order to support the decision makers.  
Indeed, all the military commands have inside their structures doctrines in place and 
personnel capable to generate operational plans in a “classic” way. However, there 
aren’t computer programs capable to make impartial and objective evaluation; 
instead, these computer applications must be considered as human expert 
consultants that can’t act as their substitute, but just help the planners to reach better 
results. From this point of view, the availability of this kind of supports guarantees a 
methodical simplification and an improved accuracy into the military operational 
planning processes; in effect, the use of simulation in this context speeds up 
planning generation enabling the development of simpler and emendable plans in 
accordance with real life elements, scenario evolution and parameters changes. 
Therefore, in order to be effective in operational planning these simulators require 
to integrate advanced models capable to reproduce complex scenarios; the 
availability of Intelligent CFG grants the use of friendly, hostile or neutral forces, 
capable of features definable in terms of behaviour and "perception" of other forces, 
in an automatic way (Bruzzone et al. 2013d; Bruzzone et al. 2014b).                     
The Decision Making activities, which constitute the essential core of any command 
action, useless to say, allow analysis of their effectiveness only at the end of the 
events generated by the decisions adopted. On this particular regard however, 
SIMCJOH is a milestone in the direction of providing a simulation system capacity 
to carry out an evaluation of effectiveness of various hypothetical Courses of Action 
without performing those, but leaving the battlefield and digital models in its 
operating office to "see progress"; provide results of interactions is a challenge of 
high value-added and high operational content, and in fact could be a step forward 
in the technology of the human brain "what if", spreading up the procedures and 
processes, obtaining more reliable results with verifiable step by step analysis 
(Bruzzone & Massei 2017a). A HLA federation is able to provide external federated 






effects that may have some kind of activities, such as the perception of the presence 
on their territory by the different ethnic civilian groups. This allows the 
Commander/Player to choose between different options, with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that the simulation results are similar/does not differ to those expected 
from their actual implementation. The resulting simulation solutions are not 
expected to be predictive tools, vice versa their goal is to estimate risks and 
confidence bands related to different alternatives. The wide number of alternatives 
related to possible combination of decisions, reactions as well as stochastic driven 
scenario evolution makes not possible to expect to have optimisation tools able to 
identify the best planning or to investigate exhaustively the range of possible 
alternatives. In addition, operational planners are not even equipped for addressing 
complex experimental analysis due to their technical background as well for the 
time constraints for apply SIMCJOH concepts in their planning decision process. 
Due to these considerations, it is critical to develop metrics and key performance 
indexes and analysis methodologies that quickly allow to compare solutions and to 
understand different simulation results; this aspect it is even useful for analysts for 
speeding up the proper tuning of the experimental analysis. 
To summarize, we may say that SIMCJHOH has been developed with two goals: 
Primary goal: To provide the Commander with the capability to investigate the 
consequences of different decisions in terms of collateral damages, PMESII second 
effects; 
Secondary Goal: overcome interoperability issues, and demonstrate technological 
capability to combine Strategic Decision Making Models with other simulation 
models for further developments in terms of CAX, Educational Programs and/or 
future Operational Planning and On-Line Decision Making. Computer Assisted 
eXercise (CAX), with several federated simulation joint and single service 
simulation system, with different complex level and aggregation, can help the target 
audience to achieve good training results in the simulation of military operations in 
digital battlefields (Cayirci and Marincic, 2009; Mastrorosa et al. 2012). In a CAX 
contest, SIMCJOH fits very well, because it has a basic capability in the complex 
and critical sector of military operation planning, using Intelligent Computer 
Generated Forces (CGF) made by intelligent software agents, which feasibility and 
initial development was reached with previous Simulation team projects outcomes 






3.2.1 MEL/MIL Flow Charts 
 
With regard to SIMCJOH primary goal, the implemented software focuses on two 
specific Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL): 
 
1. Village Block: fully operative and subject of the final SIMCJOH demonstration; 
2. Special Force Raid: entirely structured, to be implemented in future projects. 
 
SIMCJOH_VIC is a dedicated framework in which the commander observes the 
evolution over the time of specific scenarios (MEL/MIL) and Course of Actions 
(COAs). The current virtual environment includes two small towns, one village and 
one refugees camp in which the different MEL/MIL and COAs could be applied. 
This framework was finalized based on MEL/MIL and COAs defined within the 
SIMCJOH project framework, but could be further extended.  
All the COAs contained in each MEL/MIL are characterized by multiple stochastic 
variables that, within acceptable ranges, can be randomly generated in order to 
create tens of MEL/MIL and related COAs, providing the Commander with a new 
experience every time the SIMCJOH game is used. 
The following six figures below depict, based on flow charts, the conceptual models 
of the MEL/MIL COAs; the use of flow chart allows pointing out all the logical 
relationships among the different decision elements each COA entails. Moreover, 
within each flow chart it is possible to observe: 
 the difference between the Synchronous Activities and the Asynchronous 
Activities; 
 the possibilities for the Commander to ask for additional information, data or 
evaluations in different point of the COA and to take decision according to 









































































All the COAs contained in each MEL/MIL are characterized by multiple stochastic 
variables that, within acceptable ranges, can be randomly generated in order to 
create tens of MEL/MIL and related COAs, providing the Commander with a new 
experience every time the SIMCJOH demonstrator it is used. 
 
3.2.2 HLA Classes, Objects and Interactions. 
 
In compliance to HLA standard, SIMCJOH Federation includes definition of 
Federation Object Model (FOM, for the entire federation) and Simulation Object 
Models (SOM, one for each single federated). The FOM specifies all the 
information the federates will exchange each other during the simulation and 
therefore includes the object classes, the attributes, the interactions, the parameters 
and any other information relevant to the federation. On the other hand, the SOM 
specifies all the information that each single federate may provide to the federation 
and all the information that each single federate may receive from other federates 
through the Run Time Infrastructure. 
Within the SIMCJOH federation, exchanged data are grouped in terms of attributes 
when the data are persistent, in terms of parameters when data persistence is not 
required. Each class corresponds to an entity belonging to the real system (scenario) 
and classes and interactions are organized in a hierarchical structure where each 
sub-class inherits properties from another class. 





Interaction: An interaction is an explicit action taken by a federate that may have 
some effect or impact on another federate within a federation execution. Interaction 
is a messages related to MEL/MIL happening within the scenario; this Interaction 
Class is defined Player-Message and it has been introduced in order to allow 
SIMCJOH Federation to exchange messages about Commander decision. 









In order to categorize SIMCJOH, it is necessary to point out that there are three 
different types of simulation identified in Modelling and Simulation world: 
 Live Simulations. A Live Simulation is a simulation involving real people 
operating real systems, with simulated effects. 
 Virtual Simulations. A Virtual Simulation is a simulation involving real 
people operating simulated system. Virtual simulation injects human-in-the-
loop in a central role by exercising motor control skills (e.g. flying an 
airplane), decision skills (e.g. committing fire control resources to action), or 
communication skills (e.g. as members of a C4I team). 
 Constructive Simulations. A Constructive Simulation is a simulation that 
involves simulated people operating simulated systems. Real people 
stimulate (make inputs) to such simulations, but are not involved in 
determining the outcomes. 
 
SIMCJOH federation includes virtual and constructive simulations; no requirements 
are present for live simulation, despite the fact that by adopting HLA it is possible 
to include in the future real-equipment and real war-fighters in the SIMCJOH 
Federation. About the virtual aspects, the human operator is involved in the control 
of the Decision Maker in SIMCJOH Federate as well as in other constructive 
simulator, exercising his decision skills giving commands to the Coalition Units, 
while the other SIMCJOH actors are driven by IA-CGF. About the constructive 
aspects, the human operator is able to modify some IA-CGF parameters at the 
starting of the simulation in order to change the scenario evolution (i.e. difficulty 
level). 







Fig.  78 – Simulation initial set-up 
 
3.2.3 Lessons Learned 
 
SIMCJOH project demonstrate the importance and the necessity of a proper 
cooperation among modelling development team, simulation experts, and Subject 
Matters Experts. Nevertheless, collect the right mix of skills is pretty complex, and 
it is evident that different competencies are required to have the right balance to 
produce useful and reasonable results in terms of requirements: modellers, expert of 
military simulation, military personnel with an operational background, people with 
experience of the reference scenario, simulation scientists and specialists. This mix 
usually is difficult to be created, in particular in the early phases of a project; in 
addition, these resources are pretty hard to be coordinated due to the fact that often 
are pretty overloaded and sometime even located in different places, with limited 
capability to move and/or work in distributed teams. SIMCJOH, however, in 
accordance with the suggestion of IEEE 1730-2010 Standard, witnessed the 
involvement, since its early steps, of an enthusiastic Community made of Military 
Experts and Simulation scientists: the former able to address the project towards its 
broad goals, the latter keen to implement in the demonstrator the mechanics 






Additionally, this project has provided an important contribution to disseminate the 
potential of using use M&S to face complex Military and Homeland Security 
issues. The involvement of military experts evolved along the project and created a 
virtuous loop, where users disseminate these results in the military community 
becoming good promoters of the project and allowing to find and involve new 
experts from different offices. The above described lessons learned recall perfectly 
the difficulty in the collection of reliable data and information about scenarios; in 
real operations, rather than in a R&D activity like this one, the preparation and the 
validation of the mission environment will be a critical issue.  
SIMCJOH architecture proved to be flexible, able to be federated with other 
simulation systems through HLA; in the Defence area, adhere to standards gives 
value to the simulation models. Thus, having SIMCJOH_VIC as HLA-compliant 
fosters model interoperability and reusability. In HLA mode, it is demonstrated the 
capability to federate the different Models providing a complete and flexible 
approach. The integration tests carried out has revealed, above all, the possibilities 
to develop additional functionalities (e.g. the possibility to control the 
SIMCJOH_VIC real time simulation from the SIMCJOH_VIS discrete event 
simulation), opening the way to new solutions and to the integration of different 
technologies and methodologies. 
SIMCJOH Project addresses the problem of providing support in evaluating 
complex situations dealing with human factors in order to complete scenario 
analysis or decision making; the context of application is related to operational 
planning, with special attention to stabilization and normalization process 
(Bruzzone, 2013d). SIMCJOH aim is to demonstrate the potential of the M&S use 
as a virtual framework to investigate alternative hypotheses on the scenario and 
different decision impacts on PMESII conditions. In fact, these aspects need to be 
addressed because there aren’t simulators covering those aspects integrated with 
operational planning, and therefore is a need by the users and analysts to access 
models to test and evaluate alternatives. Based on subject matter expert feedback, it 
emerged that it is not possible to consider operational planning separating specific 
aspects from other ones (i.e. considering just operation planning without 
considering logistics, military support, etc), as well as the fact that the scenario 
complexity is explosive for several aspects (i.e. time constraints, background 






Summarizing, we can say:  
 SIMCJOH Models get benefits from being able to be federated with other 
simulation tools (i.e. GESI); 
 it is often easy to replicate military operation, but it is very difficult usually 
to simulate human behaviour of the involved civilians; 
 it is impossible to manage operations without integration with other operative 
elements (i.e. C2, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, etc.); 
 it is still mostly impossible to represent all the actors operating on the 
battlefield, that’s why cooperation among different Simulation Tools provide 
strong benefits; 
 it is fundamental to construct scenarios consistent and well defined in terms 
of boundaries and ranges of application, in order to guarantee the possibility 
to obtain useful results; 
 the knowledge is as important as the technology (social knowledge versus 
sensor data collection); 
 it is mostly impossible to reproduce a mutant force both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms; 
 the number of variables to be used in PMESII dimension are very high; 
 the focus it is on the stabilization phase; 
 it is critical to consider asymmetric threats; 
 in terms of system tools features, the most important aspects are related to 
decision making support and training. 
 
The analysis of SIMCJOH results highlight the benefit of using Intelligent Agents; 
indeed, the project get benefits of reusing IA-CGF developed by Simulation Team 
for different application (es. CAPRICORN). 
As far as the SIMCJOH_VIC development is concerned, the major strongholds are 
namely the UNITY3D-HLA bridge and the work done to automate the federate 
development process.  
Finally, the SIMCJOH Demonstration was carried out on MS COE by presenting all 
the different models, as well as the whole SIMCJOH Federation; thanks to the 
flexibility of the proposed architecture, SIMCJOH could operate also in stand-alone 
mode as well as on a local network of laptops. The Stand Alone Mode allows 






scenario. Demonstration consisted in presenting the evolution of MEL/MIL1 
respect a Village Block in the country of “Eblanon”, set in a realistic Middle East 
Scenario. The users get their situational awareness through the combination of 
dynamically generated reports from Virtual Assistants, tactical situation and virtual 
representations. 
SIMCJOH has been very successful in its unique capability of demonstrate to the 
player the importance of the time dimension and the corollary concept of phases. 
Even after several thousand run of the game, the player can experience a challenge 
where despite his/her best efforts and timely coordinate actions, the failure or the 
success often lies within a single factor not properly addressed; the player it is not 
merely challenged to react, but as well to deploy all the possible means and to use 
the avatar staff to identify the COAs and then to make his/her choice. Of course, the 
way out from the village (which represents the only set of victory conditions) 
bounces between the complete surrender of the military unit (not acceptable), and a 
fire engagement to clear the surrounding hostiles – together with the inevitable loss 
of civilians (not acceptable as well). Somewhere in the middle (?), and with several 
level of accomplishment, lies the solution.  
 
 











3.3 Population data model, technical pre-requisites and demonstration test  
 
The population model could operate both in federated mode with SMICJOH_VIC 
and other Simulators (e.g. GESI), as well as in stand-alone mode by using meta-
models of other missing federates.  
SIMCJOH_VIS reproduces the evolution of the population characteristics (i.e. fear, 
fatigue, aggressiveness, stress, demonstration size) as well of the other boundary 
conditions (i.e. deterrence, entities and unites, NGO); SIMCJOH VIC allows to 
present the dynamic situation and to manage the behaviour of individual virtual 
entities.  Population model simulates the Eblanon population; in the scenario the 
population reacts dynamically to events and actions carried out by the different 
parties present in the area.  
 
3.3.1 Population data model 
 
For the purpose of demonstration, three different villages could be activated for the 
crisis; their configuration is variable even if the geographical location is correct. 
The locations used are in South Lebanon and corresponds to Btaichiye, Aalma ech 
Chaab, Chamaa. Each village is characterized by a possible variable combination of 
the population attributes; for instance, in relation to MEL/MIL 1, the population 
reproduce the inhabitants of the village where the block takes place. Among the 
population attributes are listed:  
 Religion  
 Political Party  
 Ethnic Group  
 Stress  
 Fatigue  
 Aggressiveness  
 Fear  
 Sensibility to Deterrence  
 Hostility versus Coalition  
 Security Needs of the Population  
 Size of the Demonstration blocking our Squad and trend  






 Coalition Trustiness on Local Media  
 Coalition Trustiness on Domestic and International Media  
 Perception of the Last CIMIC on Site and Time Elapsed since its completion  
 Economic Status of the Population  
 Impact of Insurgents on the Population  
 History of Coalition Attacks on Site in terms of Frequency and Intensity  
 Influence of Local Police  
 Influence of Media Coverage  
 Influence of Social Networks  
 Current Disposition to Negotiate  
 Negotiation Capabilities (from both sides) 
Religion, Political Party and Ethnic Group are generated based on statistics of the 
area and correspond to major different groups - Alawites, Shia, Sunni - with a 
different presence of irregular forces such as Hezbollah, generic terrorists or ISIS, 
in the designated village. The attributes describe population status in term of 
psychophysical and social condition value are influenced by the events and 
decisions taken by Commander as well as by the operations; previous history of 
activities on the village affect future evolution and should be taken into 







































For instance, the result of last CIMIC operations in the village itself affects the 
negotiation capability of the responsible as well as population attitude; as example, 
the Commander can gain such information by questioning his staff – the J2 avatar – 
and receive a report in the form of a military-formatted briefing.  
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Fatigue Decreasing Aggressiveness Decreasing
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Fatigue Increasing Aggressiveness Increasing
 
Fig. 81- Fatigue is characterized by saturation in increasing and faster recovery during 
early phases in our range of analysis; Aggressiveness increases based on exponential 
escalation and relaxes back slowly (i.e. “it is easy to tease but hard to get released”) 
 
Events are generated by stochastic statistical and determine also spot situations that 
could lead to crisis (e.g. accidental WIA during the block), as well as the needs of 
care for inhabitants. These values are dynamically updated during the simulation 
and determine the reaction of the population when a Commander undertake 
decisions leading to new actions. For example, the use of a helicopter affects 
population as a deterrent, but could accumulate tension, at some point this could 
grow up to critical level, with risk of riot and escalation. 
The number, status and composition of rioters blocking the military patrol change 
dynamically with the variation of the level of social tension: if this value increases, 
the number of villagers increases direct proportionally. The risk of a riot rises when 
social tension level is high, and computer generated riots are simulated with a given 
probability (i.e. rioter car burning, stone-throwing against the blocked squad, 
individuals with firearms among population pop-up, and in extreme dangerous 









The test plan is based on the demonstration of the effect of the different actions and 
boundary conditions on the Population behaviour as well as their impact on the 
block; indeed, the simulator could consider also kinetic actions as well as rioters 





The situation of the population is dynamically updated inside the simulator 
SIMCJOH VIS and reports are provided to the Commander both graphically, 
Fig. 82 Risk of riots related to social tension level 






textually and as Staff Reports; a dynamic evolving Virtual Simulator could be 
federated in HLA providing to the Commander the possibility to view the Village 
situation as well as operations by God Eye or as Streaming for Field Sensors. 
 
3.3.2 SIMCJOH: technical pre-requisites 
 
Population Constructive and Logic model is embedded in SIMCJOH VIS and 
works both in Windows and Linux Environment, in HLA mode and in Stand Alone 
Mode. Population Virtual World is embedded in SIMCJOH VIC and runs on 
Windows and provides direct control to the scenario, in case it is required to use it 
for stand-alone demonstrations; both systems are interoperable by using HLA 
Standard. The two simulators models (VIS & VIC) have been tested in Windows 
environment; since it is developed in Java it is platform independent (Windows, 
Linux, Mac) but require JAVA Virtual Machine. 
In order to operate them in connection it is required to install HLA RTI; currently 
the system operates on MÄK, so it is necessary to install MÄK RTI version 4.2. 
SIMCJOH VIS and VIC could operate in separate workstations or on the same 
computer, sharing the screen, mouse and keyboard. 
Hardware required: Hard Disk 500 Gb, RAM 8 Gb, OS Windows. Tests has been 
conducted on LAN, WAN through VPN and Single Workstation using Windows 
OS.  
Model Basic Installation Procedure:  
- Copy the SIMCJOH folder and all subdirectory on the Computer  
- Create a link on your desktop  
Install the Java Virtual Machine (e.g. Java 8)  
For HLA Mode Install the MÄK RTI  
Model Basic Execution Handbook:  
- double click on SIMCJOH_VIS JAR Executable to run the simulator stand alone  
- or double click on SIMCJOH VIS run Mak Bath to run in HLA.  
- Select the Game Mode “Village Block”  
The buttons have tips to provide suggestions.  
For stand-alone mode just click the Run / Play button and select decisions by 
clicking on Virtual Assistants; double click on different decisions provides 






Configuration allows to change from Stand Alone (default, by click on “simulation 
model” and tick the box “stand alone”) to operate HLA Mode (by click and 
selection of RTI to be used, the current demonstrator use just MAK); to Close the 





3.3.3 Demonstration Test 
 
The test was conducted on SIMCJOH VIS in stand-alone, with the behaviour of 
population during the Village Block on MEL/MIL1, considering the stand-by 
condition as well as the application of COA Kinetics. Initial Conditions and 
boundary conditions are default for MEL/MIL1; no change are required on the input 
parameters or in configuration respect SIMCJOH VIS default configuration.  
The user activates the scenario clicking on Simulation; then activate the run by 
clicking “run button”, and the simulator generates a block in a village as proposed 
in SIMCJOH VIS Interface. The Virtual Assistants (operating as Commander 
Staff), controlled by the computer, generate automatically the report about the 
situation, considering time required to collect info about the situation (minutes to 
hours). This was a precise requirement addressed to the SMEs to the SIMCJOH 
developers, in order to tackle with the real-life process of collecting/evaluating 
information and present them in a proper way to the Commander. 







The report on the situation is generated to support commander decision and 
provides an overview of Village and Population based on current perception; this 
perception modifies during the run based on additional info (i.e. Recce or 
Intelligence) as well as scenario evolution. The report is presented in the figures 




Fig. 85 – Virtual Assistants, recalling the main functions inside a military staff 







Indeed, the report is generated dynamically by the simulator based on current 
situation of the scenario considering the time and workload required by the staff to 




At the beginning of the situation, the Commander/player chose the option of hold 
on, while the demonstration and tension into the village grow as proposed in the 
collected images below.  
 
 
Fig. 87 – Summary report about the ongoing crisis 







Within the required time, the COA is activated and all the options to made changes 
are available for the Commander; during this test no any change from default plan 
proposed by the Virtual Assistant is activated; following figure present already an 
improvement in reduction of the demonstrators (from over 130 to under 100) due to 
the applied deterrence. 
At this point the Commander issue the order to the Virtual Assistants to activate, 
among those proposed, the COA “Kinetic” (here kinetic is to be intended as an 
engagement, but below the use of lethal force. It can employ different assets and 
means, and almost rely on the deterrence displayed by a show of force, carried out 




In this case, the adoption of a Kinetic COA had the effect of pushing the people out 
of the demonstration site, as reported in figure below:  
 








Indeed, the Block is removed by use of deterrence and the squad is free and moves 
out, completing the simulation with success. Detailed reports are available in the 






Fig. 90 – Effect of COA activation 











It is important to outline that due to the stochastic nature of the simulator, repeating 
the run results could generate differences respect a measurable confidence band, as 
analysed in the experimental analysis report of SIMCJOH. 
 
Fig 92: Target function report with figures scroll of the scenario 
Fig. 93 -  End of simulation: last line of the log announces that the military unit is 






3.4 VIS &VIC working configurations and experimental test sets 
 
Multi Coalition Simulation Model is implemented in SIMCJOH_VIS simulator.      
It can run both federated with SMICJOH_VIC simulator and stand alone with a 
meta-model; SIMCJOH_VIS provides the different condition that are visualized in 
SIMCJOH_VIC simulator. Next are reported all the tests that have been executed 
by using the SIMCJOH_VIC simulator 
 
3.4.1 Working configurations   
 
The SIMCJOH_VIC (Virtual Interoperable Commander) is one of the simulator that 
are part of the SIMCJOH federation; it can run both stand-alone and connected as 
part of the SIMCJOH federation, based on the standard for distributed simulation 
HLA 1516-2010 Evolved. However, it should be noted that within the SIMCJOH 
framework, the commander is allowed to take decision through the SIMCJOH_VIS 
simulator (Virtual Interoperable Simulator) and therefore observe the effects of his 
decision within SIMCJOH_VIC. As part of this architecture, SIMCJOH_VIC also 
includes specific analytical models that are used to recreate realistic scenarios. To 
cite a few, the following models are included as part of SIMCJOH_VIC: Multi-
Coalition model, the real-time Helicopter motion model over 6 degree of freedom, 
the real-time military vehicles motion model. In addition, the SIMCJOH_VIC also 
includes a number of dedicated animation that are used to recreate realistic human 
models both for the civilians and for the military. As already mentioned, 
SIMCJOH_VIC is also able to run stand-alone; to this end, it has been implemented 
to allow future developments and to run even outside the SIMCJOH reference 
scenarios, since it has been developed as HLA 1516-2010 Evolved, in order to 












The execution of the SIMCJOH_VIC simulator as part of the SIMCJOH Federation 
requires in addition the license of the MÄK-RTI Version 4.2.  
 
 
Fig.94 - SIMCJOH Federation including SIMCJOH_VIC and GESI 
 
Launching SIMCJOH_VIC simulator executable in stand-alone mode requires a 







Fig. 95 - SIMCJOH Federation including SIMCJOH_VIC and GESI 
 
SIMCJOH_VIC HLA Execution: to run SIMCJOH_VIC as federate of the 
SIMCJOH HLA federation, the procedure is the following: - run the MAK RTI 
version 4.2 - run the SIMCJOH_VIC executable that will connect automatically to 
the SIMCJOH federation - run the SIMCJOH_VIS executables to connect the 
SIMCJOH_VIS to the SIMCJOH federation. In this case, the SIMCJOH_VIC 
functionalities are controlled directly by the SIMCJOH_VIS federate, therefore the 
user interface is disable in SIMCJOH_VIC. You could run each SIMCJOH federate 
on a different machine connected over a LAN (e.g. the SIMCJOH_VIC running on 
machine 1 and the SIMCJOH_VIS running on machine 2). Be sure to install and 
run correctly on all machines the MAK RTI version 4.2 before running the 
SIMCJOH Federation. Please note that the SIMCJOH_VIC will work properly only 
if the SIMCJOH_VIS is connected to the federation and running (as mentioned in 
the HLA mode the SIMCJOH_VIC is controlled by the SIMCJOH_VIS federate). 
You can also run the SIMCJOH federation over a WAN, in this case you are 






SIMCJOH_VIC Stand – Alone Execution: to run SIMCJOH_VIC stand-alone, just 
double click on the SIMCJOH_VIC executable file included in the SIMCJOH_VIC 
directory. In stand-alone mode, the SIMCJOH_VIC is provided with a basic graphic 
user interface that allows testing the SIMCJOH_VIC functionalities. The 
SIMCJOH_VIC also includes the help button that explains how to use the user 




Fig. 96 - SIMCJOH VIS & VIC federated locally  
 
Model Demonstration Test: this section contains the test specifications and the test 
results of the SIMCJOH_VIC simulator. 
Test Configuration: the SIMCJOH_VIC system ran on Windows 8 and was a 64 bit 
executable. The SIMCJOH_VIC Simulator ran as single federate of the SIMCJOH 
Federation. This configuration is equivalent to the stand-alone mode but it has been 
used to test SIMCJOH_VIC capability to join and work as federate of the 
SIMCJOH HLA 1516-2010 Evolved federation. For the federation the MÄK-RTI 
Version 4.2 was used. The RTI was running on University of Calabria site. The 
FOM was based on a RPR2 draft 20 extended by Player Message interactions. The 
federation used time management with a step size of one correlating to one second 










3.4.2 SIMCJOH VIC test sets 
 
The following table reports all the tests that have been executed by using the 
SIMCJOH_VIC simulator. Each test is then furtherly described in the next sections 
of this document. 
 
Request Unit to move to Point B 
Table 2 reports the test cases conducted for the test #1: Request Unit to move to 
point B. Two test cases have been simulated: (1) moving a military truck 
transporting two squads from point A to point B; (2) move a military truck 
transporting food kits for a CIMIC operation from point A to point B. The results of 








Figures from 1 to 6 show the simulation results of the test case 1 and test case 2. In 
particular, figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 are related to test case 1 and show respectively: 
- the internal view from the truck cockpit while moving from point A to point B; 
- the view on the second truck taken from the back of the first truck while moving 
from point A to point B; 
- the view of the two trucks with two squads inside while moving from point A to 
point B; 











Figures 4 and 5 are related to test case 2. In particular, figure 5 shows a truck 
transporting food kits for CIMIC operations while moving to point B; figure 6 




















Assign an Escort Enforcement to Negotiator 
Table 3 reports the test case conducted for the test #2: assign an escort enforcement 
to Negotiator. According to the order received an escort including two soldiers 




Figures from 7 to 10 show the simulation results of the test case 1. In particular, 
figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 show respectively: 
- the negotiator talking with the village leader; 
- a panoramic view of the negotiator talking with the village leader; 
- arrival of the escort; 


















Prepare Goods to be distributed within a Location 
Table 4 reports the test case conducted for the test #3: prepare goods to be 
distributed within a location. According to the order received the soldiers start 





Distribute Goods within a Location 
Table 5 reports the test case conducted for the test #4: distribute goods within a 
location. According to the order received the soldiers distribute goods during a 















Request Local Police forces to Move to point B 
Table 6 reports the test case conducted for the test #5: Request Local Police forces 




Request Local Police forces to Support Negotiation  
Table 7 reports the test case conducted for the test #6: request local police forces to 









Request to conduct Reconnaissance over a Location adopting a specific mode 
Table 8 reports the test case conducted for the test #7: request to conduct 
reconnaissance over a location adopting a specific mode. In particular, the specific 
mode used is the Helicopter that fly over the village where the squads are blocked. 















Activate/Deactivate EW Bubble Over the Location 
Table 9 reports the test case conducted for the test #8: activate/deactivate EW 
bubble over the location. According to the order received the EW Bubble is 


























Request for training and mentoring activities to Local Police Forces  
Table 10 reports the test case conducted for the test #9: request for training and 
mentoring activities to Local Police Forces. According to the order received the 




Report on the Status of Population  
Table 11 reports the test case conducted for the test #10: report on the status of 





















Request Local Police forces to Stop Disorders in a location 
Table 12 reports the test case conducted for the test #11: request local police forces 
to stop disorders in a location. According to the order received the local police 












Request of Helicopters Support  
Table 13 reports the test case conducted for the test #12: Request of Helicopters 
Support. According to the order received the helicopters arrive in the location where 








Request to cordon the village  
Table 14 reports the test case conducted for the test #13: Request to cordon the 
village. According to the order received different squads cordon the village. 
 
Request to send a negotiator  
Table 15 reports the test case conducted for the test #14: Request to send a 
negotiator. In accordance with the order received, the negotiator is sent for starting 










3.5 Computer Generated Forces & Virtual Assistants Experimental Test 
plan -  SIMCJOH VIS demonstration 
 
The Computer Generated Forces (CGF) have been implemented in SIMCJOH_VIS 
simulator and SIMCJOH VIC. The simulator operates in federated mode between 
SMICJOH_VIC and SIMCJOH_VIS; SIMCJOH_VIC allows to present the 
dynamic situation and to manage the behaviour of individual virtual entities, while 
SIMCJOH VIS focuses on the CGF simulation. A test plan has been prepared to 
evaluate the behaviour of CGF in order to be used during the final demonstration.  
 
3.5.1 Computer Generated Forces  
 
SIMCJOH_VIS CGF are based on IA_CGF (Intelligent Agent Computer Generated 
Forces) developed by Simulation Team. CGF can be operative also in stand-alone 
mode, by using meta-model in SIMCJOH VIS; in this case the scenario evolves 
based on CGF actions, while automatic reporting provided by the Virtual assistants 
represent the monitoring of the scenario evolution. When federated with 
SIMCJOH_VIC the virtual simulation is dynamically aligned with the overall 






Virtual Assistants in charge of reporting to the Commander and give execution to 
his decisions. 
 
3.5.2 Virtual Assistants model test plan 
 
Boundary conditions such as weather and media actions affect the elements to 
finalize the proposal, the decisions and the operational plans developed by the CGF. 
The CGFs simulates the Commander Staff (represented in the simulation by Virtual 
Assistants – VAs) and its reaction to the escalation of the social tension in fictional 
village in South Eblanon. For the experimental test, it is considered the case of 
village Block, with the – VAs) behaviour of rioters surrounding the squad and 
population evolves over time. Based on squad report and other information source, 
the Virtual assistants take care of addressing the situation and proposing the 
Commander available course of actions; the change on the situation is dynamic and 
results in the necessity to adapt to a mechanism of action/reaction (i.e. social tension 
change, non-availability of military assets from Local Authority, etc.). The Virtual 
Assistants enable possible changes and options based on request by the 
Commander; in addition, Virtual Assistants controlled by the CGF could decide to 
adapt dynamically respect the course of action adopted by the Commander/player. 
The Virtual Assistants currently cover different roles: 
 VA JS Chief of Staff 
 VA G2 Intelligence 
 VA G3 Operations 
 VA G4 Logistics 
 VA G7 Training 
 VA G9 CIMIC  
 VA LEGAD Legal Advisor 
 VA POLAD Political Advisor 
 VA PAO Public Affair Officer 
 VA CULAD Cultural Advisor 
 
Each Virtual Assistant collect data and complete a report as result of scenario 
awareness respect the specific issue to be addressed; these elements support 






in place and adapt the specific COA to the dynamic evolution of the scenario while 
he reports updates back to the Commander. In case of problems that require drastic 
changes, alert is generated and communicated to the commander (e.g. helicopter 
malfunction, denied support from local authorities, etc.). 
The different Decisions analysed by the CGF driving the Virtual Assistants are 
finalized for the demonstration in MEL/MIL1 Village Block, related to the issues 
described below. 
 
Decision Zero: Village Block Analysis and Alternative COAs 
The report self-adapt dynamically to the situation and provides four alternative 
COAs to be adopted by Commander; the Virtual Assistant in charge of it is the 
Chief of Staff, coordinating all other Virtual Assistants. 
 
Decision 1: Recce Activation 
Deals with the possibility to activate Recce by using different resources such as 
Helicopters, Special Forces and UAV; these are based on availability of these assets 
and their effectiveness respect the current situation. G3 Virtual Assistant is in 
charge of this item. 
 
Decision 2: Air Asset Activation 
This decision is devoted to identify how many and what specific air asset to use 
within those available in the brigade under the Commander and includes different 
Helicopters and UAV (if available). G3 Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 3: Dispatch UNIFIL Helicopters 
This decision is devoted to request additional support to UNIFLI resources; in this 
case Ghana (one of the UNIFLI contributing nations) has helicopters that could be 
required to integrate Italian Units or to address problems due to unavailability of 
our assets. Chief of Staff Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 4: Helicopter Evacuation 
Based on the situation of the scenario (i.e. effective presence of snipers and hostile 
forces, available space for landing etc.) it could be considered to evacuate the 






risks and should be properly evaluated as well as planned in case of activation. G3 
Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 5: Air Support 
There the possibility to call an Air Support operation in order to release the pressure 
over the blocked squad; this brings however risk of collateral damage, i.e. igniting a 
reaction from the population. G3 Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 6: Identify and dispatch an envoy to act as Negotiator 
It is possible to run the negotiation in the village by using different subject such as 
the squad leader, the CIMIC Responsible of last action in the village, a CIMIC 
Coordinator or Local Authorities; the perception of the current situation and reports 
about previous activities (i.e. success level of previous CIMIC) have to be 
considered in conjunction with the capabilities of the different subjects and with 
their readiness to respond to the crisis; in general estimations of these elements 
should be considered as decision elements based on the reports prepared by the 
Virtual Assistants. Chief of Staff Virtual Assistant is responsible of this item. 
 
Decision 7: Goods Delivery 
A quick CIMIC operation for goods delivery can be activated to support the 
condition, therefore the way to deliver it is critical; it could be possible to carry out 
it on site concurrently with the negotiation or postpone after the completion of the 
crisis; population will react to this alternatives eventually creating a crowd around 
the area that could result dangerous; therefore the impact of concurrent distribution 
could be more effective, so a decision should be made based on risk analysis; the 
Virtual Assistant responsible of the CIMIC is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 8: MEDEVAC 
During the Scenario evolution, the rioters could generate WIA (Wound in Action) 
among the soldiers of the blocked squad, thus requiring a Medical Evacuation 
(MEDEVAC). In this case his situation evolves dynamically and could degenerate; 
MEDEVAC could be a solution, therefore the decision to proceed or not as well as 






should be completed. In this case the use of Helicopters or ground units are possible 
alternative for the execution; G3Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 9: Authorizing Use of Force 
This is a very drastic decision considering the civil presence into the urban area and 
the very high risk of collateral damages; therefore, some scenario evolution could 
lead to this conditions; in the model are used to compute hitting and damaging 
probability by applying Montecarlo Techniques and Lanchester’s equations.  G3 
Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 10: Helicopter Deterrence 
It is possible to use the Helicopters in way to create deterrence; flying altitude and 
modes affect the impact on the population with positive effects in term of 
deterrence, but also risks as well as impact in terms of stress and fear on population. 
G3 Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 11: Blocked Unit 
Orders could be transmitted to the blocked squad if communications are available. 
These corresponds to different alternatives, listed below in order of aggressiveness:  
Stand by (the default option): neutral;  
Keep Position: neutral 
Raising Weapons: low aggressiveness; 
Shoot in Air: medium aggressiveness; 
Fire at Will: high aggressiveness; 
Consign Weapons: i.e. the surrender of the Squad. 
Especially the “Fire at Will” option has to be considered the least feasible together 
with “Consign Weapons”, because both are contrary to the mission mandate and so 
corresponding to non-accomplishment of the game objective. However, in condition 
of an extreme crisis the irrational behaviour of an individual or a group can 
overcome the moral restrains and the military training, resulting in actions contrary 
to the law. For such reasons, even though the G3 Virtual Assistant is normally in 
charge, IA-CGF controlling the squad, under certain conditions and based on the 







Decision 12: Local Police Information 
The engagement of local authority could be done based on an evaluation of their 
reliability and effectiveness; this is a pretty crucial element that could result into a 
support, but also lead to further problems. Chief of Staff Virtual Assistant is in 
charge of this item. 
 
Decision 13: CIMIC After the Event 
It is possible to activate CIMIC on the following months to mitigate the effect of the 
event, therefore during the simulation an estimation of this action should be 
considered as well as its impact on the future scenario evolution; CIMIC Virtual 
Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 14: PSYOPS on Radio 
Activation of PSYOPS on Radio transmission is a possibility and a decision on the 
related effort and quickness should be taken to optimize time response versus 
impact on the situation. PAO Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 15: PSYOPS on Leaflets 
Activation of PSYOPS by dropping available leaflets from helicopters is a 
possibility; in case is necessary to address it in time to board such material on the 
helicopters. PAO Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 16: PSYOPS on Loud Speakers by Ground Units 
Activation of PSYOPS by Loud Speakers from Ground Units is an option; 
therefore, previous IDF use of such techniques could ingenerate controversial 
reactions from the population. PAO Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 17: Arrest Agitators 
This is a quite drastic decision that could increase the tension. It could be performed 
for real or threatened; however, UNIFIL mandate don’t authorize it. The LEGAD 









Decision 18: creation of an EW “Bubble” 
The activation of an Electronic Warfare “Bubble” (meaning with that the intentional 
disrupting of communication achieved by dedicate jamming devices) could interdict 
the use of mobile phones among the population, and so achieve the “electro-
magnetic” insulation of the village. This could be an option, in order to interrupt the 
C2 chain of the rioters and so (possibly) contributing to cool down the tension.  
However, again, UNIFLI mandate don’t authorize EW in the area; in addition, the 
social tension instead could increase, and local and international media later on will 
definitely deliver critics over the news. G3 Virtual Assistant is responsible of this 
item, but LEGAD contributions is requested as well. 
 
Decision 19: Press Release 
Issuing a press conference or a declaration addressing the situation by UNIFLI 
officials - before the local media arrive on the spot - is a critical issue on the path of 
the crisis’s resolution. The Public Affair Officer (PAO) Virtual assistant is in charge 
of this Item. 
 
Decision 20: Negotiation Target identification 
To properly identify the target for negotiating about village block it is a critical 
issue; demonstration Leaders are the first choice, even though they could result not 
to be the right people to address, while a Political or Religious Leader can be. The 
Intelligence reports are critical to properly identify this situation. Chief of Staff 
Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
Decision 21: Ground Support 
This decision is devoted to identify how many and what specific ground unit to use 
within those available; the brigade reserve as example could make available up to 
two companies, but it should be decided if it is enough to use just 1 or 2 platoons. 
However, a massive show of force can increase deterrence, but it can heat up as 










Decision 22 Intelligence Updating 
Additional intelligence updates should be taken to optimize time response during 
the crisis. G2 Virtual Assistant is in charge of this item. 
 
In conclusion, each time a critical event occurs, the CGF face it and analyse 
possible reaction, within the required time necessary to elaborate proposals for the 
Commander. The Commander then will adopt one of the decisions (from 1 to 22) 
and accordance with it, further resources are allocated by the simulator with the 
required time. So the test plan of these models combines the generation of Reports 
by the Virtual Assistants versus the scenario evolution and the application of 
decisions. 
 
3.5.3 SIMCJOH VIS demonstration test 
 
The demonstration test was conducted on SIMCJOH VIS in stand-alone about the 
CGF and Monitoring System during the Village Block on MEL/MIL1 in stand-by 
mode. Initial Conditions and boundary conditions are default for MEL/MIL1; no 
change are required on the input parameters or in configuration respect SIMCJOH 
VIS default configuration. The player activates the scenario clicking on 
“Simulation”; then activate the run by clicking “run button”, the simulator generates 
a block in a village. The player again selects a Course of Action as soon as the CGF 
Virtual Assistants are ready to report; information is summarized in Power Point 
dynamically created on SIMCJOH VIS. At the beginning however the Virtual 
Assistants don’t have elements about the crisis; therefore, as soon as the crisis 
evolves, the VAs begin to analyse the problem, and simulation time is consumed, as 
reported by the red bar, which provides an estimation of work needed to finalize a 
course of action to address the crisis (see figure below). The staff submit the 
possible alternatives to the Commander, and as soon as the decision is finalized, 
they will activate the Corresponding COA using their time and resources as outlined 













Fig. 97 – CGF VAs waiting for the arrival of information 
Fig. 98 – CGF VAs are elaborating vs the scenario evolution 












As example, respect to the choice “Negotiation and CIMIC” and “Send a 
negotiator”, we have the following: 
 













3.6   Results of Experimental Analysis 
 
The SIMCJOH experimentation allows to identify the behaviour of target functions 
mapped by the simulator; this analysis represent an example of how Design of 
Experiments and Sensitivity Analysis allows to evaluate the impact of the 
independent variables on the target functions 
SIMCJOH Experimentation has involved military users and subject matter experts 
to: 
 collect user requirements; 
 develop and validate SIMCJOH conceptual models; 
 define the specific mission environment implemented in SIMCJOH 
Demonstrator;  
 validate the Demonstrator functions and features including interoperability 
capability;  
 test SIMCJOH Demonstrator and analyse simulation results. 
 
Concerning with the experimentation execution and the simulation results, the 
partners provided an example of techniques and methodologies to be used for 
studying results consistency.  
In particular Mean Square Pure Error and Sensitivity Analysis are carried out. 
The analysis of MSpE (Mean Square pure analysis) is required as measure of the 
variance of the target functions among replicated runs over the same boundary 
conditions. By this approach it becomes possible to identify the number of 
replications and the simulation duration able to guarantee a desired level of 
precision; MSpE values in correspondence of these experimental parameters 
determines the amplitude of the related confidence band. 
The Experimentation has been developed over the Village Block MEL/MIL; the 
target function on this simulator are addressing the following variables: 
 Scenario Duration 
 Final Results (Success / Failure) 
 Demonstration Size (Average, Min, Max) 
 Demonstration Final Condition Situation 
 Military Coalition Casualties 






 OPFOR Casualties  
 Friendly Force around the Crisis Area 
 Foe Force around the Crisis Area 
 Friendly Deterrence on Crisis Area 
 Foe Deterrence on Crisis Area 
 WIA Situation 
 Squad Status 
 MEDEVAC Result 
 Evacuation Result 
 Impact on Domestic Media 
 Impact on Local Media 
 Press Release Readiness 
 Stress Level on the Village 
 Fear Level on the Village 
 Fatigue Level on the Village 
 Aggressiveness Level on the Village 
 UNIFLI Caveat Respect on Fire 
 UNIFLI Caveat Respect on Arrests 
 UNIFLI Caveat Respect on EW Bubble 
 Communication Shut Down by EW 
 Village Block Situation 
 Squad Final Result 
 CIMIC Status 
 After Action CIMIC Status 
 Radio PSYOPS Status 
 Leaflets PSYOPS Status 
 Loud Speakers PSYOPS Status 
 Combat Status in the Village 
 List of All taken Decisions 
 
All these variables are affected by the decisions that could be taken by the 






etc.) and by the boundary conditions (e.g. weather, hostile forces, history of actions 
on crisis area, skills of available resources, etc.) 
Mean Square Pure Error are carried out for different Commander Decision: 
 Stand By 
 Negotiation & CIMIC 
 Kinetic 
 Negotiation & Local Forces 
The developers applied the use of Design of Experiments in order to estimate the 
impact of stochastic variables on the target function. 
In this case the developers used as main independent variable the Commander 
decision about the overall COA on the scenario: 
 Stand By 
 Negotiation & CIMIC 
 Kinetic 
 Negotiation & Local Forces 
The approach is based on ANOVA (Analysis of Variance); in particular, it is 
proposed the analysis of MSpE (Mean Square pure analysis) that is an effective 
measure of the experimental error due to the stochastic elements present in the 
simulators; indeed, MSpE provides a measure of the variance of the target functions 
among replicated runs over the same boundary conditions just by changing the 
random seeds of the random generators. By this approach it becomes possible to 
identify the number of replications and the simulation duration able to guarantee a 
desired level of precision. 
MSpE values in correspondence of these experimental parameters determines the 







In fact, the MSpE allows to quantify the experimental error due to influence of the 
stochastic components respect the required replications or durations for obtaining a 
stabilization; by this approach it becomes possible to estimate the confidence band 
on the different target functions For instance, considering the Aggressiveness Level 
of Population related to the 4 different commander decisions, the MSpE (Mean 




The Aggressiveness is expressed as pure number and the Figure 1 provides an 
estimation of his variance along the simulation as well as the stabilization at during 
final phases of the simulation. 
In following figures multiple runs are compared for the different evolution of this 
scenario; different end states could be approached during the simulation due to 
stochastic components therefore final achievements results consistent based on 
MSpE Analysis. 
A further analysis has been conducted by measuring the Number of demonstration 
during the simulation, considering the four different possible Commander decision 
respect the main COA during the game. 


























By applying Design of Experiments it could be conducted a test on the influence 
of the independent variables respect the target functions. 
A sensitivity analysis on the effect of the different decision on simple scenario 













3.7 V&V applied to simulations involving human behaviour modelling 
 
This paragraph proposes the methodologies applied to complete VV&A 
(Verification, Validation and Accreditation) of interoperable simulators to be used 
in an HLA federation to address Multi Coalition Joint Operations in scenarios 
affected intensively by human factors. A case study (SIMCJOH) it is provided, with 
an overview of the different methodologies used and the processes carried out along 
the entire life cycle of the federation development. The example represents a quite 
challenging context considering the simulation of the human behaviours and the 
multiple use modes that move from CAX federate to intuitive application for being 
used directly by Commanders and their staff. 
 
3.7.1 Verification, Validation and Accreditation (VV&A) 
 
VV&A is recognized as, among few, one of the most critical element in simulation 
project (Amico, Guha and Bruzzone, 2000; Youngblood et al. 2000; Roza et al. 
2012; Kim et al. 2015). In a few words, Validation is referred to as the process to 
ensure that the right M&S assets is built for the intended use (i.e. M&S validity); 
Verification is the process to ensure that the M&S asset is built right (i.e. M&S 
correctness). Accreditation (a concept which is often underestimated), represents the 
corner stone to guarantee the use of simulator, since it is the official certification 
that a model, simulation, or federation of models and simulations and its associated 
data are acceptable for use for a specific purpose (IEEE 1997). A top simulation 
expert with very large experience in industrial application and also in defence, was 
used to say that “Simulation Failure is usually not due to bad model development, 
but by missing the trust of the decision makers that should use it to take multi-
million dollar decisions” (Williams 1999). Indeed, it is evident that a decision 
maker should develop trustiness in the capabilities as well as knowledge in the 
limits of the simulators that is supposed to use (McLeods, 1984). In facts simulation 
requires significant efforts to be developed and it is usually applied to challenging 
problems where the decision could affect human life, big quantities of money, 
important consequences and even personal career (Mosca et al. 1994).  
In order to deal with VV&A issues, from 2014 to 2018 NATO created Modelling and 






Identification and Management”. MSG 139 was tasked to define and provide an 
initial implementation of a roadmap to support the development and employment of a 
generic methodology, methods and techniques for M&S use risk identification, and 
analysis and to balance M&S use risk with resources applied to M&S verification and 
validation (V&V). The work of the group was formalized as the M&S Use Risk 
Methodology (MURM); on that regard MSG 139 analysed the capability of MURM 
to balance risks with costs and to provide a mean for risk identification and 
mitigation. 
In the context of the MURM, M&S use risk is defined as: 
The probability that inappropriate application of M&S results for the 
specific intended use will produce unacceptable consequences to the 
decision maker. 
The approach taken has been to translate this definition into mathematical logic 
used to calculate M&S use risk on a requirement-by-requirement basis.  
 
 







The derivation of the methodology is based on coherent mathematical concepts that 
minimize unintended bias and establishes an explicit relationship to the V&V 
process and products. The MURM can be useful at several stages of the M&S 
development process. Upon the conclusion of the work carried out by MSG 139 
(April 2018), the proposed way ahead has been to develop an international standard, 
subject to configuration management and change control, through the Simulation 
Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO), using its Product Development 




Fig. 102 -  Process to Reduce Unacceptable Levels of M&S Use Risk 
 
However, it is fundamental to involve the users in the development process to 
guarantee that they will trust the simulation and its results, also in case of critical 
decisions (Bruzzone et al. 2001b & 2002). In facts the decision makers should use 
simulation for decisions, based on the confidence that they achieved along the 
VV&A processes by their engagement and understanding of the models and 
simulator capabilities. It is evident the necessity to engage them since the beginning 
of development phases, for instance when the simulation goals are defined as well 






order to succeed in this case, it is fundamental to be able to combine users, SMEs 
and simulation scientists into an effective team that share information and acquire a 
clear picture of simulation capabilities and limits based on intuitive and measurable 
achievements, even without entering into the technical details of the algorithms 
(Amico, Guha, Bruzzone, 2000). The case of simulation for training is a classic 
example where these principia should be applied, because in absence of full 
trustiness the impact of simulation training sessions results drastically downgraded, 
and training objectives risk to be not achieved (Bruzzone & Massei 2017a; 
Bruzzone et al. 2017b). Considering such aspects, it is very important to properly 
address the simulation development process matching it with the VV&A activities. 
Therefore, this aspect becomes very challenging in case of complex models, among 
these the human behaviour models represent probably one of the most-hard case 
considering the difficulty to have reliable data and proper model representing both 
emotional and rational elements. In the next paragraph we refer to the case of 
SIMCJOH VIS & VIC (Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint Operations involving 
Human Modelling – Virtual Interoperable Simulation & Virtual Interoperable 
Commander) simulators, both developed to serve as core engine of SIMCJOH 
project (Bruzzone et al. 2015b). 
 
3.7.2 VV&A Principles and Criticalities 
 
As already mentioned, Verification Validation and Accreditation (VV&A) 
represents one of most crucial elements of simulation development, both in decision 
making and military training domains. In general, V&VA uses consolidated 
methodologies and procedures since its foundation, and has further developed in a 
well-defined set of procedures and methodologies (McLeods 1984; Balci et al. 
1996; Youngblood et al. 2000; Roza et al. 2012; DoD MIL-STD-3022, 2012; MSG 
139, 2018). Along the years, different tentative have been made in the effort to 
formalize a standard in this sector: however, the high degree of tailoring required to 
successfully apply VV&A allowed just to define best recommended practices and 
guidelines as it happen with FEDEP and DSEEP (IEEE 2003, 2011). In particular, 
one of most successful attempts is embedded in the IEEE 1516.4 best practice; this 
document provides the description of all consequent conceptual phases of the 






Each phase is articulated into subsequent elementary activities which are then 
building the different chapters of the VV&A document: Accreditation plan, V&V 
plan, V&V report and Accreditation Report.  
 
 
Fig. 103 – DSEEP process for simulation interoperability (from HLA Tutorial 1.0, Pitch 
Technologies, Sweden 2002) 
 
The IEEE 1516.4 supports the process by providing a clear description of the 
temporal execution of the different V&V activities; vice versa, the MIL-STD-3022 
standard as well as the 5000.61 Instruction have been developed by the US M&S 
Coordination Office in order to provide templates of the different VV&A 
documents as well as lists for definitions and concepts to be elaborated during 
development of simulators and relative V&V. Both approaches are paying attention 
to support the coordination of the multitude of different actors usually involved in 
the development V&V and use of the simulators. Because of the similarity and the 
synergy between the 3022 and the 1516.4, the two document mostly complete each 
other, even though some differences are present making specific difference in the 
two approaches; the main is that the MIL STD 3022 is developed for Stand Alone 
Simulators, while FEDEP and DSEEP are mostly focused on VV&A of federations, 
i.e. networks of simulators. 
However, in order to be successful in VV&A it is fundamental to establish an 
effective and reliable cooperation among SME (Subject Matter Experts) covering 
the different simulation domains, and simulation development team in order to 
share knowledge and data as well as to interact during the development 
(Szczerbicka et al. 2000; Sarjoughian & Zeigler 2001a). In facts, it is not only 






important also to combine experience from operational people that served on the 
field and that could contribute in understanding the context and defining priorities 
for the different elements to models (Bruzzone et al. 2013a). In addition, a major 
requirement is related with the necessity to conduct joint VV&A on the whole 
simulator when made by different components, federates or objects; and this need to 
be done since the beginning of the simulation development and along its entire life 
cycle (Balci, 1994). This is due to the need to develop proper conceptual models 
(Validation) and to implement them correctly (Verification) keeping engaged the 
final users to generate trustiness on the Simulator (Accreditation). From this point 
of view data collection, knowledge acquisition and conceptual modelling are 
probably the key point on this process (Williams 1996; Amico, Guha, Bruzzone 
2000; Zacharewicz et al. 2008).  
On that regard, worth to mention is the concept of Simuland, which represents the 
pictures that experts have of the real system and that is used as mirror to develop the 
simulation conceptual model, even though sometimes not exact or complete 
(McLeod 1986). In facts, to complete V&V (Verification and Validation) of a 
model or simulator, it is required a real system as reference and the related data; 
however, this system is not directly measurable (e.g. because of fear present among 
the population), not very well known (e.g. an opponent weapon system or an 
emergent social behaviour) or even does not exist yet (e.g. the reliability of new 
doctrine). In all these cases, hypotheses should be adopted about the nature of the 
real system by generating an intermediate world, defined Simuland, used to create 
the simulation, that could introduce additional challenges (Bruzzone & Massei 
2017b). Actually it is almost impossible to know exactly a real system and even   
SMEs have just a partial knowledge of the scenario to be simulated together without 
reliable data, as both comes mostly from their field experience, in the case of the 
military. So, it could happen that along final phases of the simulation development 
process, new elements arise, improving the understanding of real system and so 
correcting the Simuland. Overall, SMEs transfer in their observations and 
recommendations concerning their field experience invariably their set of belief and 
value judgement that can introduce a bias; on that regard, scientist have the 
obligation to be aware of that when they draw their conclusion and implement the 
model, especially when the simulated phenomena belong to social and political 








Fig. 104- System, Simuland & Model respect VV&A 
 
All these aspects are generating a very complex context, remarkably in the case of 
simulation dealing with Human Behaviour, representing a major challenge, even 
though interesting experiences has been accumulated over the years (Cacciabue 
1998; Bocca et. al. 2006; Bruzzone et al. 2011b; Di Bella 2015). 
 
3.7.3 VV&A Methodology applied to SIMCJOH VIS & VIC 
 
The military industry has been relying more and more on M&S, especially when it 
comes to training, analysis and defence acquisition; so in order to guarantee that 
simulators are able to reproduce adequately the real system, validation and 
verification process are put in place (Kim et al. 2015). VV&A methodologies and 
procedures are fundamental in simulation over many different areas of application 
including military simulators for training of cadres (Zeltzer & Pioch 1996); 
furthermore, examples of VV&A activities exist in the context of industrial 
application of HBM (Aas et al. 2009; Song & Zhang 2010). In military simulation, 
statistical analysis and data validation must be integrated with military strategy and 
military tactic analysis in VV&A (Kim et al. 2015). In other words, quantitative and 
qualitative analysis skills are both required; the first coming from simulation 






In the proposed case study, which is SIMCJOH VIC & VIS, it was created a team 
composed by simulation scientists, V&V Agents, SMEs and military personnel 
devoted to cover the different aspects. The simulation adopted a MS2G (Modelling, 
interoperable Simulation and Serious Game) paradigm in order to be flexible for 
different use modes (Bruzzone et al. 2014a; 2014b), but in particular to support 
training. SIMCJOH is especially oriented to the evaluation of the impact of the 
decisions undertaken by the commander on human factors; in facts the human 
behaviour models are central in SIMCJOH VIS & VIC and proper VV&A has been 
required for successfully complete the project. The SIMCJOH VIS & VIC gave 
birth to very interesting opportunities for the application of different existing state 
of the art procedures and methodologies to drive the VV&A processes (Bruzzone et 
al.2017b). In the proposed case, the VV&A process regard HBM is complicated due 
to data availability and reliability, as well as to the uncertainty on human factors 
(Bruzzone 2014b). The V&V and Accreditation Agents have been appointed based 
on available resources among simulation experts, following the scheme proposed in 












During the early phases, it was necessary to review the Experimentation Plan for 
supporting VV&A and for defining: 
 
 Mission Environment 
 Terrain 
 Villages 
 Population Data 
 Coalition Data 
 OPFOR Data 
 LEGAD Constraints 
 Geo Political Conditions 
 Planning Elements 
 Tasks 
 Alternative COAs 
 Desired Final Effects 
 MOE/MOP 
 Metrics 
 Exercise Plan 
 
VV&A plan was executed by organizing meetings in order to identify errors and 
missed elements, as well as the testing procedures to be used on the models. 








Table 6- SIMCJOH  VV&A Plan 
 
Finally, the scenario was finalized - the case involving a squad seizure with 
media implication locally and domestically, with actions affecting population.  
Military SMEs and Simulation Scientists played the scenario over three full 
days, exploring every COA and the possible implications; it emerged, that the 






system complexity and cannot be overpassed by simulation or software solutions 
due to the dynamic nature of the mission environment and related data. In facts, 
the creation of the mission environment based on data and feedback provided by 
the users and the fine setting of variable lists and models carried out by VV&A 
pool during conceptual modelling and preliminary algorithms tests, allowed to 
identify the specific details for the experimentation. Concerning the VV&A of 
SIMCJOH VIS & VIC models, different techniques and methodologies have 
been used including face validation, review and walkthrough as well as dynamic 
techniques based on ANOVA, DOE & MSpE (Mosca et al. 1994; Montgomery 
2008). In order to verify user trustiness due to current data availability and 
experimentation plan, it was decided to carried out a technical and an 
operational V&V session based on sensitivity analysis devoted to provide a 
more detailed analysis on the correlations and impacts of the different factors as 
well as on simulator effectiveness. This phase has a great impact on simulation 
development process and it is usually based on reviewing documents with SMEs 
and to correlated them with original requirements, for instance if the case was 
carried out respect the original SIMCJOH VIS & VIC Simulator description. 
The definition of measures related to the human factors to be used for testing 
and experimentation resulted critical to finalize the experimental plan. For 
instance, it was decided to define key performance indexes including among the 
others: fear and aggressiveness level on the population, size of the 
demonstration, perception of deterrence by different parties, local and domestic 
media perception; some of these factors are real and measurable (e.g. number of 
people participating at the demonstration), others are just virtual, therefore their 
evolution along time and in relation with key events support the VV&A of the 
Simulators. 
A conceptual model walkthrough has been executed; such informal technique 
allows to review the proposed models to be used and implemented in the 
simulator by interacting with the SME. Considering the subject of HBM, this 
requires to adopt representations that should be easily implemented, but also 
intuitive for being accessible to psychology, sociology and military SME. In our 








Fig.106- VV&A Methodologies & Techniques 
 
As anticipated, the definition of Mission Environment and Scenario is 
fundamental and does not represent a limitation for the models and the 
simulators; vice versa the proper definition of these elements and related 
boundaries allows to conduct a reliable experimentation that could replicated 
with measurable Measures of Merits that allow to finalize VV&A in this 
framework considering the needs of Strategic Decision Makers. 
Data Collection Check was very critical, because in terms of population and 
related parameters, usually the information is pretty inhomogeneous and not 
aligned in terms of validity time and area. In addition, confidential aspects and 






decided to use just public domain data and it resulted critical to engage in the 
process the people actually in service in planning operations in the area; in this 
way it was possible to fine tune such data in consistency with realistic situations 
without using any sensible information. 
The use of SMEs allowed to execute the scenario before finalize the simulation 
development, in order to check conceptual interoperability among models and 
consistency among data and parameters. 
The techniques summarized in the table allowed to finalize technical aspects like 
Implementation Checks, Code Review and Debug, Single Model & Algorithm 
Face V&V and to arrive to an execution capability able to deal with SME face 
validation. Obviously the single model/algorithm V&V does not guarantee the 
simulation validity, therefore it is a useful corner stone to check proper 
implementation and remove doubts about some single elements before moving 
to integration testing and overall execution. In this phase the use of Animation, 
Virtual Reality and Dynamic Synoptic Representations is very important to be 
able to complete V&V of complex phenomena; SIMCJOH VIS for example, 
proposes a graphic representation (see figure below) including the human 
behaviour levels (e.g. fear, fatigue, aggressiveness, stress, deterrence perception, 
media attitudes), change speeds & accelerations, history as well as the factors 
contributing to their evolution.  
 






The Conceptual Model Validation represents a landmark in VV&A, allowing to 
check conceptual model development versus original requirements, considering 
data collected and knowledge acquired along development life cycle; these 
aspects turn even more mature as soon as single model tests allows to select the 
most promising solutions to implement the simulation. 
For what concern MSpE, DOE, ANOVA, such dynamic quantitative 
methodologies are fundamental to estimate experimental error and confidence 
bands considering the highly stochastic nature of the HBM; in this phase VV&A 
agents are involved on a technical basis, preparing all documentation required 
for the forthcoming accreditation procedures.  
The final step was devoted to finalize simulator accreditation by users and 
military experts, by distributing and analysing the experimental analysis results 
during an experimentation carried out directly by them. In SIMCJOH VIS & 
VIC the test took a whole day, and was repeated other times to engage other 
military subjects, resulting successful. SIMCJOH VIS &VIC Verification and 
Validation process passed with success the face validation of Models and GUI, 
and the project moved forward for the dynamic testing during the 
experimentation. The integration test on HLA models was successful passed; the 
functional tests as well as final experimentation resulted pretty satisfactory 
receiving very positive feedbacks from military SMEs. It is important to outline 
that the verification and validation based on experimental analysis was 
fundamental to create trustiness in the HBM embedded in SIMCJOH VIS & 
VIC. In facts the success of this aspects supported the fully achievement also of 
the whole SIMCJOH Project and its objectives. 
In conclusion, the VV&A methodology followed for the development of 
SIMCJOH adhered to the principles of: 
 reducing risks derived from poor decisions based on incorrect model and 
simulations (Kilikauskas & David, 2005); 
 reduce the probability that inappropriate application of M&S results for 
the specific intended use will produce unacceptable consequences to the 











Hybrid is not the New War. What it is new in warfare has been brought by 
globalization paired with the transition to the information age and rising 
geopolitical tensions, which have put new emphasis on hostilities that manifest 
themselves in a way that it is named “hybrid”. The seed of hybridization of 
conflicts, planted in 1999, germinated almost 20 years later; in such contest, 
conflicts are less and less driven by military means, so the comprehension of 
DIMEFIL & PMESII_PT dimensions are necessary in order to understand and 
subsequently model Hybrid Warfare.  
Hybrid Warfare is a deliberate choice of an aggressor. While militarily weak nations 
can resort to it in order to re-balance the odds, instead military strong nations 
appreciate its inherent effectiveness coupled with the denial of direct responsibility, 
thus circumventing the rules of the International Community (IC). From this point 
of view, the delivery of a considerable amount of damage across the DIMEFIL 
vectors against the opponent, could be viewed indeed by an aggressor as a 
fascinating opportunity. In order to be successful, Hybrid Warfare should consist of 
a highly coordinated, sapient mix of diverse and dynamic combination of regular 
forces, irregular forces (even criminal elements), cyber disruption etc., in order to 
achieve the desired effects against the entire PMESII_PT status of the opponent.  
However, the owner of the strategy, i.e. the aggressor, by keeping the threshold of 
impunity as high as possible and managing to decrease the willingness of the 
defender, can maintain his Hybrid Warfare at a diplomatically feasible level; so the 
model of the capacity, willingness and threshold, as proposed by Cayirci, Bruzzone, 
Longo and Gunneriusson (2016), remains critical to comprehend Hybrid Warfare.                   
Its dynamicity is able to capture the evanescent, blurring line between Hybrid 
Warfare and Conventional Warfare. In such contest time is the critical factor: this 
because it is hard to foreseen for the aggressor how long he can keep up with such 
strategy without risking either the retaliation from the International Community or 
the depletion of resources across its own DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT spectrum. Similar 
discourse affects the defender: if he isn’t able to cope with Hybrid Threats (i.e. 
taking no action), time works against him; if he is, he can start to develop counter 






medium long period, to an unforeseen (both for the attacker and the defender) 
escalation into a large, conventional, armed conflict.  
Examining the same phenomena, Balaban & Mielniczek (2018) developed a 
conceptual model for Hybrid Threats/Conflict/Warfare, which has the merit that it 
explains very clearly, by means of a Causal Loop Diagram, how Hybrid Warfare 
accumulates into a Hybrid conflict and how such conflict can reach the intensity of 
a Hybrid war; in their analysis, the strictness of law (whose content and meaning it 
is however subjected to a highly political controversial and divisive debate over the 
IC, as well as scrutiny of the public opinion within the single nations) defines the 
line between the Hybrid Conflict and Hybrid War.  
Throughout History, especially the most recent one, war and military operations 
have been rarely (almost never) purely kinetic. The performance of operations that 
required more than kinetic effects drove the development of DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT 
models and in turn this drive the development of Human Social Culture Behavior 
Modelling (HCSB), which should stand at the core of the Hybrid Warfare 
modelling and simulation efforts. Elaborating on this perspective, the ET 43 
conducted a survey of the current M&S tools available and meaningful toward 
Hybrid Warfare modelling. Even though the survey identified several gaps to be 
covered and the necessity of further inquiries, the outcome has been that multi-agent 
simulations are relevant in designing, analyzing and evaluating complex socio 
natural systems such as civil wars, political instability, economic development.  
From the survey emerged as well that the most innovative researches within 
modelling and simulation community could be strategic for addressing almost all 
the areas of different layers of Hybrid Warfare. Multi Layers models are 
fundamental to evaluate Strategies and Support Decisions: currently there are 
favorable conditions to implement models of Hybrid Warfare, such as 
CAPRICORN, DIES IRAE, SIMCJOH and TREX, in order to further develop tools 
and war-games for studying new tactics, execute collective training and to support 
decisions making and analysis planning. The proposed approach is based on the 
idea to create a mosaic made by HLA interoperable simulators able to be combined 
as tiles to cover an extensive part of the Hybrid Warfare, giving the users an 
interactive and intuitive environment based on the “Modelling interoperable 
Simulation and Serious Game” (MS2G) approach. From this point of view, the 






support population simulation as well as their native HLA structure, suggests to 
adopt them as core engine in this application field. 
However, it necessary to highlight that, when modelling DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT 
domains, the researcher has to be aware of the bias introduced by the fact that 
especially Political and Social “science” are mostly accompanied and built around 
value judgement. From this perspective, the models proposed by Cayirci, Bruzzone, 
Guinnarson (2016) and by Balaban & Mileniczek (2018) are indeed a courageous 
tentative to import, into the domain of particularly poorly understood phenomena 
(social, politics, and to a lesser degree economics - Hartley, 2016), the mathematical 
and statistical instruments and the methodologies employed by the pure, hard 
sciences. Nevertheless, just using the instruments and the methodology of the hard 
sciences it is not enough to obtain the objectivity, and is such aspect the 
representations of Hybrid Warfare mechanics could meet their limit: this is posed 
by the fact that they use, as input for the equations that represents Hybrid Warfare, 
not physical data observed during a scientific experiment, but rather observation of 
the reality that assumes implicitly and explicitly a value judgment, which could lead 
to a biased output. Such value judgement it is subjective, and not objective like the 
mathematical and physical sciences; when this is not well understood and managed 
by the academic and the researcher, it can introduce distortions - which are 
unacceptable for the purpose of the Science -  which could be used as well to 
enforce a narrative mainstream that contains a so called “truth”, which lies inside 
the boundary of politics rather than Science.   
Those observations around subjectivity of social sciences vs objectivity of pure 
sciences, being nothing new, suggest however the need to examine the problem 
under a new perspective, less philosophical and more leaned toward the practical 
application. The suggestion that the author want make here is that the Verification 
and Validation process, in particular the methodology used by Professor Bruzzone 
in doing V&V for SIMCJOH (2015) and the one described in the Modelling & 
Simulation User Risk Methodology (MURM) developed by Youngblood et al. 
(2018), could be applied to evaluate if there is a bias and the extent of the it, or at 
least making clear the value judgment adopted in developing the 
DIMEFIL/PMESII_PT models. Such V&V research is however outside the scope 
of the present work, even though it is an offspring of it, and for such reason the 






Then, the theoretical discourse around Hybrid Warfare has been completed 
addressing the need to establish a new discipline, Strategic Engineering, very much 
necessary especially now, because of the current a political and economic 
environment which allocates diminishing resources to Defense and Homeland 
Security (at least in Europe). Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Engineering are two flip 
of the same coin: complexity brought by the former can be dealt with the 
knowledge and tools gained from the latter. For this reason, Strategic Engineering 
can successfully address challenges, especially when coupled with the 
understanding and the management of the fourth dimension of military and hybrid 
operations, time. As elaborated by Leonhard and extensively discussed in the 
present work, addressing the concern posed by time is necessary for the success of 
any military or Hybrid confrontation.  
The SIMCJOH project, examined under the above perspective, proved that the 
simulator has the ability to address the fourth dimension of military and non-
military confrontation. In operations, time is the most critical factor during 
execution, and this was successfully transferred inside the simulator; as such, 
SIMCJOH in its HLA federation mode can be viewed as a training tool and as well 
a dynamic generator of events for the MEL/MIL execution during any CAX 
exercise. In conclusion, SIMCJOH project successfully faces new challenging 
aspects respect human behavior modelling, by developing new simulation models 
able to support Commanders and their Staff for training or decision making.  
Finally, the question posed by Leonhard in terms of recognition of the importance 
of time management of military operations - nowadays Hybrid Conflict - has not 
been answered yet; however, the author believes that Modelling and Simulation 
tools and techniques can represent the safe “recipient” where innovative scientific 















M&S tools relevant for Hybrid Warfare Modelling 
(Geller, 2016) 
 
Name Type Topics 
RTE Multi Agent 
Network Model 
of State Failure 
 State Failure 
 Lack of State Legitimacy 
 Province Secession 
 Hostility Tension 
 Corruption 
 Intergroup Conflicts 
 Link Terrorists and Weak States 
 Corruption 
 Cost Benefit Analysis 
 Real World Data Terrorist Level 
 Criminal Level 
 Foreign Military Aid Level 
 Lack of Services 
 Indonesia & Thailand case studies 
Senturion Game Theory 
Model 
 Game Theory based platform on 
Adversarial and Competitive Interaction 
 Spatial Bargaining 












 Multicultural Features 
 Multi-ethnic Features 
 Social and Human Model 
 Constructivist Identity Theory 
 Social Alienation 
 Regional Concentration 








AfriLand  Model of a 
region with Ten 
Neighbouring 
Polities 
 Sociocultural and Environmental Dynamic 
Analysis 
 Local HADR Scenario 
 East Africa Scenario 
 Connected to RebeLand 
RebeLand Island Polity 
Model 
 Socio-political Models 
 HADR 
 Local HADR Scenario 
 East Africa Scenario 
 Connected to AfriLand 
FactionSim Serious Game, 
Cultural 
Training  
 Generic Game Simulation for Social 
Science and Policymaker 
 South Asia, Middle East, Horn of Africa 
Scenario  
 Cognitive, Social and Economic Models 






 Generic Game Simulation for Social 
Science and Policymaker 
  South Asia, Middle East, Horn of Africa 
Scenario Cognitive 
 Social and Economic Models 






 Set of models and simulators such as: 
JCATS, Pythagoras, UOB DAT, XMT, 
Canadian Forces Landmine Dbase, XML 
Files 






 Combat Simulation 










 Opium Supply Chain Emergent Behaviour 
 Jirga Pashtun Scenarios 
 Human Behaviour Model 
 Tribal Society Model, 
 Scenarios in South Waziristan, 
Afghanistan 












 Afghanistan Political Economy Model 
 Country scale 
 Heterogeneous Population 
 Country-Scale Drug Process and 
Economy Simulation  
 Household-Resolution Multi-Agent 
Simulation 
 Rural Population Model 






 Object Oriented C++ Simulation 
 Air Campaign Model 
 Land Combat Model 








 Object Oriented C++ Simulation 
 Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
Model 
 Tactical Scale Agents non-interactive 
simulation  
 Diplomat and military components in non-
warfighting 








 GO & NGO entities 







StratMas Interacting War 
gaming 
Scenario 
 Game Environment for Command and 
Control Operation 
 Population Dynamics 
 Post-Conflict Reconstruction Afghanistan 
Scenario, Future Iraq Scenario 
PAX Multi Agent 
Model 
 Civilian Behaviour model 
 Psychological Driver Model 
 Peace keeping Operation Strategies 







 Model of Attitude and Opinion Diffusion 
in the Population 
 Social Judgement Theory 
 Attitude Change Model 







 HADR Planning 
 Short Term Planning 







 Different Parties Simulation 
 Integrated Natural Resources Management 
in Developing country and Context 
 Village Level Simulation 
 Thai and Vietnamese Scenario 
 Senegal and Easter Cameroun Scenario 
 Drug & Crime in Melbourne Scenario 
 Irrigation and Water Sharing  
PIOVRA  Intelligent 




 Poly-functional Intelligent Operational 
Virtual Reality Agents 
 Federated in HLA with JTLS and IA-CGF 
 Intelligent Agents 
 Human Behaviour Modelling 
 Civil Disorders Simulation 






 Domestic Riots and Middle East Disorder 
Scenario 




 Psychological Operations and Weapons: 
Evaluation by Robust Simulation  
 Human Behaviour Models 
 PSYOPS 
TRAMAS 




 Transportation Management & Simulation 
Katrina Like Crisis Simulation 
 An Entire State Simulation: 
Transportation Layer 
 Respect of Public Directive based on 
Human Behaviour Models 
 State Disaster Simulation 
 Katrina Hurricane Scenario 




 Modelling Supply Chain Attack 
 Food Contamination and Population Fear 
 Fear and Saturation Dynamics 
 Media Countermeasure Effectiveness 




 Pandemic Dynamic Objects Reactive 
Agents  
 Pandemics Dynamics 
 Human Behaviour Model of Population 
 Quarantine Directive and HBM 
 H1N1 Australia Scenario 




 Riots   
 Agitators & Terrorists  
 Warlord Models 










 Intelligent Agents Computer Generated 
Forces  
 Interoperable HLA Simulation 
 Psychological and Sociological Models 
 Multiresolution from Individuals to 
Interest Groups 
 Human Behaviour Modelling 
 Population Simulation 
 Entity Modules, Human Modifiers & NCF 
(Non- Conventional Frameworks) for 
specific Scenarios 
 Multiple Scenario in Asia, Europe & 
Africa 




 CIMIC And Planning Research In 
Complex Operational Realistic Network 
 CIMIC Models 
 PSYOPS Models 
 Human Behaviour Models 
 Environmental Conditions Models 
 Population Modelling 
 Individual and People Models 
 Interest Group Models 
 HLA Native Simulation 
 CAPRICORN Federation 
 Kapisa Afghanistan Scenario 




 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 C2 Agility Model 
 Multiple Actors (e.g. NATO, EU, ВМФ 
России, Local Coast Guards, etc.) 
 Maritime Interdiction and Social Context 
 Cyber Defence Model 












 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Simulation of Earthquake (2010 Haiti 
scenario) 
 Psychological and Social Models 
 Food, Water and Health Care Needs 









 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Looting in Urban Environments 
 Riots and Civil Disorders 
 Human Behaviour Models 




  Psychological and cultural Simulation of 
Population  
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation 
 Population modelling for Villages, Towns 
and Provinces 






  Computer Generated Forces & C4 for 
Italian Army 
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Human Behaviour Modifiers 
 Asymmetric Warfare 
 NATO Net-centric Multi Level Maturity 
C2  
 Population Generation and Simulation 
 Village Simulation 
 Multiplayer Simulation (ANA, ANP, 
Coalition, Insurgent) 
 HLA Federation with IA-CGF NCGs and 







 Zabul Province and Afghanistan Scenario 




  Dynamic Targeting Collateral Damages 
and Consequences  
 Joint Fire and Intelligence Branch (JFIB) 
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation 








 Intelligence Agent Computer Generated 
Forces UAV and Counter-Insurgency  
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent 
 COIN Models  
 Desert Area and Village Simulation 
 Saharan Area Scenario  




 Simulation of Multi Coalition Joint 
Operations involving Human Modelling - 
Virtual Interoperable Simulation & 
Virtual Interoperable Commander   
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Human Behaviour Modelling and Multi 
Coalition Model in Virtual Interoperable 
Simulator (SIMCJOH VIS) 
 VIC Serious Games federated with 
Simulator  
 Communication Models in Simulation of 
Communication (SC) and Scenario 
Generator and Animator (SGA) 
 Entity Level Simulation in GESI 
 HLA Federation 











  Threat network simulation for REactive 
eXperience  
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Simulation of Town and Villages 
 Human Behaviour Models 
 Cyberspace Simulation 
 Critical Infrastructure and Commodity 
Layers Simulation (e.g. Water, Power) 
 Thread Network and Asymmetric Warfare 
 Hybrid Actions and Event 
 Tested on Desert District Scenario 




  Joint Environment for Serious Games  
Simulation and Interoperability  
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Simulation of Autonomous Systems and 
Traditional Asset 
 Cyberspace Simulation 




  Immersive Disaster Relief and 
Autonomous System Simulation   
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Simulation of Accidents Nuclear Plant and 
Chemical Facility  
 CBRN  
 Ukraine Scenario 
MOSES  Stochastic 
Simulation 
  Modelling Sustainable Environments 
through Simulation  
 Stochastic Simulation 
 Environmental Models 
 Urban Development Model 






 Coastal Scenarios 
SPIDER  Interoperable 
and Immersive 
CAVE 
  Simulation Practical Immersive Dynamic 
Environment for Reengineering  
 Interactive Common Environment to 
Supervise Complex Simulation 
 Interoperable HLA Simulation 
 Cooperative Environment 




  Incidents & Emergencies Simulation 
Interoperable Relief Advanced Evaluator 
 IA-CGF Intelligent Agent, HLA 
Simulation  
 Logistics and Transportation Models 
 Population Models 
 Human Behaviour Models 
 HADR Models  





 Conceptual Model 
 Montecarlo Techniques 
 Capacity, Willingness, Threshold in 
Hybrid Warfare 
 Religious and Ethnical Country Divisions 
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